THE CHARACTER OF CURRICULUM STUDIES

Bildung, *Currere*, and the Recurring Question of the Subject

WILLIAM F. PINAR

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

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Dedicated to Alan A. Block

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Preface

The powers that generate and support the good as experienced and as ideal, work within as well as without.

John Dewey (1962 [1934], 54)

Curriculum studies is an interdisciplinary academic field devoted to understanding curriculum. In its early decades, the field was characterized by a strongly ameliorative orientation,[1] devoted to improving the school curriculum. In the United States, efforts to improve the curriculum focused, at various times, on its structures, both its internal structures (e.g., school subjects, their content and sequencing, and assessment) and its external structures (e.g., the alignment of the curriculum with the world beyond the school). During the great progressive experiment during the 1930s known as the Eight-Year Study (as we will see in chapter 5), the school subjects were expanded, as history was recast as social studies, incorporating material from the various social sciences.[2]

Various tracts were written urging the structural alignment of the school curriculum with society, the latter sometimes very broadly conceived as "adult activities" (in the case of Franklin Bobbitt: 1918, 153–154) and sometimes more narrowly conceived as economic expectations, even actual job preparation. In both instances, it was often imagined that such alignment followed from understanding schooling as preparation for life (Bobbitt 1918, 18). In the United States, this has included an ongoing effort to coordinate the curriculum with questions of democracy, both in terms of its content and its processes, often intersecting concerns (Dewey 1916). William Heard Kilpatrick (1918) argued that encouraging students—alone and with others—to reconstruct the curriculum after projects of their own choosing, under the guidance of experienced teachers, not only enabled students to pursue their own interests (thus making learning more enjoyable, presumably) but also taught the democratic values of initiative, cooperation, and curiosity, qualities he summarized as

"purposeful activity" (1918, 4).[3] Critical of such curriculum organized around students' interests or children "needs," George Counts demanded during the 1930s that teachers convey democratic ideas that would enable students to reconstruct the social order (see Perlstein 2000, 51). At almost the same time Joseph Schwab argued for the educational significance of class discussion, not just the simple exchange of ideas but an ongoing focused deliberation[4] that yielded insights that only concentration and focused dialogue could yield (Schwab 1978, 35; Block 2004, 54; Levine 2007, 116).

Others—especially Ralph Tyler (1949)—focused less on what was taught than how whatever was to be learned was to be assessed, a practice that told teachers what students had failed to learn. While establishing objectives had for decades been assumed to constitute the starting point of curriculum development, Tyler tied objectives to assessment, and in doing so, recast teaching as implementation. This simple but devastating demotion eradicates academic—intellectual—freedom, one indispensable prerequisite for teaching.

These efforts at improving the school curriculum were presumably in the service the "individual." It was the individual who was said to benefit from improving the curriculum, important because it was the individual who was the engine of the American economy, itself—so-called free-market capitalism—understood to be the cornerstone of American democracy. Who was this "individual" for whom the school curriculum was designed? What was his gender, his race, and his socioeconomic class?[5] Do not these concepts themselves de-individuate the person as singular, unique, and original? If, as William E. Doll, Jr. (Trueit in press) has suggested, the "ghost" in the US school curriculum is "control," does this determination to control imply that the "individual" was an unruly creature requiring, in a common image of the 1920s, reassembling (as in mass industrial production) so that social efficiency and/or social reconstruction would follow?

During the 1930s, when the Progressive Education Association undertook one of the great American experiments in public education: the Eight-Year Study, a sustained and systematic effort was made to comprehend the human subjects of education. Under Caroline Zachry's[6] leadership, composite portraits of various students were composed that, in their summary form, sometimes seem questionable, especially when describing students' bodies and reporting personal matters (see Zachry 1968 [1940], 519). This questionably expansive interest in students' character and experience—now it often takes the form of ethnographical studies—remains sometimes prurient today.[7]

In certain ethnographies, efforts to understand the "individual" risk reducing those studied to their circumstances or to their point for the investigator.[8] These failures represent not only the misapplication of method but also an impoverishment of theory and ignorance of the disciplinary history. Under these conditions, ethnography often fails to tell us anything we did not already know.[9]

The impoverishment of theory[10] and ignorance of the field's intellectual history[11] have plagued curriculum studies for decades. The ameliorative orientation predisposes practitioners toward "action," itself often conceived in behavioral rather than intellectual terms. Theory and history are prominent among the casualties of an ameliorative orientation focused on outcomes, often quantified in (now standardized) test scores, or qualified as platitudes such as "social justice." In its eagerness to improve the school curriculum, curriculum studies has, as a field, devalued, even ignored, those intellectual resources that might have enabled it to do so. That missed opportunity at curriculum improvement may not present itself again in the foreseeable future, as five decades of school "reform" have sidelined curriculum specialists as major players in US school curriculum improvement.

In its preoccupation with improvement, then, the academic—often university based—field of curriculum studies in the United States has not only overlooked the centrality of theory and history to its intellectual advancement. Relatedly, it has also overlooked the subject, in curriculum studies a double entendre, referencing not only the school subject (and its referent, the academic discipline) but also the individual person. The former has been the subject of systematic attention, including study of the history of school subjects, showing that their content, justification, and significance have altered significantly over the past century (Goodson 2005, 54–67).

Despite an unending affirmation of the "individual," it has been the individual who remains missing in action. Implied (as unruly or ignorant or self-directing) and sometimes subsumed in the category of the social (as in "at risk" or elite youth) or the cultural (as Asian or African American or "white"), the "individual" has often been rendered a rhetorical device rather than the enduring if ever-changing multivariate site of educational experience (Autio 2006a, 106, 109). Certainly the human subject has been split from the school subject, which gets construed as "content" someone "teaches" or "learns," but—in the United States at least—has rarely been understood to provide the forms through which the human person achieves singularity and social commitment.

Organization of the Book

Each idea somehow defines a particular semantic space, the original place from which one of the fundamental questions humanity keeps returning to arises.

Stéphane Mosès (2009 [1992], 73)

Unless you started reading here, you know already that in the preface I provide—in very summary form—the disciplinary context in which the question of the subject reoccurs. In the introduction that follows I define key concepts, including those comprising the title and subtitle. I suggest their interrelations. Understanding curriculum—the aspiration of curriculum studies, presented in the opening sentence of the preface—may seem a straightforward affair, but each concept enjoys a long history with multiple at times dissonant meanings. I will concentrate on their interrelation, as the character of curriculum is defined in no minor way by the strategies employed to understand it. That third term in the title—character—also conveys multiple meanings, several of which are telling to the effort to understand curriculum. I explain how in the introduction and again in the epilogue.

The concepts in the subtitle focus further my effort to characterize curriculum studies. The subject—in both its meanings as person and as school subject—has been central to rather different conceptions of education: *Bildung* and *currere*. *Bildung* is sometimes translated from the German as "edification" and sometimes as "liberal education." It refers, Gert Biesta (2003, 62) explains, to the "cultivation" of the "inner life," for example, the "soul," the "mind," the "person," and her or his "humanity." *Bildung* is a centuries-old tradition—Paul Standish (2003, vii) locates its origins in "medieval mysticism" but Biesta (2003, 62) attributes it to ancient Greece—with a voluminous literature that has not played a major role in US curriculum studies. Why? For now suffice to say that the ameliorative orientation—improving both the content of the school subjects as well as aligning them with social and economic objectives—has meant that the "individual" has devolved into a functional category whose significance is his or her role in society or the economy, not his or her significance culturally or spiritually or subjectively.

The Latin root of curriculum, *currere*[12] is relatively recent in US curriculum studies. It is a concept I invoked 40 years ago to underline the significance of the individual's experience of the school curriculum, whatever the course content or its alignment with society or the economy. Autobiography provided the theory and practice for

emphasizing one's own lived experience, enabling the individual to exist apart from institutional life, creating distance from the everyday for the sake of self-reflection and understanding. Recently, I have refocused autobiography from self-study to self-expressivity through academic knowledge directed to, informed by, the world.[13] The world was always the source of lived experience, but early on I underemphasized the world in order to articulate the singularity and specificity of lived experience. I positioned the world as "ground" and the individual as "figure" in part as a tactic against the conflation of the two, against narcissism and conformity. Cultivating such noncoincidence can support the cultivation of virtue, key to a self-conscious and chosen commitment to others.

That is one meaning of "character" in the dictionary's terms: for example, as "moral excellence and firmness" (*Webster's*, 187). Associated with these ideals, academic study—not cramming for exams but a spiritually enhancing subjective engagement with academic knowledge—provides opportunities to reconstruct one's experience, in the process changing oneself and in some (not always) small way the social world one inhabits. While solitary, study—the very site of education—is inevitably, sometimes overwhelmingly, social. It is informed by others, including those long deceased and by those we imagine might follow us. The running of the course—*currere*—implies a conversation complicated with multiple interlocutors, multiple references, and temporal moments, as well as almost infinite possibilities, not a few of them awful. This last fact requires us to reconstruct the character of complicated conversation as ethical.

Despite the centrality of the ethical subject to curriculum studies, it has been marginalized in the United States by decades of preoccupation with the politics of the curriculum. Imported from the United Kingdom, US scholars who had come of age during the 1960s—accented by anti–Vietnam War protests and civil rights struggles—brought the primacy of the political to the study of the curriculum. In the opening chapter, I chronicle this development, following the theoretical throughline from the so-called new sociology in the 1960s through to contemporary "critical pedagogy." Assumed from the outset was a standpoint free of ideological interpellation from which critics could observe and explain the workings of power throughout the school system, including—especially—in the curriculum, even though this was consistently characterized as "hidden." The "I" presuming to see the totality of the social remained unaddressed, despite invitations, even demands, to include it as implicated in any analysis of power.

While political theorists and self-styled activists declined to include themselves in the world they were critiquing, several of us did, embracing first philosophical traditions like phenomenology and existentialism, then psychoanalytic theory, then literary theory—and specifically autobiography—to problematize the subject occluded by political analysis. The inseparability of the social and the subjective has been clear to political activists outside curriculum studies, and in the second chapter, I chronicle one important antecedent example: Frantz Fanon. While focused on psychiatry, then on political revolution, Fanon's formation was informed by phenomenology, existentialism, and psychoanalysis, and structured by his lived experience as a man of African descent. The recurring question of the subject for Fanon was the question of interpellation: how to decolonize those who had internalized the racial hatred and cultural superiority of those who had dominated them.

The character of curriculum studies is simultaneously social and subjective, focused on power and psyche, the social and the solitary, forefronting the subjective and social reconstruction decolonization demands. Such ongoing ethical self-encounter threatens to disappear in the contemporary cult of multiculturalism, one of the keywords of our era. Its intellectual isolation from curriculum studies has signaled its devolution into identity politics, reducing the multivariate self-constituting social subject to the culture from which one comes and to which, evidently, one is to be returned, through the study of presumably culturally appropriate materials and ideas taught in culturally responsive fashion. In chapter 3, I affiliate multiculturalism with nationality and internationalism, specifically cosmopolitanism, underlining its significance as a curricular concept.

This significance is not only cultural and national, it is also historical, both in the sense of being located in a certain historical moment that forms in particular places, but as well as in the sense of "becoming historical," for example, attuning oneself to what is at stake in the present (Toews 2004). Such attunement requires acknowledgment of the subject as historical, as embodying those issues and injuries inherited from the past. Subjective engagement with the social and the cultural for the sake of self-formation comprises one meaning of *Bildung* that I discuss in chapter 4. One hundred years ago, Americans traveled to Germany (see Pinar et al. 1995, 80; Autio 2006a, 104) to study concepts of education. It seems to me it is time again to selectively incorporate German concepts[14] in North American practices of education.

The reciprocity of social and subjective reconstruction was acknowledged in the Eight-Year Study. The occasion—each of these chapters started from specific occasions, disclosing what I take to be the inevitable historicality of curriculum—was the publication of an important new study of the project (Kridel and Bullough 2007), one that disclosed cripplingly contradictory currents within the study, prominent among them the dissonance between curriculum reform as *reorganization* rather than intellectual *reconstruction*. I specify the distinction and consider its consequences.

Although eclipsed today by the federal government's insistence on student scores on standardized exams as the only indication of learning, for centuries the imagination has been regarded as central to the question of education. In recent decades Kieran Egan, Elliot Eisner, and Maxine Greene have been among those who have acknowledged—indeed embraced—the centrality of the imagination to educational experience. In chapter 6, I address the question of the imagination in the aesthetic education of the human subject through the work of Maxine Greene, focusing on her 20 years of talks to teachers given at the Lincoln Center in New York City.

In the final chapter, I portray the educational experience of the subject as she—the subject is the Chinese scholar Hongyu Wang who works in the United States—finds her way through Foucault and Kristeva to Confucius. While the sequence of her study is not that linear or only in that direction, what becomes clear is that one can reconstruct oneself through academic study that incorporates subjectivity and sociality as lived through and rearticulated as intellectual life history and self-understanding.[15] In the educational experience of this actually existing individual, we glimpse the study of curriculum as lived, as complicated conversation among self, society, history, and culture.

In the conclusion—the epilogue—I return to the keywords,[16] reviewing how they have become clarified through these specific studies, and suggesting how they might be pursued for the sake of the disciplinary development of the field and the improvement of school curriculum. I do so in part to demonstrate how curriculum studies—and the school curriculum itself—are complicated conversation. Solitary study reactivates that conversation, as one reconsiders one's reading and writing in contexts of ongoing sometimes contentious discussion. In so doing, one reconstructs that conversation and oneself through dialogical encounter with others, returning, in different moments in different places to the key curriculum

question: *what knowledge is of most worth*? Our individual answers will vary, as the historical moment requires, but its incessant asking refocuses our study, reengages our attention, stimulating us to address the reality of the world. That subjectively situated, historically attuned intellectual engagement structures the character of curriculum studies.

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Finally I thank Alan Block, whose friendship and colleagueship has meant to much to me for so many years. I dedicate this book to you.

William Pinar

Introduction

The first critical task of genealogy, then, involves distancing oneself from the institution, morality, or worldview that is investigated.

John S. Ransom (1997, 80)

Curriculum is a complicated *conversation*. Structured by guidelines, focused by objectives, and overdetermined by outcomes, the US school curriculum struggles to remain conversation. It is conversation—efforts at understanding through communication—among students and teachers, actually existing individuals in certain places on certain days, simultaneously personal and public. The fact that students and teachers are individuals complicates conversation considerably, and often in welcomed ways, as each person brings to whatever is being studied his or her own prior knowledge, present circumstances, interest, and yes, disinterest. Students' speech and writing enable teachers to assess where the classroom conversation is, what might happen next, and what needs to be reviewed or sometimes sidestepped. Add to these the locale or region where the curriculum is enacted, the nation (its history and present circumstances), the state of the planet, expressed as specifically and mundanely as the weather (with catastrophic climate change threatening us all), and one begins to appreciate just how complicated the conversation about the school curriculum is, can be, and must remain. There is as well the fact of the individual school, although that institution has often been overemphasized in efforts to improve the curriculum. It is the lived experience[1] of curriculum—*currere*, the running of the course—wherein the curriculum is experienced, enacted, and reconstructed.

The verb form (*currere*) is preferable because it emphasizes the lived rather than the planned curriculum, although the two are intertwined. The verb emphasizes action, process, and experience in contrast to the noun, which can convey stipulation and completion. While every course ends, the consequences of study are ongoing, as they are social and subjective as well as intellectual. The running of the course—*currere*—occurs through conversation, not only classroom discourse,

but also dialogue among specific students and teachers and within oneself in solitude. Because the running of the course occurs socially and subjectively through academic study, the concept of *currere* forefronts the meaning of the curriculum as complicated conversation encouraging educational experience. Indeed, *currere* emphasizes the everyday experience of the individual and his or her capacity to learn from that experience; to reconstruct experience through thought and dialogue to enable understanding. Such understanding, achieved by working through history and lived experience, can help us reconstruct our own subjective and social lives. We can be changed by what we study, but the pronoun is relevant (Winch 2008, 295), as the "I" is a "we," and the "we" is a series of "I's." For Michael Uljens (2003, 46), "[T]he pedagogical paradox is related to the *subjectivity* of the individual: for learning to be possible there must not only *be* a *somebody* whose reflection is stimulated but also a *somebody* whom the individual *becomes*—that is, there must be the idea that the person in some sense *comes into being* through education." In my terms, educational experience enables subjective and social reconstruction.[2]

Curriculum conceived as a verb—*currere*—privileges the concept of the *individual* in curriculum studies. It is a complicated concept in itself. Each of us is different, meaning we each have a different makeup, genetically, as well as different upbringings, families and caretakers, significant others, and, more broadly still, in terms of race, class, and gender, inflected by place, time, and circumstances. Informed by culture and by other often homogenizing forces, each of us is, or can be, distinctive. Indeed, we can cultivate that distinctiveness. We can become individualists, committed to actualizing whatever independence we experience and can muster in order to pursue courses of action (including thinking) that we choose as significant. As we will see in chapter 4, the concept of *Bildung* underlines as it complicates this meaning of the individual as self-formation through education.[3]

Bildung

> *The elevation of the independent, creative, autonomous individual is the heart of the project.*
>
> *Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 76)*

Declared by some to be among the casualties of postmodernism (Peukert 2003, 105)—wherein so-called master narratives[4] like "progress" are dumped in conceptual landfills (Marshall 1997, 64;

Autio 2003, 323)—*Bildung* enjoys a remarkable resilience, in part due to its malleability (Baker 2001, 360, 418 n. 73). The contemporary concept starts in the eighteenth century (Løvlie and Standish 2003, 4; Nordenbo 2003, 27), when the formation of the individual was associated with an aesthetic education, a concept with religious connotations.[5] It was this view of individuality—"different from the competitive individualism of liberal economics and politics," Luft (2003, 15) emphasizes—that was "at the heart of the religion of humanity that emerged out of the German Enlightenment in the work of Goethe, Schiller, Lessing and Humboldt." Individuality was, then, not an anatomical given; it was a spiritual-intellectual possibility that required cultivation. Self-formation required, Rauch (2000, 107) points out, participation in one's traditions, enabling one to interpret experience as cultural and historical. An aesthetic education, she continues, meant the sculpting of the imagination and interpretation through art, for example, the cultivation of judgment and pleasure. By the time the historian George Mosse (2000, 184) encountered the concept, it meant the "usual humanist education which in Germany conferred social status." As he studied the origins of *Bildung*, however, Mosse (2000, 184) found it very different from the "rote learning" and "strict obedience to rules" demanded by his teachers at the Gymnasium he had attended as a boy in Berlin.

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) is "inseparably connected" with the formulation (at the beginning of the nineteenth century) of the concept *Bildung*, or "self-cultivation" (Bruford 2009 [1975], 1). Humboldt positioned the individual at the center of the educational process (Nordenbo 2003, 29); it was the individual who, Mosse summarizes, through "constant self-education, could realize the image of his own perfection, which every person carried within him (2000, 184). In addition to this forefronting of self-directed self-reflective study, "education was to be an open-ended process without set goals, except for each individual striving to perfect himself" (2000, 184). In his *German Jews beyond Judaism* (1985), Mosse shows how German Jews internalized this idea—making it a "vibrant heritage"—while many non-Jewish Germans forgot *Bildung*'s emphasis on "individualism and open-endedness" (2000, 184). From the "very beginning," Mosse (2000, 184–185) concludes, "this ideal, despite its open-endedness, was restricted by incorporating respectability and citizenship as unquestioned virtues, and thus it contained the seeds of its own foreclosure." Robert Musil (1990, 259) was even more cynical, judging in 1934 that "classicism's ideal of education [*Bildung*] was largely replaced by the idea of entertainment, even if it was entertainment with a patina of art."

Theodor Adorno agreed (see Løvlie and Standish 2003, 1). *Bildung* had devolved into distraction, ornamentation, and pretension (see Gay 2001 [1968], 60), self-formation recoded as social conformity[6] that left it vulnerable to political co-optation (Baker 2001, 372, 413).

How did self-formation become conflated with social conformity? The individual, Daniel Tröhler (2003, 759) explains, was no empirical fact, but a spiritual possibility, realizable through "effort and self-cultivation, or *Bildung*." Integral to this realization, moreover, was the spiritual life of the "ethnocultural nation" (2003, 759). The individual can realize himself only through his culture and its people—the German *Volk* (2003, 759), defined sometimes linguistically, sometimes racially. "To be free," Tröhler (2003, 760) summarizes, "meant the embedding of the individual into the harmonious beauty of the whole." Likewise, the project of culture was always linked to the development of the nation-state," Guillory (2002, 27) points out, "and that culture, despite its invocation of universalist values, was to be realized in the form of *national culture*."

Culture, not politics, played the major role in the history of *Bildung*, as culture represented the ideal, even the spiritual, while politics conveyed vulgarity and corruption.[7] To illustrate this distinction, Peter Gay (1978, 4) quotes Friedrich Schlegel who, in 1800, advised, "Do not waste faith and love on the political world, but offer up your innermost being to the divine world of scholarship and art, in the sacred fire of eternal *Bildung*." Having earlier affirmed this view (in his 1918 *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man*), Thomas Mann famously reversed himself in 1922, endorsing parliamentary democracy as integral to self-formation (see Gay 2001 [1968], 74; Weitz 2007, 254–55). The admired novelist—in W. H. Bruford's (2009 [1975], 226) assessment, "the representative of the best German thought and feeling, the enduring German conscience, in the most disturbed and tragic half-century of German history"—now counseled students (in Gay's 2001 [1968], 142 words) to have "patience" and to acquire an "appreciation of the true freedom that comes with rationality and discipline," a courageous condemnation of German youth's seduction by the cult of the irrational, including in politics, most pointedly by the Nazis. After Hitler's success in the elections of 1930, Mann issued "An Appeal to Reason" in October 1930 at a meeting in Berlin, which only police protection prevented the Nazis from turning violent (see Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg 1995, 145).

Despite its displacement in some countries by traditional US curriculum theory,[8] in recent years, *Bildung* has enjoyed something of a revival, thanks in part due to its wedding with democratization

(Gundem, Karseth, and Sivesind 2003, 529; Løvlie, Klaus, and Nordenbo 2003; Kincheloe 2007, 33). Without *Bildung*, Karsten Schnack (2003, 272) asserts, democracy is an "empty shell, a procedure or form of government." Without democracy, he adds, *Bildung* becomes "reduced to what the leaders of the hour have defined as highbrow culture and good manners" (2003, 272). Commitments to inner development and social democracy are juxtaposed in my conception of curriculum as lived experience: *currere.*

Currere

> *Justice was then not only an arrangement to be realized in any given society, but also a state of the individual which was called a virtue.*
>
> *George Grant (1986, 54)*

While distinctive, then, the individual is comprised of material shared with others. Flesh and blood most materially, but ideas and emotion also come from others; however, they are reconstructed through our individual and socially mediated experience of them. We seek clarification of these domains of imprinting, influence, and resemblance through reflection upon them and through conversation with others. That conversation with others is complicated by the fact of our, and their, individuality, their differing generational, genetic, and cultural locations. It seems we share experience but that experience is always inflected by these separate locations, in historical time and geographical place, and by our distinctive experience of these. The reverberating fact that we are each individuals—however differently—separates us from each other, but it is also what connects us to each other. What we have in common, Kaja Silverman (2009, 4) suggests, is this shared experience of "finitude." Each of us has a life; each of us dies.

Death provides focus for living. If it seems near-at-hand, death can provide urgency. That sense that each of us has a life, that it is of limited duration, is a fact we share not only with every other human being, but also with every living creature. As Silverman (2009, 4) appreciates, "[F]initude is the most capacious and enabling of the attributes we share with others, because…it connects us to *every* other being." This is, in William E. Doll Jr.'s terms, the relationality of life, and this realization characterizes the relationality of curriculum. While we usually think of the curriculum as divided into different courses and concepts, we can also think of it as a "totality," as a "vast, unauthorized book" (Silverman 2009, 9) still being written,

including ourselves and individual lives. Studying the curriculum, then, connects us to everyone else, "not *in spite of* the particularities of their lives but rather *through* them" (2009, 9). The fact that conversation is, then, complicated is not only a pedagogical problem but also an educational opportunity to understand difference within resemblance, and not only across our species but also within life on earth, as well as within our own individuality, as subjectivity itself is an ongoing conversation (Reichenbach 2003, 101).

The school subjects themselves codify *conversation*, especially when they are summarized in linear logical fashion in textbooks. The curriculum is a conversation complicated by the singularity of teachers and students, and necessarily so. Teachers cannot teach unless they express themselves through the school subjects they love and feel committed to explain to those often not eager to leave the confines of what they know already. It is this psychological resistance built into the core of study and learning that positions as primary the relationship teachers can forge with students. Only if class size is sufficiently small, and only if the curriculum enables teachers to incorporate their subjective investments and encourage those of their students can such relationships—threaded through the school subjects—form and be expressed. This fact suggests the educational significance of orality (Pinar 2012, 175).

Even when they are avowedly interdisciplinary, the school subjects draw upon the academic disciplines as they are advanced at universities. The academic disciplines represent ongoing conversation among scholars and researchers working with concepts and problems discovered and created by their predecessors, prompted by present circumstances, perhaps even governmental priorities. Often considered to be a series of disciplines separate from human interests, even science is structured by these. Moreover, each academic discipline—like biology or chemistry, to which the school subjects correspond—itself represents an interdisciplinary configuration that changes over time. As Anderson and Valente (2002, 4) remind, "[D]isciplinarity was always interdisciplinarity." There is no "pure" school subject to be transmitted uncontaminated by those who study and participate in it. That does not mean there are no essential facts in each discipline—what we can call "canonicity" (Anderson and Valente 2002, 13)—but it does mean that these are to be engaged, even translated, if they are to be understood.

While not necessarily its outcome, *understanding* is the raison d'être of the curriculum. Understanding is intellectual, and we work toward it through our minds. These days we are reminded regularly

that those minds are housed in our brains and our brains are in our bodies, so we are quite clear that understanding is simultaneously intellectual and emotional, and that it is always embodied, the latter not only conceived as biological and neurological but also as immanent. That means that understanding is individual and social, directed to the present (including our fantasies of the future we experience in the present) as it is informed by the past. In the simultaneity of its sources and the multiplicity of its aspirations, understanding becomes allegorical, "an emotional writing," Rauch (2000, 129) explains, "that transforms the signs into a mentality or spirit in the effect of the historic remnants on the individual mind." Emotion is not sufficient, of course, as one cannot experience one's historicity without factual knowledge of the past, but, Rauch (2000, 130) continues,

> What the allegorical intends is not the static knowledge of things but the productive imagination of the individual which can associate and create new ideas about a different and better historical setting. The impact of allegory on cognition causes a constant transformation of attitudes and thoughts about reality.

Juxtaposing facts and lived experience in creative tensionality—in part because "allegory expresses the impossibility of a perfect unity between image and concept" (Jay 1993c, 112)—can trigger transformation. The curriculum recasts intellectual, psychological, and physical facts as allegorical. The world to which the curriculum provides passage is simultaneously empirical and poetical, phenomenological and historical.

The complicated character of understanding has meant that at different times and places we have conceived of communication as only cognitive and at other times as primarily emotional, but each is always historical.[9] It is, of course, both of these at once, if in varying degrees according to subject matter, again understood as a double entendre. In a letter written to his wife in June 1909, Gustav Mahler depicted "reason"[10]—the means of the intellect—as "the limited but necessary means for communicating with the phenomenal world" (McGrath 1974, 124). He wrote:

> The rational, that is to say, that which can be analyzed by the understanding, is almost always the inessential and actually a veil which disguises the form. But insofar as a soul needs a body—there is nothing that can be said against that—the artist must pick out his means for presentation from the rational world. (quoted in McGrath 1974, 124)

As William McGrath (1974, 120) points out, Mahler aspired to express "metaphysical concepts in musical terms," but reason was required not only for such complex composition, but also for expressing in language the content of his music.[11]

In our time this dualism—between mind and body (Bordo 1993)—seems to have been settled in the body's favor. We are, it seems, our bodies. Is it capitalism that has made materialists of us all? Ocularcentrism is in play here of course, although its association with science—and racism—complicates speculations regarding its role in the present cultural privileging of material objects.[12] While there may be no homunculus inside the body, no separate soul imprisoned in the flesh, the body does not coincide with itself. This structural noncoincidence[13] is the space and time of subjectivity. In that time[14] and space,[15] characterizing the body and its being-in-the-world, one knows one is alive. One becomes aware that one is undergoing experience in all its multidimensionality and elusiveness (Jay 2005). It is the structural noncoincidence of the alive body—the time and space of subjectivity—that invites us to experience *experience*, for example, to remember what we have undergone, to forget what we cannot bear to remember, and to understand what we can recall and feel compelled to comprehend. It is subjectivity wherein we begin to know ourselves and the world we inhabit and that inhabits us, for example, "the historicity of understanding" (Rauch 2000, 129).

Self-knowledge—know thyself[16]—is the ancient educational injunction. Such knowledge implies self-reflection, a process enabled by the fact of structural noncoincidence. In different conceptual systems different terminology applies—in phenomenology there is the transcendental ego (Jay 1993b, 145)—but the general conclusion is that we are able to distance ourselves from our experience and the world wherein it occurs, that we can remember (potentially, eventually) what we undergo, and that we can exercise some choice in affirming those elements we want to emphasize (and in de-emphasizing those elements we prefer to devalue). In certain systems—psychoanalysis most prominently (Zaretsky 2004)—the sphere of freedom is modest, as it becomes clear that who we imagine ourselves to be may represent a defensive reconfiguration of what we are in fact. "The more we think about the 'I'," George Grant (1966 [1959], 69) reminds, "the more mysterious this subjectivity will appear to us." Knowing oneself is, then, no simple matter of paying attention to what happens—although it depends on that—as it requires retrieving what has happened already and remains only as residue and sometimes not readily accessible. This ongoing sense of mystery in fact impels self-study and haunts the formation of the subject.

The Recurring Question of the Subject

Do we still have the strength . . . to oppose the scientific-deterministic worldview with a self that is grounded in creative freedom?

Gottfried Benn[17] *([1932], in Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg 1995, 380)*

The idea that there is an individual who can participate in the ongoing reformulation of his or her own character is summarized in the concept of the subject. Often associated with the Enlightenment in Europe—the marker for modernity, that substitution of science for religion as the governing mythology of life—*the subject*, as we have designated the person, emphasizing one's capacity for agency, can learn to exercise reason. Through reason one might ascertain his or her self-interest and distinguish it from the public interest, although on occasion these have been seen to be closely related. Adjudicating the tensions between the private and public spheres, and those tensions within one's own psychic life, were appreciated as prerequisite for the subject to achieve emancipation—freedom—from servitude in its several forms, ranging from social conformity to physical enslavement.[18] That latter practice was dependent upon the denial of subjectivity to those enslaved; they were bodies monetized, sometimes sexualized, but always commodified.

Converting subjects to numbers has proved pivotal not only to the sophistication of science but also to its application to practical life in technology. Evidently, we are so enthusiastic about the consequences that we have applied quantification to almost all aspects of life, not only its practical aspects.[19] In the last one hundred years, we have applied it to the education of the child, previously imagined in philosophical then in psychological and social terms (Baker 2001, Autio 2006a). Today we understand education as a series of numerals, as test scores on standardized examinations, a category of assessment to be supplemented, and, if the Obama administration succeeds, by rates of graduation (Dillon March 10, 2011, A22). Not only philosophy, but also subjectivity itself becomes bleached from schooling, itself reduced to test preparation. In the United States, educational institutions have been deformed; they devolve into cram schools. Dewey's coupling of democracy and education has been superseded by the fusion of business and schooling.

That is the tragic trajectory of US school "reform" since 1968. Something remains, however, if only the school's noncoincidence with itself. Despite the repression that is school "reform," students squirm and teachers still struggle to create opportunities to teach.

School "reform" has been my life: I remember how the present came to be. I testify to what has been lost in the rush to reduce students and teachers to numbers. Despite being silenced by the press and sidelined by the government, critique remains required. Indeed, *critique* is one crucial professional practice of curriculum studies.[20] Critique implies not only noncoincidence but also reconstruction as questioning, skepticism, forming finally conviction. In such understanding there is created the domain of determination originating perhaps in passion, subjected to evidence, refashioned as ethics or morality, and invoked when present circumstances violate these or others'. Critique is informed by lived experience juxtaposed with academic knowledge and compelled by conviction; it is professed as part of an ongoing conversation. Or in order to restart one, or even to end one.

The "professor"—the key participant in the conversation that is the curriculum—is a teacher: a communicant, knowledgeable and committed to explain and assist students to understand the subject at hand, including themselves as they struggle and sometimes revel in what they read and write and say and hear.[21] The concept of communication incorporates, as James Carey (1992, 15) points out, ancient "religious attitudes," now secularized—and naturalized (Garrison 2008, 99)—but still structured by our faith that language can carry us beyond the world we know now, not only to futures foretold (and yet to be told) but also back to the past whose injustices might somehow (through our remembrance of them) stimulate reparation. This "historic religious undercurrent," Carey (1992, 18) continues, "has never been eliminated from our thought." Nor should it, I say, as the embrace of the common good constitutes professional ethics for educators of the public. Not transparent sieves nor accomplices of the state, teachers not only have knowledge, they also communicate character.

Employing the etymological method, I referenced this definition of *character* in the preface. In our time "moral excellence" is not necessarily associated with the Word of God, but with the specificities of situation and subjectivity. In *Webster's*, in fact, most of the eight definitions offered for "character" emphasize its singularity, whether this follows from a "complex of metal and ethical traits [that] individualize a person, group or nation (as in assessing a person's character)" or from a "main or essential nature, especially as strongly marked and serving to distinguish." While the former definition acknowledges the internally differentiated complexity of individuality, the latter invites us to associate singularity with culture or nationality or animality, with something essential that is more basic than our

ephemeral and shifting subjectivity, with nature's and culture's and history's imprinting of us and our imprinting of them.

As constructed, the character of the subject is in a sense fictional. However constructed—as persona or avatar—its fictional character does not imply its insubstantiality or falsehood. I am a subject, subject to my own life history, reconstructed according to my own dreams and internalized demands, and called into question by those around me. My subjectivity—the personal possessive implies the subject's noncoincidence with itself—is imprinted by culture, nationality, and by historicality itself. There have been those who have been so mesmerized by such internal multiplicity and outer connectivity that they have declared the concept of the subject dead, deconstructed into various often contradictory elements. Instead of a coherent person, today many celebrate prostheses, post-human forms of connectivity, relays of energy, and animation that take momentary form then disappear, sometimes forever, reappearing in different, not always recognizable forms. In such a postmodern condition, the subject fragments, withdraws, becomes a talking head perhaps, images (including photos), text without context, registering what remains of the private on public websites, chronicling the sequence of once-private (if only because one kept them to oneself) events evidently now everyone undergoes and or at least everyone knows. Such public information can be collected and categorized by businesses that target customers, not subjects. That conversion points to another and more prominent (it's number one) definition of character that *Webster's* offers. Character is defined as a "cipher that represents information, also a representation of such character that may be accepted by a computer." A "cipher," *Webster's* explains, is a "zero," a "nonentity." Does the question of the subject recur because the subject has vanished?

Subjects seem absent in cram schools, where so-called skills replace academic knowledge, decontextualized puzzles preparing for employment in jobs without meaning, itself a casualty of capitalism's compulsion to profit no matter what it takes.[22] No longer subjects, students become "ciphers" in cram schools. In these deformed institutions—once sites of complicated conversation, now devolving into test-prep centers—human subjects become numbers, for example, test scores. There can be no structural noncoincidence in ciphers. *Just do it* becomes the anthem of our time: acting now, suspending judgment,[23] and ignoring ethics; only outcomes matter, and outcomes are numbers, only. Representation evaporates, except for the numeral. The subject—the double entendre of the curriculum—becomes subjugated to its reign. We are its subjects. As an academic field committed

to subjects not numbers, the circumstances supportive of curriculum studies fade.[24]

There is another definition—indeed, it is also listed among the first series of definitions in *Webster's*—of *character*. In this definition character is not a numeral but a "graphic symbol (as a hieroglyph or alphabet letter) used in writing or printing." This is a definition that reinstalls representation as primary in communication, explicit in an antecedent definition: character is a "conventional graphic device placed on an object as an indication of ownership, origin, or relationship." Indeed, character—also acknowledged by *Webster's* as "magical"—can denote a "style of writing or printing," the definition listed just before its computerization (noted above). Writing or printing denotes self-expression, public testimony, and collective remembrance, and these expressive forms and genealogical traces of experience require subjectivity, invoke, in fact, a "person," in this line (it's 6a if you're checking) of *Webster's* list of definitions for character, "marked by notable or conspicuous traits: personage." The hieroglyph inspires this series of associations as well, when, as Rauch (2000, 15) suggests, hieroglyph becomes "a metaphor for the remnants of experience that need to be read, put together, instead of interpreted." Reading *is* interpretation, but Rauch is emphasizing here the archeological demand to which reconstruction responds.[25]

Reconstruction means reassembling the remains of what was, as in the United States after the Civil War. Reestablishing the past is in principle impossible, but in the effort to reconstruct what was—understanding it on its own terms—one reconstructs what is now. Finding the future, then, means returning to the past, not instrumentalizing the present.[26] Especially in an epoch defined by its presentism—a state of mind in which everything is now—we cannot escape the constraints of capitalism (and its educational equivalent: the cram school) from where we are now. Nor can improving what we do now—the ameliorative orientation that has so accented curriculum studies in the United States (Kliebard 1970)—enable the future to unfold. Because it works within the structures of the present,[27] amelioration risks only reorganizing, not reconstructing, what is. Regression to the past—reexperiencing prior, even archaic, forms of life—opens paths to the future reorganizing the present occludes.

The educational significance of the past positions history, not mathematics or science, as central to the education of the public. Of course, mathematics and science are historical subjects as well (Shapin 2010), and these histories might be emphasized in the curriculum, in part as a corrective to misconceptions that these subjects are independent

of time, place, and circumstance, including politics.[28] And corrective as well to the assumption that mathematics and science constitute contemporary versions of nineteenth-century Latin and ancient Greek: difficult subjects whose mastery muscles the mind, preparing it for any eventuality. History also discloses the shifting character of culture, a concept sometimes misconstrued as timeless, as somehow separate from politics and economics, and in our day ordained as definitive, as "difference." History includes sexuality, which when contained within biology may be misconstrued as ahistorical or noncultural, leaving students with the misconception that sexual practices are only "natural" and ahistorical. History makes clear that we ourselves are historical, that what we experience is in part a function of time, and that we are both different and similar to those who have preceded us and from those who will follow. The recognition and reconstruction of such difference enables understanding of our—it becomes, then, educational—experience.

The primacy of the temporal in the curriculum—one among several breakthroughs made by the canonical curriculum theorist Dwayne Huebner (1999, 131–142)—means that it matters who said what when. That phrase can conjure up cross-examination in a courtroom, but only the aspirations (not realities) of attentiveness, civility, and argumentation associated with litigation are pertinent to the open-ended, often judgment-free, ongoing effort to express oneself, understand the other, and communicate with everyone that characterizes the complicated conversation of the school curriculum. The temporal, then, animates what is spoken and studied as it underscores how memory structures what we experience in the present, and how new experience enables us to reconstruct what we remember and can foresee. We say we learn from experience, but unless there is experience—embodied, temporally structured—there is nothing to learn from. In the curriculum, temporality structures *orality*.[29]

Orality is not necessarily speech, not necessarily behavioral at all. Certainly it is not chatter, saying whatever comes to mind without rhyme or reason. Nor is it clever talk designed to impress the teacher or another classmate or oneself. It is not simply the right answer to a question posed by a teacher confined to a lesson plan or exhibiting a "best practice." Orality references the temporally structured—and structuring—expression of subjectivity through text, a physical text and/or, more broadly, the text that constitutes the ongoing class discussion. It is saying what you think and/or feel, preferably after you've thought about it, although spontaneity can disclose something unforeseen, enabling the speaker to know more about himself

or herself and/or his or her academic subject. Orality is an ongoing and reconstructed form of self-conscious intertextuality, acknowledging that one's statements have antecedents, public and private, past and present.

Even without knowing the details of one's students' lives—in most publicly funded schools this isn't possible given the excessive size of classes—the teacher can hear the multi-referentiality of the students' statements, provided she is attuned to this variegated temporal character of conversation. On many occasions statements are simple and straightforward, but as memory and openness allow, one can register the past when it is heard in the present. Simple exchange of information is no instance of orality, even when that occurs through speech, unless there is intertextuality or intentionality. Simply saying stuff is simply saying stuff; it is not conversation.

It is tempting to confine such chatter to the Internet, but clearly it occurs everywhere, even in families where personal histories are often in members' faces, as we say. While the Internet is no friend of orality, it does not preclude it either. Face-to-face speech lacks orality when it amounts to the anonymous exchange of facts, or is a medium of seduction or exploitation, and when it is reduced to giving instructions or obtaining "feedback." Orality requires the articulation of embodiment, of personification, acknowledgement, and engagement, so that the distinctiveness of those present becomes audible in what they say, discernible in how they act, not as an ornamental flourish to an already full act (expressing one's "style"), but as registering the originality and creativity that subjectivity can convey when one is embodied in the present moment. On occasions playful and on others utterly serious, such complicated conversation enables students to experience social democracy, mocked by politicians who are polarized by ideology.

Social democracy is not personal posturing or groupthink but, rather, the engagement of others in deciphering the intersubjective reality[30] in which all are embedded and participating, even when they are withdrawn. Such discernment occurs in solitude as well, but among others one hears firsthand, with the "firsthand" of the other (e.g., his or her distinctiveness), how things (or one thing, an idea or a fact or a feeling) look or feel to him or her, what they seem to those assembled. Codes of conduct, rules of engagement, rites of civility, questions of conformity, performance, ulterior motives, and social sincerity: all these require the physical presence of others so you can sense what's going on. Online you can sometimes tell when someone is pulling your leg, but the body gives off more than odors as so-called nonverbal communication nestles words as they are uttered.

Organizing such conversation goes only so far. No format forms forever, even the relative absence of formats as in the encounter groups in which I participated 40 years ago.[31] Sharing a circle with 12 (or so) others, one waited for someone to speak, and so it began. Unguided—on occasion there were interventions from the group leader, often in the form of questions, but infrequently as prohibition or reprimand—the conversation became a projective screen for the preoccupations of those present. Without a shared history or an assigned task, group members made it up, as it quickly became clear to everyone. There was nowhere to hide, as those who had spoken and felt exposed sometimes demanded reciprocity. There was a point to these often unnerving exercises, of course. Not only did group process become visible—how what one said produced that response, becoming a crescendo or ensuring silence—but also this produced no nomological law, as the particularity of individuals was inescapable, and what became summarized as "social constructivism" was irremediably concrete and personal. No one could deny people were making *this* up.

Its constructed character hardly rendered this speech false, however. What became clear is that social reality is comprised of falsehood as well as factuality, as well as all points in-between. Over time, groups acknowledged past events internal to the group and began referencing new statements in terms of previous ones, noting differences and repetitions. Often there was an appetite for new material; other times there was determination to work through puzzles left over from the past. Sometimes the former depended on the latter, and vice versa. The rules of engagement were few, precisely because the ongoing character of group encounter meant that judgments must be made in the moment, to which other judgments would be added. The direction any stream of conversation was headed could be changed by the wave of a wand—a word spoken, a gesture, or a sense of something not yet articulated—and the content of conversation could change as well. There was a quality of adventure—and danger—in a process where some safety was assured but the destination was unknown.

That—the loss of adventure—is the catastrophe of objectives, especially when their "implementation" is assessed by tests. The creativity, spontaneity, and originality of conversation are converted to puzzle solving, task completion, and what is left of group process becomes social conformity funneled toward a predetermined end. The curriculum becomes a tax audit. Receipts are always necessary, as no one takes your word for anything. Professional judgment is replaced by regulation, playfulness by wisecracks, and sincerity by cynicism: just

do it, damn it. Working to find out "what works" we converted the classroom to cram school, the contemporary version of the factory, an assembly line wherein mechanical behavior and efficiency replace inventiveness and memory. Regulation is now internalized, through objectives whose implementation will be assessed later, over and over. Teachers and students still talk, but now as if in prison, exchanging information while walking to the next station, always under surveillance, even if that panopticon is now internally installed. Doing time can be an adventure, but its destination takes the tension out of the unknown and attaches it to others, against whom one aggresses for the sake of a fantasized placidity always extrinsic to the "empty stare" (Grumet 1988, 116), of the cram[32] curriculum.

The excitement of education may have been excised by "reform," but curriculum-studies scholars have kept up appearances. Without jurisdiction—for many heartbreaking, for the field castrating, for the schools devastating—we encouraged enactment of orality through the elaboration of concepts—such as "complicated conversation"—knowing that these would be kept out of schools, themselves shut down, sometimes physically, always intellectually, as the adventure of the unknown journey is replaced by the proceduralism of the tax audit, wherein test-item completion substitutes for thinking, especially for the critical and creative kinds. Not immobilized by their severance from the schools, US curriculum studies scholars kept hope alive by remembering the past, reworking the present, and imagining the future. Forced to the sidelines by government intervention, curriculum studies scholars switched from supervising curriculum development in schools to understanding the curriculum in schools, often providing occasions for critique and demanding testimonies to possibility. Nowhere is the latter louder than in the still-reverberating work of Maxine Greene, whose talks to teachers at Lincoln Center in New York I discuss in chapter 7. In those you can hear the frustration of being sidelined, the dignity required for carrying on despite this incomprehensible calamity, and the affirmation of action possible through the imagination.

Action inspired by the imagination is one consequence of complicated conversation. "Aesthetics," Mosès (2009 [1992], 104) asserts, "provides the language through which the fundamentally political nature of history is revealed." Working through the imagination enables us to work creatively within and through constraints. Those constraints are external and political, but they are also internal, emanating from our psychic (what Freud called primary) processes, visceral and unconscious. Despite the weight of the past and the power

of the present, breakthroughs are possible. "Each moment of time," Mosès (2009 [1992], 108) tells us, "bears judgment on moments that precede it." Breakthrough, what for Walter Benjamin was "redemption" (Silverman 2009, 179), can occur at any moment, breaking the inertia of the present, bringing a new insight, or a new reality into the world. This is no quantitative or cumulative conception of historical time, but an idea, as Mosès (2009 [1992], 108) explains, "borrowed from Jewish messianism, of a utopia appearing in the very heart of the present, of a hope lived in the mode of today." For me, "determination" is sturdier than "hope" but each is attuned to the immanence of worldliness (Pinar 2009, ix).

While a fact of life—however obscured it becomes in instructional schemes sequencing so-called skills in some grand Ponzi scheme wherein investments now presumably lead to payoffs later—the possibility located in each and every moment can be activated through juxtaposing the past with the present. Such juxtaposition and the creative tension[33] it installs can lead to what gets called a "third space," as Hongyu Wang explains in chapter 7. This third space—what intellectual historian Martin Jay (1993c, 8) depicts as a "force field"—does not subsume the past and present into some third common category, as in dialectics, but preserves the distinctiveness of each as a new reality struggles to be born. It requires us to enact the noncoincidence of subjectivity with reality through the cultivation of distance, even estrangement and exile, demonstrated through Wang's self-study that I depict in chapter 7.

Distance has gotten a bad rap in recent decades, as the identity politics of the women's movement and African American affirmations of cultural heritage insisted that experience is the primary prerequisite to knowledge. Only a woman or a black man could know what sexism or racism is, what whiteness communicates. While acknowledging an important fact, such insistence also overstates the authority of experience as it understates the significance of study. While it can—often does—provide invaluable knowledge, experience can also provincialize and even mislead: experience is not always reliable. Men can understand sexism and its institutional and psychic structuration as masculinity through academic study, if they distance themselves from—indeed question—their own self-evident experience and listen to the testimonies of others' firsthand experiences. Those of European descent can understand racism and whiteness as well, despite cultural predispositions to substitute identification for empathy (Hartman 1997, 18), reiterating the arrogance of cultures whose science encouraged them to imagine that their knowledge was applicable everywhere.

While experience is invaluable, understanding also takes, as Maxine Greene (2001, 53) knew, "a kind of distancing," and for Greene such distantiation was always infused with the immediacy of the aesthetic moment. Others—like Jane Roland Martin (2008, 126)—have been even more confident, asserting that "the greater one's distance from one's object of study, the better one can understand it." In Humboldt's letters to his wife, Bruford (2009 [1975], 23) tells us, Humboldt too spoke "repeatedly" of "the need" he felt for "cultivating detachment." Obviously Humbolt was not "completely detached," Bruford (2009 [1975], 23) comments, "or he would not have become one of Prussia's leading statesmen . . . offered so important and congenial a task as the reorganization of the Prussian educational system." It was through the imagination, Humboldt said, that reality affected him (Bruford 2009 [1975], 26).

For Pasolini, it was indirect discourse—the "contamination" of public aesthetic forms with private passion (Pinar 2009, 185 n. 32)—that installed distance while preserving identification. Such aesthetic formulation of lived experience—what Markus Gabriel (in Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 76) terms "objectification"—represents "our being-in-the-world," so that "we recognize ourselves." Aesthetic creation is also "capable of rendering the 'spirit' of a life-form, of an epoch, of a typical life in our century, of an atmosphere" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 76). In contrast, reification splits off knowledge from subjectivity, installing it as independent of those persons and processes constructing it. Scientism is one familiar form of reification, as it—in Gabriel's language (in Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 77)—"denies the paradoxes and antinomies which lie at the basis of determinacy and accredits itself the capacity to investigate into the conditions of possibility of determinacy (of meaning, truth, etc.)." Through distance and engagement one discerns the paradoxes and antinomies of determinacy. Distance and engagement are two intertwined if tensioned modalities of study, always altering their forms and intensities according to the project at hand, its historical situatedness, its subjective meaning, or its social significance.

Rather than the silence produced by the self-segregating smugness of identity politics—with its inverted reinscription of stereotypes—the character of curriculum studies is communicative, committed to dialogical encounter across difference. In what James Carey (1992, 18) calls a "ritual view," communication becomes less a transmission of messages, an "act of imparting information," as it is the "representation of shared beliefs." Such communication is associated with concepts of "sharing," "participation," "association," "fellowship," and "the possession of a common faith,"[34] as it recalls the etymological roots of

the terms "commonness," "communion," "community," and "communication" (Carey 1992, 18). Rather than "the extension of messages across geography for the purpose of control," Carey (1992, 18) continues, this "archetypal" conception of communication is as "the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality." Communication, then, is an ongoing social ceremony aspiring to shared understanding while engaging difference and protecting dissent. It contributes to the creation of community.[35]

Not every classroom matches that description nor should it. There is no formula for "what works," nor should there be. If there is to be communication characterized by the concepts listed above, the forms it will take will differ, even among the same participants on different days on different topics. The vitality of conversation depends in part on its momentariness, how it communicates what it felt or heard or remembered and in ways aligned with the texts and talks that have (re)structured the class thus far. Certain forms of talk—hate speech, for instance—are excluded from classroom conversation. An ongoing aspiration to authenticity is mediated by commitments to civility, personified in individual teachers who regulate—at the beginning of the year and on any particular day—what the range of possible expression can be. Not only is the character of conversation shaped so individually, so should be, I suggest, the syllabi.

While I no longer oppose governmental curriculum guidelines—they are preferable to contentless curriculum organized around skill-based standardized tests—I insist on institutional support for teachers' academic freedom to teach the material that teachers deem appropriate and in the manner suitable to that material and to those studying it, these judgments to be made by individual teachers, if in consultation with colleagues and others (including colleagues at the university) and with students themselves. From large and heterogeneous to small and specialized schools emphasizing curricular themes and serving specific populations, schools' organizational structures ought to be as malleable as teachers and students request them to be. As I show in chapter 5, emphasizing organizational structures over intellectual content risks undermining the vitality of the curriculum, even when reorganization is undertaken in the name of curricular reconstruction.[36]

While democracy depends on citizens and other residents capable of dialogical encounter with the difference they personify, experience, and express, demanding such encounter by forcing students from all backgrounds to enroll in the same classes is not only politically ill-advised in a democracy but also, in practical terms, pedagogically

Sisyphean. Still, some schools could be established—I am endorsing here a model of largely self-governed publicly funded independent schools—that forefront dialogical encounter across social difference, just as others could cultivate the internal differentiation of shared identity, religious or cultural or political.

There can be no Nazi schools, however, just as there can be in a democracy no accommodation for nondemocratic, intolerant religious schools either. The protection of religious freedom is limited to worship, not to be extended to publicly funded instruction where secularity must be—in general, with specific and relative exceptions—institutionalized if democracy is to prevail. In a time of terrorism sometimes stimulated by religious zeal, it is appropriate to err on the side of secularism, even though religious expression, when not politically intemperate, ought not be repressed in public. In a different era—not our own, but one marked by religious quietism rather than politicization—more exclusive and experimental religious schools could be encouraged. This same temporally tempered—avowedly historical—view of what is educationally appropriate obtains in questions of multiculturalism, as becomes evident in chapter 3.

A cosmopolitan curriculum, then, acknowledges difference in efforts to understand reality, as it was, is now, and might be. The verb is crucial, as the promotion of difference, or particularism, is a provincialism. Like education itself, cosmopolitanism is imperfect, as Sharon Todd notes (2009). Like multiculturalism—as Sneja Gunew (2004, 1) explains—cosmopolitanism is also situated, to be invoked when affirmations of difference become politically and educationally appropriate, that is during times of trouble. Cosmopolitanism is no eleventh commandment, no transcendent demand for human holiness. On the contrary, to be cosmopolitan commands contempt for intolerance, as, for instance, Pasolini personified (Pinar 2009, 99–142). And it can be expressed in quiet concern for one's neighbors, however local and global one's neighborhood is conceived to be, as in Jane Addams's case (Pinar 2009, 59–82). Cosmopolitanism occurs, then, in the world, not in some split-sphere of (postmodern) abstraction where self-righteousness gets smuggled in, passing for cultural critique and ethical judgment.

The character of curriculum studies is cosmopolitan, encouraging the ongoing understanding of the world as historical, as always changing and different, and as always unchanging and the same. Allegory conveys this simultaneity of the mythological and the historical, the cultural and the individual, and the abstract and the concrete. When I teach the character of curriculum studies, I am also

communicating what history expresses through me, as my professionalism as an educator laboring in the public interest requires not only disciplinary expertise but also the commitment to communicate that understanding in variable and always-changing social settings. In teaching, then, we are not implementing objectives or preparing students for tests but testifying every day in every way to the human capacity to understand the world and its personification in our subjectivity. Seeking such knowledge is the recurring question of the subject.

PART I

The Subject of Politics and Culture

CHAPTER 1

The Unaddressed "I" of Ideology Critique

Introduction

[I]t is power, not knowledge, that counts in education.

Michael F. D. Young (2008, 94)

In his *Bringing Knowledge Back In*, Michael F. D. Young asks: "[W]hat went wrong with the sociology of knowledge in educational studies and the social constructivist approach with which it was associated?" (2008, 199). Among the answers he provides is sociologists' reduction of the curriculum to the interests of those in power (2008, 26, 29, 164). "[K]nowledge," Young acknowledges, "cannot be reduced to the activities and interests of those who produce or transmit it" (94). Social constructivism (not the sociology of education) is to blame, he concludes (164); it "can do little more than expose the way that curriculum policies always mask power relations" (22). While four decades ago the association of knowledge with power represented an advance over earlier apolitical conceptions, Young acknowledges that

> [i]n arguing that all knowledge is social (an inescapable truth, if you do not give authority to divine revelation), it [the "new" or "critical" sociology of education][1] led to the position that curricula were no more than a reflection of the interests of those in power. (2008, 94)

In depicting the school as primarily political, ideology critique installed power as a primary concept, until "power" splintered into identity politics (Young 2008, 164).[2]

In part because the concept is expansive, "power" has proved elastic, adaptable to changing circumstances. In its elasticity, does "power" risk becoming an empty signifier, a "decoy-concept" (Pasolini 2005

[1972], 125) masking more historically specific configurations of causes, concomitants, and effects?[3] Even if some core of the concept remains, if the "forms" that power assumes have shifted, would not the relationship (e.g., reproduction) between power and education (as one of its forms) change as well? If "power" is not only economic, political, and cultural (if it is also, for instance, semiotic and psychic), is its medium of hegemony—ideology—likewise recast? If ideology represents a pervasive "misrecognition" (Wexler 2007, 47) of reality, how do those who conduct ideological critique escape misrecognition of themselves and others?

In a collection celebrating the legacy of Michael W. Apple, Greg Dimitriadis, Lois Weis, and Cameron McCarthy testify to power's mutability: "Although Apple urges scholars to explore the links between education and power, such forms of power as linked to broader economic, ideological, and social structures have changed markedly over time, space, and place" (Dimitriadis, Weis, and McCarthy 2006, 7). Dimitriadis, Weis, and McCarthy cite globalization, electronic media, and economics as examples of changing forms. In the same collection Allan Luke focuses entirely on globalization, specifying its implications for teachers' work, among them "intensification" and a "retrograde recommodification of knowledge" (2006, 123). Luke calls for a conception of teaching as "cosmopolitan work," invoking a metaphor of "craft" to underscore academic freedom, "one's right to select and work with [varied] materials...rather than uniform products" (124, 126). It becomes, he suggests, our professional obligation to "learn beyond the nation" (138).[4]

Globalization has produced "changes in the US economy" that, Jean Anyon asserts, "require that we rethink the hypothesis that schooling reproduces social class position" (2006, 37). One change Anyon notes is the "bifurcation of incomes and class structure" (2006, 37), a consequence of the massive relocation of manufacturing jobs to sites of less expensive labor. Given that the forms of power have changed, Anyon suggests, the reproductive relation between ideology and curriculum has also changed.[5] As early as 1980, Anyon had argued that "schools...had the potential for nonreproductive effects" (2006, 44). The shift from reproduction to resistance during the 1980s was apparent only (see Pinar et al. 1995, 252ff.). Like a sponge, the totalizing concept of "reproduction" absorbed resistance to it. Acknowledging the expansiveness of "reproduction," Dennis Carlson asks, "[H]ow can one effectively distinguish ideological from nonideological texts?" (2006, 96). If reproduction is pervasive, and

ideology totalizing, how does one distinguish between ideology and ideological critique?

As "a book of its time" (Arnot 2006, 22), Apple's *Ideology and Curriculum*—the canonical text of ideology critique in US curriculum studies—was "somewhat functionalist" (Whitty 2006, viii). Moreover, it lacked empirical evidence (see the critique reported in Pinar et al. 1995, 266), including evidence supporting "resistance" and "contestation" (Whitty 2006, ix; see Gandin 2006, 196).[6] Arnot charges that "Apple was all too aware of the contradictions of a rather deterministic neo-Marxist tradition and the liberatory politics he espoused—a theme that shaped his work for the next 30 years" (2006, 24). This 30-year repetition of the same conveys a different sense of "reproduction" than Apple perhaps intended. If the material forms of power have shifted, how could Apple remain reiterating the "contradictions" his determinism installed? Is there a radical "disconnect" between reproduction theory and the material reality it purports to represent?

Displaced Imitations

> *Too much supposed critical scholarship assumes…that critical concepts have a radical effectivity regardless of the context in which they are generated and circulated.*
>
> *Geoff Whitty (1985, 168)*

In the United States, the "new" sociology of education was a British import, as is widely acknowledged (see Anyon 2006, 38; Arnot 2006, 19, 22; Dimitriadis, Weis, and McCarthy 2006, 1, 2, 4; Luke 2006, 129). One risk in importation is that the local and specific conditions associated with the original fade. While 1968 was a decisive historical moment across the West, its traumatic repercussions (the "Great Repression" [quoted in Pinar 1994, 193]) were experienced differently given the distinctiveness of national history and culture. Philip Wexler argued that the "new" sociology of education represented a reenactment of that lost political struggle: it "recapitulates that defeat, restating it abstractly and obsessively" (1987, 4, 27), devolving into "a displaced imitation of it [1968], an attempt culturally to recapitulate the practical historical course of the movement, *in theory*" (Wexler 1987, 26). Such a "displaced imitation" occurred in an imaginary realm characterized by ritualistic—indeed "simplistic" (Anyon 2006, 40)—reiterations of reproduction and resistance.

Michael F. D. Young likens these North American reproductions of British scholarship to "muckraking journalism rather than social science" (2008, 199). Young references Apple's work as "the most sophisticated and influential example of this genre" (2008, 226 n. 3), a backhanded compliment indeed. Admirers revalorize the simplistic character of Apple's prose as "accessibility" (Dimitriadis, Weis, and McCarthy 2006, 7). Perhaps to an extent not the case in the United Kingdom, there have been, in the United States, charges of "elitism" directed at Leftist education professors from within their own camp (see, for instance, Stanley 2007, 385), leading some (Apple perhaps?) to perceive the "necessity of making it simple" (Huerta-Charles 2007, 258). One measure of the success of this "keeping it simple" strategy is evidently measured by sales figures (see Apple 2009, 9). The price for pandering to the present is intellectual stasis, for example, "reproduction" of the present.

Given his 1987 critique that the educational Left was reenacting the trauma of 1968 relocated to an imaginary sphere, Wexler's recent recommendation for "resistance" seems itself strangely "reproductive." While Wexler tells us he continues to dismiss "the Durkheimian structuralist-functionalist and Marxist labor theories of reproduction and resistance" (2007, 46), he has evidently settled on a new scenario of social change. "[T]he sacred is pushed back onto the social stage," Wexler (2007, 44) proclaims, and "we have the possibility of a new dialectic; where religion is not only a soporific, ideological opiate, but also an Archimedes point, and a powerful source of social mobilization and critical thought."

Certainly the Taliban and conservative Christianity have served as sources of "social mobilization," but of "critical thought"? Wexler is thinking of neither of those, but of "Jewish mysticism, in Hasidism and Kabbalah"; these, he suggests, provide a "resource" for "critique" and for the "envisioning of alternative forms of social life" (2007, 45). While I share his preference for immanence over transcendence (see Wexler 2007, 46; Pinar 2009, 29, 146), one does look forward to Wexler's specification of how "archaic practices of shamanism and magical prophesy" (2007, 53)—as he acknowledges, the old "opium of the people"—provide "resources" for "critical thought."

No longer regarded as radical[7]—"Apple is himself part of the educational establishment" (Young 2008, viii)—ideology critique is (Young recommends) to be replaced not with religion but with its contrary, what he terms a "socialist realist approach." Young "seeks to identify the social conditions that might be necessary if objective

knowledge is to be acquired" (2008, 164). But after positing knowledge as central (2008, 95), he quickly abandons it, substituting for it "the *conditions* for the *acquisition* of knowledge as the central educational research issue" (2008, 94, emphasis added). He associates this view (e.g., "social realism" [2008, 95])—with "the question of knowledge," that is, "what is it that people need to have the opportunity to learn or know." Who, one wonders, determines the people's "need"?

It is not the state, at least not the British state. Young endorses "less direct state intervention and regulation and more self-regulation" (2008, 102). Both can quickly devolve into assessments (of "opportunities" and "needs": see chapter 5) made by bureaucrats working in ministries of education or, worse, by politicians exploiting education as a political issue. In our time, too rarely does the classic curriculum question ("what knowledge is of my worth?") remain located within the ongoing professional judgments of individual teachers.[8] Indeed, in the United Kingdom, teachers' academic freedom seems to have disappeared along with "phenomenological sociology" (Whitty 1985, 16; see also 162), marked by the appearance of the national curriculum and the political weakening of teachers' unions (Arnot 2006, 18). (In the United States, teacher unions are, as of this writing, being dismantled, most prominently in Wisconsin and New Jersey: see Gabriel and Dillon 2011, A1; Gabriel 2011, A1, A18.)

While I doubt Young has brought academic knowledge back (instead he emphasizes the "conditions" for its "acquisition"), it is to his considerable credit to notice that it has gone missing, and not only in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the key curricular question of "what knowledge is of most worth?" has been degraded to "*whose* knowledge is of most worth?" (Buras and Apple 2006, 3, 18, emphasis added), collapsing curriculum into identity politics and the question of power, as *who* creates knowledge is more important than the disciplinary and educational significance of the knowledge itself. This is, in Young's terms, a version of the genetic fallacy (see 2008, 26). Such reductionism is not, however, the exclusive property of the neo-Marxist Left.

The Problem with Postmodernism

[T]he risk, the chance of the political, is undertaken without guarantees, without opposition, without resolution, truly temporal, unprogrammable, necessary, and inevitable: an impossible praxis.

Patti Lather (2007, 15)

Not only are those hierarchies of determination associated with the "new" sociology of education responsible for the reduction of knowledge to the forces of (or persons associated with) its production. So is postmodern theory. Such theory is often "French theory," like the British "new" sociology of education exported for resale in America. François Cusset (2008, 279) observes that Foucault functioned in the United States as theoretical support for now knee-jerk condemnations of universalism, rationalism, and humanism. Foucault also fueled allegations that practices of exclusion (of the insane, of criminals, and of homosexuals) produced the norm (reason, justice, and heterosexuality), reducing reality to a set of impugned binaries. "This interpretation of Foucault," Cusset continues,

> provided his American readers with a veritable *conspiracy theory*, in the name of which they scoured society to uncover its aggressors and victims. American cultural studies or minority studies texts inspired by Foucault consistently focus on the notion of "unmasking" or "delegitimizing" some form of power that is "stifling" or "marginalizing" one oppressed minority group or another—an approach that stands in direct opposition to Foucault's genealogical method. (Cusset 2008, 280)

Conspiracy theories require perpetrators, of course. For those embracing identity politics (see Alcoff et al. 2006), power becomes personified in restated stereotypes (e.g., "whitestream thinkers" [Grande 2004, 33]).

This splintering of the social into separate (if collective) identities results, for Young, in "relativism" (2008, 25). If all points of view are relatively right (or utterly and "always already" incommensurate, located in self-contained ethnic or gendered or classed subject positions), if all there is is ideology (Carlson 2006, 96), the task becomes not ideology critique but jostling for power within hegemonic power, recasting education as "countersocialization" (Stanley 2007, 371). Split off from realpolitik, "resistance" becomes the quixotic cry of self-appointed representatives of victimized groups and of those jostling for leadership of a (never materializing) unified opposition.

Among critical pedagogues,[9] postmodernism is sometimes targeted as Delilah. In one dramatic critique, the academic Left is alleged to have deteriorated to the "lowest level" of "degeneracy" (Martin 2007, 337). "[I]n crisis," critical pedagogy has been "scrubbed clean" of any "social consciousness [and is] no longer a material force for social change," Gregory Martin (2007, 337–338)

charges. While the epigraph makes clear that, at least for Lather, a postmodern praxis is in principle "impossible,"[10] one wonders where and when critical pedagogy had ever been a "*material* force." Now only a "shopping basket" of "skills susceptible to the private profit needs of big business," critical pedagogy is, Martin laments, "like visiting a familiar town where all the street signs have been renamed" (2007, 339).

As that image conveys, for Martin it is postmodernism (evidently its emphasis upon signification) that is to blame for the current crisis of critical pedagogy (2007, 339). Martin is not alone in targeting postmodernism; Peter McLaren blames the "flat-lined anti-politics of postmodernism" for rewriting "class struggle . . . in the aerosol terminology of the politics of difference" (2008, 47). Not everyone on the Left agrees that postmodernism (and its theoretical subsidiary, poststructuralism)[11] is to blame; Dennis Carlson suggests: "To get beyond the current 'stuck point' in progressive cultural politics, I believe poststructural perspectives can be particularly useful" (2006, 110). If education is the reproduction of power, the resounding defeat of 1968 would seem to be to blame, not efforts to challenge hegemonic forms of representation. Is postmodernism a convenient and distracting scapegoat? Not for Richard Wolin (2006, 311), who also discerns in postmodernism the "philosophical longing for 'totality' and political totalitarianism."

In their formulations of reproduction and resistance, note that both "critical" scholarship and postmodernism efface subjectivity, and the embodied historical individual, each pronounced, respectively, as only complicit with capitalism (the so-called possessive individual) or, simply, "dead" (as in the death of the subject/author). Both "critical" scholarship and postmodernism (as imported in US curriculum discourses) foreclose agency, resulting, as Lather poignantly puts it, in an "impossible praxis." Unable to appreciate that the "individual" and "structural determinations" (McLaren 2007, 292) as reciprocally related, indeed mutually constitutive, "critical scholarship" spins its own wheels, crying "crisis" and conspiracy. Ranting does not activism make. Nor does it dispense with relativism.

The Unaddressed "I"

What else can the loss of self-transcendence breed but a profound narcissism?

Sande Grande (2007, 322)

To remedy relativism, Young asserts that "the social character of knowledge is an indispensable basis for its objectivity" (2008, 30). Young's assertion of the social as the "basis" of knowledge seems strange; after all, given its self-constitutive dissensus (see Ziarek 2001), how can "the social" in principle ever provide "objectivity," itself a long-buried casualty of epistemological critique (Rorty 1979)? If the social is primary and if subjectivity is epiphenomenal (see Kincheloe 2007, 26, 31, 36; McLaren 2007, 311), the individual is rendered inactive. Only as the subjective and the social are acknowledged as embedded in and reciprocally constitutive of the other, can the "I"—alone and in solidarity with others—undertake political action in the world.

Is the failure of resistance due to its dissociation from subjectivity? As Leigh Gilmore notes (in a different but pertinent context): "[T]he author as the person who writes (the **I** who writes **I**) is left precariously unaddressed" (1994, 85). Unaddressed, the "I" becomes the "other" of ideology critique. Unaddressed yes, but not gone: in "critical scholarship" subjectivity gets smuggled back in as that detached omniscient observer that the primacy of "the social" disallows. Geoff Whitty admitted: "The temptation to explain developments in terms of all-embracing, but uni-dimensional, theories of education is, not, however, one from which I have been entirely immune myself" (1985, 137). As Gilmore notes (substitute "critical scholarship" for "male autobiographies"): "The male autobiographies that many feminist critics have claimed as models of unity and coherence . . . evidence the discursive and ideological tensions of the models of personhood they invoke" (1994, 11). Judith Butler summarizes these tensions:

> Power not only *acts on* a subject but, in a transitive sense, *enacts* the subject into being. As a condition, power precedes the subject. Power loses its appearance of priority, however, when it is wielded by the subject, a situation that gives rise to the reverse perspective that power is the effect of the subject, and that power is what the subject effects. (1997, 13)

Simultaneously interpellated and self-constituting, the subject acts after—and in the midst of—being acted upon. Butler emphasizes this point: "The subject is itself a site of this ambivalence in which the subject emerges both as the *effect* of a prior power and as the *condition of possibility* for a radically conditioned form of agency" (1997, 14–15). The subject cannot act as if outside power, but through it: "Thus resistance appears as the effect of power, as a part of power, its self-subversion" (Butler 1997, 93).

Does resistance positioned as outside power devolve into a form of deferred obedience (see Santner 2006, 70)? Does seduction suggest the "subversion" implied by resistance within power? If so, what stultified the educational Left was not only the reproduction of power "outside" but also within us, the incapacity to imagine resistance against ourselves and with others. As Butler asserts: "What makes us think that the unconscious is any less structured by the power relations that pervade cultural signifiers than is the language of the subject? If we find an attachment to subjection at the level of the unconscious, what kind of resistance is to be wrought from that?" (1997, 88). What kind, indeed? The reproduction of self-undermining working-class masculinity?

Without subjective reconstruction of one's own ideological interpellation (subjugation in Butler's parlance), the split-off "I" asserts itself as an unitary context-free cohesive self, reserving for itself the agency evidently eluding everyone else. "[T]eachers especially," McLaren announces, "become an easily breached conduit for the official narratives of the state" (2007, 299). Such a gendered[12] pronouncement is possible only from a subject position somehow safely located outside ideological interpellation (see Biesta 2003, 68, 72). McLaren is hardly alone; at one point Henry Giroux warns teachers against becoming "the instrument of a safely approved and officially sanctioned worldview" (2007, 3). How can McLaren and Giroux imagine teachers as "conduits" and "instruments" while reserving ideology-free agency and insight for themselves? As Jonathan Jansen appreciates: "[B]y dividing the world neatly into rival camps—the oppressor and the oppressed—a self-righteous stance is assumed that absolves the teacher/liberator or the critical theorist from critically engaging their own place in the state of oppression" (2009, 259).

Somehow "floating above the emotional and political divides that separate those in the classroom" (Jansen 2009, 269), the critics of ideology somehow see all (see Kincheloe 2007, 21ff.).[13] Somehow insulated from the power that is evidently flowing everywhere else (especially through those "conduits" posing as teachers working in schools), "the revolutionary subject of Marxism has both atrophied and multiplied" (Mowitt 1988, xiii). Critical pedagogy may be "wedged between an ideological rock and a hegemonic hard place with a relatively small audience" (Kincheloe 2007, 40), but it is also clear that it suffers from delusions of grandeur. Split off from subjectivity, severed from historical actuality, in its frustration (or gloating over being "right"), "critical scholarship" enacts a repetition compulsion.[14] After almost 40 years, the "insight" remains essentially

the same: schools reproduce social reality (see, for instance, Carlson 2006, 108; Torres 2006, 50; McLaren 2007, 294; Wexler 2007, 47). It is reproduction theory that reproduces itself.

The giants represented the scale but not the specificity of what Don Quixote saw. The question of representation becomes, E. San Juan, Jr., notes, "How can one recognize the Other not just as a distorted projection of all the negativity and lack in one's self?" (1995, 213). How can we claim to know what is there without examining the subjective "apparatus" by which we apprehend the "there"? By reducing reality to the social (or to gender, race, even religion), "critical" scholars position themselves as the ideology-free individuals their theory excludes.[15] In concocting abstractions with vague referents (e.g., reproduction and resistance), "criticalists" (Kincheloe 2007, 22) instantiate a "capitalism" completely independent of them, as if their own utterances and the academic system in which they circulate were not also commodities circulating in systems of exchange. Under capitalism, as Marx knew,

> the ego could strategically manage its self-representation only within the terms of market exchange, an opaque, seemingly natural order that determined the fate of all choices. Individuals struggled with each other with envious competitiveness to make their representations of self-activity increase in relative value. (Toews 2004, 430)

Despite the rhetoric of "social justice," what is revealed in professional practice is the "'full Monty' opportunism of careerist academics" (Martin 2007, 337). Without subjective knowledge of the "historicity of experience" (Cusset 2008, 156)—as Marx also appreciated (see Toews 2004, 432)—agency becomes dispersed over the social surface where it is replaced—parodied—by what might more accurately be called "image activism." In such an "impossible praxis," the conspicuous "criticalist" (like conspicuous consumption)[16] becomes commodified as a "metasubject" (Jay 1993b, 52, 136) then sold to students as reproductions of heroic individuals such as "Ché" or "Paulo" (McLaren 1997, 105; 2007, 306).

While subjectivity does appear in lists of categories relevant to "resistance"—in addition to Kincheloe's (2007, 21ff.) see also Grande (2007, 320), Martin (2007, 344), and McLaren (2007, 308, 310, 311)—it remains unelaborated theoretically, split off from "the social" and from history. Unaddressed is Paul Smith's long-standing observation that "critical scholarship" is "too inflexibly abstract in relation to the question of individual experience" (1988, 66) and that Giroux's work in particular is insufficiently attentive to ideology's

"reach" into the "subject," for example, the unconscious, and specifically "the agent's individual history" (1988, 67).

Until recently (as noted in the introduction) it has seemed to me that autobiography was key to ideology critique, as autobiography enables self-understanding of interpellation (see Whitty 1985, 27), sedimentation, and those singular tasks constituting social and subjective reconstruction. Unaddressed, the interpellated "I" reenters "critical scholarship" as an unproblematic commonsensical self, an "I" evidently unencumbered by the political forces reproduction and resistance theories depict as omnipresent and determinative.

> Reincorporating subjectivity in ideology critique involves abandoning the idea of an area of fully conscious and knowledgably activity discrete from the unconscious. Only armed with such a theoretical notion will social theory be able to account for the complexity of individual receptions of ideology and ideological formations, and thus be in a position to construct more than merely rhetorical notions of resistance. (Smith 1988, 68)

When "the social" predominates, agency fades, the victim of the epiphenomenal status "the social" assigns to the individual. But the repressed returns. When subjectivity gets smuggled back in as an ideology-free individual, also reincorporated are bourgeois distinctions between mental and manual labor: Apple characterizes "work" as "getting our hands a little more dirty" (2006, 215), a peculiarly patrician phrase for the self-described activist (Apple 2009, 1).

Joe L. Kincheloe[17] juxtaposes the social constructedness of the individual alongside the "individual's responsibility" for one's "actions" (2007, 27). If constructed by the social, how can one be held responsible for actions that are not, in principle, "individual," that cannot, therefore, be one's own? Without the agency of subjectivity, the critical pedagogue is paralyzed by reproduction, left to cry "resistance" without the subjective means to enact it (see Whitty 1985, 88). John Mowitt observed that the political Right "capitalized" on this "paralysis" of the Left, "recasting political discourse in its terms and appearing to address the need for revolutionary subjectivity by empowering people to unleash the economic forces that actually enslave them" (1988, xiii). Agency was recast as entrepreneurialism, the reward for which was not ethical satisfaction or political transformation, but wealth (Taubman 2009a).

The political power of subjectivity—including its centrality in decolonization (De Lissovoy 2007, 366; see also, chapter 2)—remains

lost on the Left in education. It was not lost on Barack Obama, as the US presidential candidate personified agency through the endless reiteration of his simple but effective affirmation: "Yes We Can." Omniscient observation may resist, but embodied subjectivity acts, alone and in solidarity with others. The mistake of the Left has been the bifurcation of the two: "Collective struggle, *rather than* the individual exercise of supposedly free choice in an unequal society," Whitty insisted, "can product human betterment" (1985, 180, emphasis added). As the Obama presidential campaign testified, the two are reciprocally related. In its construction of a split-off sutured subjectivity, reproduction theory rendered agency quixotic, "sloganistic" (Whitty 1985, 82) gestures of doomed defiance.

What has been splintered socially cannot be easily put back together again. In calling for "intense efforts in the coming years to bring more diversity into our ranks," Kincheloe offers two reasons for critical pedagogy's appeal (2007, 11). One is that critical pedagogy has much to teach; second is that it has much to learn from subjugated peoples. Neither reason acknowledges that the knowledge of "others" might be important in its own right. Instead, the importance of diversity is its utility for critical pedagogy, a point Kincheloe underscores when he calls for a "humble" critical pedagogy that "listens" to the subaltern and makes "use" of that knowledge (2007, 17). After all, he continues, "indigenous knowledge is a rich social resource" (2007, 17). The distinctive labors and accomplishments of such disparate and heroic individuals as DuBois, Wells, Woodson, and Horace Mann Bond become reduced to a "compendium of critical theoretical data" (2007, 20). And critical pedagogues wonder why there isn't more "diversity" in the "our ranks."

Conclusion

[W]hat holds us back are resistances whose origin is to be sought in the archaic layers of our personal history.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1981, 110)

What is remarkable is not only the political ineffectiveness of critical scholarship (a criterion of judgment it itself insists upon), but also its compulsive repetition of the same concepts (reproduction and resistance) with which it inaugurated itself (four decades ago) as "new." Like the commodity it decries, reproduction theory presents the always-the-same as "new" (Santner 2006, 65 n. 26). "[W]hat [Walter]

Benjamin refers to as petrified unrest," Eric L. Santner points out, "pertains to the dynamic of the *repetition compulsion*, the psychic aspect of the eternal recurrence of the same that for Benjamin defined the world of commodity production and consumption" (2006, 81). In the reiterations of reproduction and resistance, we witness such "petrified unrest," although resistance is now perhaps pointless, as (we are told) "the classroom [has] lost its power as the site for critical intervention and advocacy research" (Arnot 2006, 30), a judgment now shared by others (see Sandlin, Schultz, and Burdick 2010). For others, (see Torres 2006, 52), however, whatever the location nothing has changed: "Theories of social reproduction and resistance *continue* to inform the analyses of critical sociologies of education" (Torres 2006, 52, emphasis added). How can we understand this apparently endless reiteration of the same?

A dysfunctional response to trauma (including the loss of power in 1968), recall that the *repetition compulsion* substitutes fantasy for reality, as in the "fort-da" phenomenon. Through repetition compulsion "the child gains mastery over loss: the wooden reel or favorite toy stands for the mother whose absence and then presence the child enacts and controls via the toy" (Clark 2005; verb tense change is mine). Pertinent here is the solace (Taubman emphasizes pleasure: see note 14) achieved by relocating what is lost (the mother for the child, power for us adults on the Left) into a substitute object ("power" and the story of its loss: "ideology") where it can be controlled (observed and resisted). In this substitute imaginary realm, agency becomes illusory; it devolves into rhetorical reiteration, to rant. Inadvertently self-referential, Apple's critique of critical pedagogy makes this point precisely: "The often mostly rhetorical material of critical pedagogy simply is unable to cope with what has happened" (2009, 8). Reproducing the same projection, McLaren declares: "We need more than powerful exhortations" (2007, 311). What "we" need is reality.

Dissociated from reality, absent a self-critical, self-overcoming subjectivity, there has been in 30 years (Apple 1979) of "critical" scholarship no new insight, no accumulated knowledge, or intellectual advancement (Pinar 2007). There is, simply, reproduction. The political struggle that was lost in history—in 1968—was relocated to an imaginary sphere where its lost materiality and historicality became reclaimed obsessively in a symbiotic rhetoric of reproduction/resistance. Various elements were in turn reified into the "base" du jour, sometimes "economic," sometimes "cultural," now, for Michael F. D. Young, "the social." Reifications of a historical reality no longer

actual, do these "toys" provide solace in an evidently never-ending game of rhetorical substitutes for reality?

The unaddressed "I" of ideology critique is the individual person "constructed at different moments as the place where agency and structure are fused" (Smith 1988, 22). Key to ideological critique is self-reflexively grasping the reciprocal relations between one's own ideological interpellation, social positioning, and the historical conjuncture. Such an autobiographical undertaking animates as it structures the specificity of subjective and social reconstruction. In so-called critical scholarship subjectivity is defused from structure, split off and rendered epiphenomenal, construing it as incapable of agency. Agency and structure become separate satellites orbiting around an unaddressed "I"[18] left pondering how to resist the "reality" it itself has concocted.

"In political thinking," Jessica Benjamin points out, "the move to locate what is harmful in that which constructs the subject . . . tends not so much to foster awareness of subjection as to heighten the tendency to split, projecting outward what properly belongs to self" (1998, 99). Projection re-fuses in fantasy what was intolerable in reality by banishing the obstacles to resistance from inside subjectivity to society seen as wholly outside, even "objective." The critic sees that something is "there"—Don Quixote sees giants where windmills stand—but its representation in abstractions (reproduction and resistance) without concrete referents (see Whitty 2006, ix) registers only its narcissism.

"I do not encounter myself on the outside," Gilles Deleuze (1986, 98) asserts (too dramatically), "I find the other in me" (no qualification needed here). While the latter phrase conveys the social character of subjectivity, I would remove the negative in the first in order to acknowledge the inextricably interwoven relations among ideology, sociality, and subjectivity. Because it is unable to acknowledge its complicity with the reality it discerns, ideology critique in education is split off from historical actuality, the historical moment in its specificity. Spinning their own wheels, the critics of ideology cannot resist the compulsion to reiterate reproduction. In so doing, ideology critique established "an indissoluble position of identity from which to attack exclusion and unmask power, as if it were free of it" (Benjamin 1998, 103). Is the knowledge that needs to be brought back in self-knowledge?

CHAPTER 2

Decolonization and Subjective Reconstruction

Fanon's current fascination for us has something to do with the convergence of the problematic of colonialism with that of subject-formation.

Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (1991, 458)

The time has indeed come to remember Fanon.

Ato Sekyi-Otu (1996, 10)

Minus self-knowledge, resistance to power risks becoming a repetition compulsion. Stripped of subjectivity and historicity, power becomes a projection that only reproduces itself. There is something "there" all right, but without addressing the apparatus that experiences the "something" and the "there," reality reduces to social currents that only sweep one away. Floundering in a sea of sociality, action becomes quixotic, as one's voice becomes increasingly shrill as one moves farther away from shore. That shore is self-knowledge, never a completed project, always retrospective if a provocation of a painful present. It is never self-identical, however intimate and singular its contents and structures, and it is never still, as new knowledge, experience, and the pull of the present require ongoing reconstruction. In such reconstruction—simultaneously subjective and social—one activates agency, as one commits to the ongoing study of the past, a "regression" that enables one's entry into the future. In becoming subjective, one becomes historical. One develops character, one becomes a subject, and the canonical curriculum question—*what knowledge is of most worth*?—recurs.

That question is washed away in preoccupations with "the social" that devalue the specificity of historical experience, its lived and

genealogical character, its political and personal meanings. Self-knowledge requires social knowledge, requires attending to what is happening around as well as in one, knowledge that is simultaneously subjective and historical, as the present is itself never identical with itself, is always the latest wave washed shore, carrying us away, miles from where we began, miles away from where the wave began. Such images become concrete in specific lives, in all lives that are necessarily specific, however standardized the molds others construct. Molds never stay outside the skin, but seep through, and so resistance to power requires self-conscious scrutiny of one's inner life as the "enemy" is also within. There are heroic individuals who have testified—who testify today—to what is at stake in such subjective reconstruction, one form of which is decolonization.

One such heroic individual was Frantz Fanon. Coming-of-age in French colonized Martinique, Fanon knew firsthand the psychological trauma of "being objectified, stigmatized, and thus humiliated into consciousness" (Chow 2002b, 183). To engage in decolonization, Fanon appreciated that one must not only politically repudiate the colonizing regime, but also one must participate in an ongoing process of self-negation (even self-shattering: Pinar 2006b, 180–183). Political resistance, even when victorious in collective terms, is insufficient: what is also necessary is subjective reconstruction, for example, extricating oneself psychologically from interpellation by the colonizing regime. And that interpellation may have occurred for generations of indigenous peoples, installing at the deepest psychic levels tendencies toward mimesis that portend self-contradiction, even self-destruction. Through the self-conscious recovery of his own interpellation—accomplished initially through academic study in France—Fanon understood that the political and the psychological, the subjective and the social, were inextricably interrelated. No reproduction theory for Fanon.

Autobiography—the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic method of *currere*[1]—can be political when it disables, through remembrance and reconstruction, colonization through interpellation. By affirming the capacity to restructure one's subjectivity, autobiography disentangles us from absorption into collectives—even when presumably these are self-affirming cultural identities. Indeed, I share Edward Said's (1993, 299) lament over the narcissism of identity politics: "Identity, always identity, over and above knowing about others." Contradicting autobiography's association with the US cult of individualism, I have invoked the method of *currere* to perform a collective autobiography, a process of intersubjective negation (through self-criticism) and reconstruction (toward political mobilization), tracing

the history of the nightmare that is the present for US schoolteachers and education professors. Continuing to emphasize the centrality of academic knowledge in self-formation, I work from intellectual history to restructure the autobiographical demand as curriculum development (Pinar 2006a, 180 n. 3) conceived as allegories of the present (Pinar 2012, 49). The juxtaposition of the past and the present, the subjective and the social, can produce the shock of self-engagement that Weimar critic Siegfried Kracauer associated with progressive film (Levin 1995, 26).

In "teaching the postcolonial" (see Dimitriadis and McCarthy 2001), we study, then, not only the social forces that structure reality, as these confine us to the surface of the present, itself consuming through dispersing our subjective coherence. To escape the present and its disintegrative presentism, we must flee to the past; from there we can find the future. In the lives and work of those heroic individuals who struggled for freedom and independence against colonial regimes, we can engage in the subjective and social reconstruction of the subjects we have been interpellated to be. In the struggles of postcolonial artists and intellectuals, Greg Dimitriadis and Cameron McCarthy (2001, 21) found that "there is always an effort to link individual will and fortune to collective possibility." Surely the three are inextricably intertwined. For Fanon, there could be no collective possibility without subjective and social reconstruction.

The Revolutionary

> *The liberation of the individual does not follow national liberation. An authentic national liberation exists only to the precise degree to which the individual has irreversibly begun his own liberation.*
>
> *Frantz Fanon (1967b, 103)*

> *To repair oneself, burdened with an identity that has been constructed (in proslavery language, black = "slave"), is to dis-identify with it.*
>
> *Françoise Verges (1999, 267)*

On December 6, 1961, Frantz Fanon died in the United States. Born on July 20, 1925, on Martinique, educated in France to become a psychiatrist, Fanon became a militant during the Algerian Revolution of 1954–1962. It was in colonized Algeria, where he had been assigned to a psychiatric hospital, that he experienced his political awakening,

and it was through the Algerian Revolution that he came to theorize the meaning of such subjective and political struggle for liberation. Such struggle was allegorical, simultaneously specific and universal. "The battle of Algeria," Irene Gendzier (1973, vi) suggests, "became for him the battle for man." The war for Algerian independence required decolonization, restructuring Algerians' social (including gender) relations with one another and with France.

Fanon maintained his conviction, Gendzier tells us, that the struggle for self-understanding and reconstitution is integral to if not identical with the struggle for a people's political independence. In a hectic, violent, and brief lifetime, Frantz Fanon wrote four books that serve as a powerful record of the psychological and materials costs of colonization and decolonization.[2]

Fanon's writings were first appreciated within the European civilization that he so cogently criticized.[3] These writings become testaments for US black revolutionaries (among them, the Black Panthers: see, for example, Haymes 1995, 16) who considered African Americans members of the Third World.[4] The white middle class, including conservatives who read Fanon from their own racial anxiety, studied him carefully. *Time Magazine* listed Fanon's last book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, as one of the five most important books of the 1960s (Geismar 1971). "More than any other thinker," bell hooks (1996, 85) reports, "he [Fanon] provided me with a model for insurgent black intellectual life that has shaped my work."[5]

Strongly influenced by Nietzsche and Freud (see Bhabha 1989), and like his contemporaries Sartre and Camus, Fanon was par excellence the organic intellectual engagé, a "great philosopher," in Lewis Gordon's (1995, 2) judgment.[6] The duty of the revolutionary intellectual, Fanon believed, is to integrate oneself into the interior of, through working dialogically with, the people. Speeches to the masses are insufficient, he judged. The peasantry is quite capable, he insisted (as would Freire: 1968), of progressive political activity if the proper questions are posed to them: "[P]olitical education means opening their minds, awakening them, and allowing the birth of their intelligence; as Césaire said, it is to 'invent souls'" (Fanon 1968, 197).[7]

Fanon has been acclaimed as the "prophet of revolution," an original thinker who "is to Africa what Lenin is to Europe, or Mao to Asia." Others (Caute 1970) compared him to Ché Guevera; many pronounced him a contemporary Karl Marx. Some declare he was a "humanist," a "socialist," and a "passionate internationalist," and others denounced him as a "nihilist," "an apostle of violence," and a "prisoner of hate," as did the April 30, 1965, issue of *Time Magazine*. *The Wretched of*

the Earth has been likened to both Marx and Engels's *The Communist Manifesto* and Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (*Time*, same issue); the book was, some said, the black man's "Revolutionary Bible" (Geismar 1971, 2; other passages quoted in Bulhan 1985, 5–6). While many philosophers would dispute the claim that Fanon was a great philosopher, few would contest that he was, also in Lewis Gordon's (1995, ix) judgment, "one of the most influential [intellectuals] of the twentieth century."

While Fanon's writing is indispensable to understanding colonialism, decolonization, and postcolonialism, its appeal is even broader. That appeal derives from the apparent universality of his themes as well as the originality and poetic force of his theorizing. While issues of individual and collective identity have grown increasingly important over the twentieth century, few have faced their historically situated interrelatedness as courageously as Frantz Fanon (Gendzier 1973).

Early in his life, Gendzier suggests, Fanon concluded that he needed to understand himself as he was. Self-knowledge included grasping how the world looked at him: his interpellation. To change the world required understanding the world. Only through such understanding, Fanon realized, might he grasp the world's absurdities as well as the possibilities of its transformation. To write could become a form of action, Fanon knew. In its subjective origins, writing is self-focused and reflexive, but in its social expression, writing becomes outward-reaching, engaging the world. By its very nature, writing is, Fanon appreciated, an effort to communicate, to teach.[8]

As he frankly faced his situation—a Martiniquean whitened by colonization but always black in the eyes of the colonizer—Fanon testified to his subjective experience of racialization, experience he knew he shared with others. While theoretical in character, his works are strongly autobiographical. Like US slaves who wrote narrative histories (Butterfield 1974), Fanon wrote to understand himself and mobilize others. These are intersecting projects.

Subjective Struggle as Revolutionary Activity

To Fanon, there is a continuity between individual and political freedom.

Françoise Verges (1996, 49)

For Fanon, true liberation is the achievement of subjectivity.

Terry Goldie (1999, 79)

Fanon employed psychiatric research into the incidence and forms of personality disorders to understand certain cultural and political elements of the historical process.[9] Only through the medium of human personality, Fanon thought, could one understand the colonial experience. By conceiving psychiatry as a political action, his psychology of colonialism departed sharply from practice common at that time. Many psychiatrists rejected the possibility that mental illness could follow from class position or social experience, that individuals could become ill *because* they are politically powerless and racially loathed (McCulloch 1983; Verges 1996).

In contrast to most Europeans, many North Africans did not regard the pathological person as responsible for his illness. The patient was taken to be an innocent victim of spirits (genies) over which she or he had no control (Bulhan 1985). To grasp Algerians' experience of mental illness, Fanon began to study the basic features of Algerian life, including the centrality of religion and family in Algerian culture. Fanon studied Arabic; by the end of 1956, he could understand most of what patients were telling him. Fanon's respect for traditional cultural beliefs ended, however, when they interfered with what he regarded as responsible psychiatric methods (Geismar 1971; Verges 1996).

In his resignation letter to Robert Lacoste, resident minister of Algeria, Fanon complained that the Algerian had become an "alien" in his own country, driven to "desperate" acts due to the "absolute depersonalization" French governance had inflicted (quoted in Gendzier 1973, 98). Fanon's letter of resignation was answered by an order of expulsion. Within two days, Fanon and his close associates departed what would later (after 1962) be named the Frantz Fanon Hospital (Gendzier 1973).

Fanon integrated the roles of the intellectual and the political activist in the Algerian cause. The reflective "I" that had animated *Black Skin, White Masks* became the committed "we" of identification with the Algerians. Fanon's singular contribution to the cause of the Algerian independence at this time was, Emmanuel Hansen (1977) believes, the internationalization of the Algerian struggle. Through his journalistic and theoretical writings, Fanon characterized the war not only as an Arab nationalist movement; it was also, he insisted, a catalytic event in the liberation of Africa. At the time of his death, however, Fanon concluded that there had been no effective liberation because there had been no decolonization: internalized psychic colonial structures had not been destroyed. What happened at independence, he lamented, was simply the Africanization of colonialism (see Hansen 1977, 50; Sekyi-Otu 1996, 12).

To destroy colonialism, Fanon concluded that violence was necessary. Violence destroys not only the formal institutional structures of colonial rule but, as well, the alienated consciousness—what William J. McGrath (1986, 230), in another context, terms the "psychic polity"—that colonial rule had implanted in the native (Hansen 1977; Gibson 2003). For Fanon, violence was morally justified because it transformed the colonized psychically as well as politically. "Decolonization destroys both colonizer and colonized," in Samira Kawash's (1999, 237–238) paraphrase of Fanon, "in its wake, something altogether different and unknown, a 'new humanity,' will rise up." Without such destruction, colonialism would reappear in the political and social life of the newly independent nations.

Fanon depicted violence as a "cleansing force" that "frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it left him fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon 1968, 94). To justify violence as a necessity in armed struggle in a war of national liberation made sense to many—more than 10 percent of Algeria's Moslem population had been murdered in the course of the French retreat to the northern shores of the Mediterranean—but to justify violence because it cleansed those who committed it seemed to most morally outrageous (Gendzier 1973; Gibson 2003).

To address psychic alienation required political action *and* a restructuring of the colonized character of the individual. What was necessary was the eradication of those noneconomic—psychic, mythological—mechanisms that sustained racism (see McCulloch 1983, 84; see also Sandoval 1997, 100). In addition to destroying the economic foundations of colonialism, Fanon insisted, it was imperative to demolish the cultural and subjective residues of that history (McCulloch 1983; Gibson 2003). Unsurprisingly, then, Fanon was interested in the role of schooling in racism. He argued that in the cultural matrix of white society—he was referring specifically to the French and Martiniquean societies of his lifetime—schooling channeled racial aggression into socially acceptable forms. Children's games, psychodramas, some folktales, and other school activities provided, he thought, forms of racial catharsis, the social expulsion of collective anxieties. In many stories written for white children, the characters symbolizing fear and evil were represented by Indians or blacks. Racism infiltrates everything, Fanon knew. The eradication of racism was not possible as long as schools simply rechanneled it (Gendzier 1973).

Decolonization meant, then, not only fundamental social, cultural, and economic restructuring, but political education as well

(see Hansen 1977, 119; Sekyi-Otu 1996, 122). Fanon rejected Marxism; it reduced psychology to economics. He had no faith that shifts in the spheres of production and ownership would lead to shifts in consciousness. For Fanon, Zahar (see 1974, xxi) points out, the political process of decolonization can be realized only when the psychological mechanisms produced by colonialism are destroyed. Fanon linked decolonization to processes of self-immersion and Dionysian descent, McCulloch (1983) argues, forms of self-understanding achieved through self-negation and consequent subjective restructuring. Only through such self-shattering (Bersani 1995) can internalized racism be destroyed.

Fanon worked through image and fantasy—"those orders that figure transgressively on the borders of history and the unconscious" (Bhabha 1989, 136)—in order to contest colonial conditions. He articulated the problems of colonialism in the psychoanalytic language of demand and desire. In so doing, Bhabha explains, Fanon radically questioned the formation of both individual and social authority as they appear in Western discourses of sovereignty. In Bhabha's (1989, 137) words,

> [F]ebrile, phantasmatic images of racial hatred . . . come to be absorbed and acted out in the wisdom of the West. These [are] interpositions, indeed collaborations of political and psychic violence within civic virtue, alienation within identity.

This intrapsychic violence of civic self-formation was evident not only in colonized regions, but in the colonizing nation-states themselves.

Fanon argued that colonialism produced reverberations the colonial powers could not escape. These were "boomerang" effects, the importation of those violent practices, attitudes, and institutions exported by the colonizing bourgeois ruling classes. For Fanon, Fascism and Nazism were internalized—self-directed—expressions of Europe's colonial violence (see Jinadu 1986, 25). These boomerang effects disclosed that racism was, finally, a form of masochism, political as well as psychic. Indeed, Fanon equated racism with masochism (see Young-Bruehl 1996, 497).[10] The boomerang effects of colonialism's masochism constitute "blowback," a term employed by some to characterize the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[11] Like reproduction and resistance, "blowback" is insufficient an explanation, as it obscures religious and subjective sources of violence. Specific individuals committed to jihad undertook this violence against humanity.

The Here and Now

Fanon's postcolonial imagination is a challenge: an insistence that one confront the here and now.

Nigel Gibson (2003, 204–205)

Fanon's contemporary urgency is thoroughly bound up with the way his memory—precisely in its menaced and even contested character—represents for us the state of specifically cultural emergency in which we find ourselves.

John Mowitt (1999, 96)

Rather than trying to capture the authentic Fanon, Stuart Hall (1996, 14) admonishes us to "engage in the after-life of Frantz Fanon." For Hall (1996, 14), that means (after Derrida) dwelling in Fanon's "spectral effect," facing the present in its "moment of danger." While that danger remains associated with terrorism, for me that "moment of danger" is the political present in the United States, a period like interwar Germany riddled by antidemocratic movements, among them political "conservatism" and Christian fundamentalism, not always intersecting phenomena.[12] The "boomerang effects" of imperialism abroad include continuing assaults on democracy at home.

In the ongoing political crisis of the (dis)United States, the nation's originary tendencies toward unregulated capitalism and religious extremism now take the form of "preemptive strikes," aimed at both domestic and foreign targets. This predatory America has now become politically polarized, thanks to the intensification of right-wing reaction, including aggressive disinformation[13] campaigns of so-called conservatives. While its aggressive foreign policy has been moderated under President Barack Obama, the nation's economic instability intensifies as the effects—high unemployment, an unsustainable national debt, and increasing economic inequality—of the Great Recession (itself the result of mass violence: the invasion of Iraq and a deregulated financial industry free to fleece not only the general public but investors as well) intensify. "We are living," Peck (2010, 56) warns, "through a slow-motion catastrophe, one that could stain our culture and weaken our nation for many, many years to come."

Despite the publication of numerous books (see, for instance, Berliner and Biddle 1995), it has taken the egregious actions of recently elected (in November 2010) Republican governors and state representatives and senators—determined to use budget deficits to undo unionization and enrich financial backers—to engender a politically conspicuous grassroots

movement among US public-school teachers. Despite widespread public support for unionization—and opposition to the brinkmanship tactics of, say, Wisconsin governor Scott Walker (Davey 2011, A1)—the current (spring 2011) political configuration in the most visible states (Wisconsin, Ohio, New Jersey, and Indiana) does not portend success. The capitulation of governors to calls for budget cutting—in New York, and Washington State, for instance—underscores the bipartisan willingness to sacrifice schools for short-term political gain.[14] The looting of public budgets for private gain—the extension of Bush-era tax cuts for the wealthy in late 2010 pinpoint the process—resembles colonial appropriation of people's labor to build the wealth of the few.

Memories are short, however, as the intensification of daily life, the psychically disintegrative effects of the information technologies, and pervasive standardized testing in the schools erases the capacity to situate subjectivity historically. The three-decades-long federal government's assault on public schools continues by emphasizing standardized tests that measure intellectually vacuous "skills," devoid of intellectual content, thereby institutionalizing historical amnesia, eviscerating creativity and critical thinking, as both require subjective attunement to the historical moment.[15] The American Federation of Teachers' proposal of a common curriculum[16] is, in my view, a desperate if reasonable effort to blunt the anti-intellectual, neo-fascist authoritarianism of school deform.

Perhaps future generations will judge my generation with contempt. Perhaps, after Fanon, we should take up armed struggle against the neo-fascists in our midst. In confessing my disinclination to take up arms—except rhetorically—am I acknowledging my moral failure and lack of political courage? Or am I expressing my commitment to nonviolence? What I do know is that I feel keenly—as did Bhabha (1990, 206)—that "remembering Fanon is a process of intense discovery and disorientation. It is painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present." To make sense of the present historical moment—political polarization, economic destabilization, and the impending climate crisis—I study and teach the past, determined to find there a passage to a future forced from factuality by neoconservative colonists of the homeland. "For Fanon shows us," Kawash (1999, 256) points out, "decolonization is not an event that happens in history; it is rather the shattering of that history and the opening to an otherwise that cannot be given in advance, but that is always, like justice, to come." If such justice is to come, what forms will it take?

CHAPTER 3

Multiculturalism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism

> *Experience, despite its often being understood in subjective terms alone, comes only with an encounter with otherness in which the self no longer remains the same.*
>
> *Martin Jay (2005, 356)*

The idea of multicultural education is at least as old as ancient Athens. Martha Nussbaum (1997, 53) recalls that Socrates came of age in an Athens already influenced by such ideas in the fifth century B.C. Nussbaum reminds us that Herodotus studied the customs of distant countries, "both in order to understand their ways of life and in order to attain a critical perspective on their own society" (1997, 53).[1] Writing in the early to mid-fourth century B.C., Plato alludes to studies of Sparta, Crete, and Egypt (Nussbaum 1997, 55).[2] Rather than a cosmopolitan openness to difference, for many conservatives multiculturalism threatens social cohesion. "In the conservative view," Juan Flores (2006, 57) suggests, it is Johann Gottfried von Herder[3] who is identified as the father of present-day multiculturalism, "that divisive, separatist particularism that so tragically impedes our sense of national and universal unity." Why such intensity of dispute? Let us acknowledge that curricular debates over multiculturalism are also political debates over national identity.

In our time, as Reva Joshee (2009, 211) points out, Canada[4] was the first country to adopt the term "multiculturalism," the first to adopt a state multiculturalism policy, followed by Australia (Genew 2004, 7).[5] That policy, Joshee reports, was informed by "four liberal social justice discourses": (1) identity[6]-based (linked with ethnicity or culture), (2) recognition (allied with identity and

the acknowledgment of diversity and difference), (3) rights-based discourse, and (4) the discourse of redistribution.[7] Due to neoconservative ideology, Joshee (2009, 220) reports that the official state position in Canada has shifted "in recent years" from "valuing" to "decrying . . . diversity" as a "threat" to the "security" of Canada. Reminiscent of Herodotus, Joshee (2009, 221) concludes by suggesting that "international dialogue" might provide "counter discourses" to current conservative ones; she cites the Indian notion of "active respect" as an example.

While I do not assume everyone should even passively respect everyone else's culture,[8] Joshee's embrace of "international dialogue"—what Amada Anderson (2006, 73) emphasizes as "destabilizing experiences of intercultural contact and exchange"—seems crucial (see also, Donald 2004, 26). Whatever respect we might finally feel for others can come through efforts to understand difference, through study[9] punctuated by (especially international) dialogue. As David Palumbo-Liu (2006, 126) emphasizes, "[M]ulticulturalism . . . has always had an important international dimension" (see also, Gunew 2004, 55). That was evident in the May 2009 conference on "Globalization, Multicultural Society, and Education" sponsored by the Korean Association for Multicultural Education (KAME), held at Hanyang University in Seoul, presentations at which I forefront here.

"A global discourse," Sneja Gunew (2004, 15) emphasizes, "multiculturalism deals with theories of difference." Consonant with Joshee's analysis, Gunew points to multiculturalism's administrative function, as it "deals with the often compromised management of contemporary geopolitical diversity in former imperial centers as well as in their ex-colonies" (2004, 15). Such "bureaucratic multiculturalism," Ivan Hannaford (1996, 400) complains, has "led us into the blind alley . . . [a] sterile orthodoxy of an alien race relations." In contrast, Greg Dimitriadis and Cameron McCarthy (2001, 113) allege that multiculturalism suffers from an insufficient accenting of difference: "[M]ulticultural education . . . attempts to 'discipline' difference rather than be transformed by it." In its administration of difference, does multiculturalism threaten cultural particularism? Can it be a harbinger of cosmopolitanism? The answer to these questions may depend on where you live.

Nations, Nationalism, and Nationality

Joshee's recollection of Canada's prominent position in state-sanctioned multiculturalism reminds us that nations can play progressive roles

in promoting multiculturalism. For some, however, the "nation" is inevitably linked with nationalism, a concept associated with the suppression of difference internally and with aggression internationally. For many, however, the "nation" is in retreat (Strange 1996), undermined by globalization. For me, this view is contradicted by instances of intensified nationalism, not only in the United States during the Bush administration but also in the powerful roles played by numerous nation-states in internal development and the mediation of globalization (Pinar 2009, 28).

The view that the state is in retreat was in evidence at the KAME conference in the research reported by Francisco Ramirez and his colleagues. Ramirez (Ramirez, Bromley, and Russell 2009, 48) reported on what he and his colleagues take to be the curricular consequences of the educational "valorization" of "humanity" and "diversity." He identified two: (1) increased curricular emphasis upon global issues and (2) increased curricular acknowledgment of "subnational" groups, among them women,[10] children, and ethnic groups including indigenous peoples and immigrants. The first he construes to be a "transnational" curricular focus; the second he positions as "local" groups with a "global profile." He and his colleagues examined 500 textbooks published since 1970 in 69 countries to determine "whether and to what extent" (2009, 49) humanity and diversity are represented in "valued ways." Their "exploratory analysis" reveals a "cosmopolitan and multicultural emphases." Ramirez and his colleagues (2009, 60) concluded: "The nationalist spirit is hardly dead. But the shifts in the intended curricula that students increasingly face suggest a world beyond nationalism." It is not obvious why cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism imply the end of nationalism. For instance, in another conference presentation Jin ChangLu (2009, 141) pointed out that in China "the aim [of multiculturalism] is to achieve greater national unity."[11] State multiculturalism—especially that associated with Canada and Australia—are also presumably in the service of nationhood, not its disintegration.

In Suk-Ying Wong's (2009, 98) study of "textbook content, a total of 39 world history textbooks from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were selected." Wong (2009, 99–100) found that in these textbooks history was depicted as made by individuals. Among the individuals who were represented were "kings and queens, popes, etc.," although Wong acknowledges that there have been fluctuations in the popularity of this practice. In Taiwan, for instance, Wong (2009, 103) reported that "an overall decline in the number of historical figures since the 1960s and then a slight increase in the current textbooks." In

Hong Kong and China generally, Wong (2009, 105) reports an overall reduction in the number of historical figures represented in world-history textbooks. And the kinds of historical figures represented differed over time: "Both Taiwan and Hong Kong saw a departure of a great number of political-military statesmen and dynastic monarchs while China [said] farewell [to] a great number of revolutionary leaders or heroes" (Wong 2009, 107). Increased was the number of sociocultural historical figures, among them "scientific and technological inventors, human cultural contributors, religious preachers, philosophers and thinkers, and entrepreneurs" (2009, 107). Wong (2009, 107) commented:

> This remarkable increase of historical figures from the "cultural" and "science and technology" groups in all texts reveals a kind of world history that begins to engage more the social, cultural, and economic behavior of people who are now regarded as fellow citizens and important contributors to the development and progress of human society. These types of historical figures are inevitably brought about by a world history that concerns more with humanistic experience in intellectual, scientific and cultural pursuits.

Wong (2009, 109) associates this "humanistic" practice with the "Western model of a nation-state," questioning the Ramirez disassociation of nationalism with cosmopolitanism.[12] In the social theory of US pragmatist George Herbert Mead, Mitchell Aboulafia (2010, 87, emphasis added) explains, "[N]ational identity and self-determination need to be achieved *before* cosmopolitanism can come into its own." If Mead is right, nationalism—patriotic acknowledgment of domestic cultural complexity and social differentiation—may constitute a prerequisite to cosmopolitanism. While I am disinclined to endorse a developmental model, I do reject any assumption of an intrinsic antagonism between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Uncritical assumptions and sweeping generalizations always risk provincialism. Consider the concept of "globalization," for instance. Gunew (2004, 51) points out: "Globalization is often glibly invoked as a homogenizing force but, paradoxically, it yields useful meanings only when analyzed within very specific locations." She (2004, 54) acknowledges: "Whether or not and to what degree globalization functions as a liberating force for *local* cultures remains a point of contention." A point of contention implies that there are those for whom globalization *does* function progressively. Sweeping claims regarding the retreat of the state and the disappearance of nationalism due to shifts in practices of representation in school textbooks must be

contextualized nationally, as these claims are made, and take their specific resonance, within particular national cultures, however multicultural such national cultures may be.

Reparation

The contextualizing force of the nation is also clear in the very meaning of multiculturalism, which differs according to the nation wherein it is articulated. As KAME conference presentations made clear, the multicultural situation in Korea differs radically from that in Canada or the United States. For many progressive scholars in North America, for instance, multiculturalism is a "way of acknowledging historical injustices and resisting their recurrence" (Markell 2003, 163). For North American conservatives, however, multiculturalism reproduces injustice, specifically social inequality: "[E]ffective classroom schooling has to be monocultural for the same reason the marketplace has to be—so that all can participate" (Hirsch 1999, 209). For Diane Ravitch (2000, 421), "[E]thnocentrism [children learning about the accomplishments of their own ethnic group] seemed to be new but was actually an inverted form of racism that reversed the color of favored groups from white to non-white." In contrast, for Israeli multiculturalists, both common and particular cultures are emphasized as well as the dialogue among them (Sabar and Mathias 2003, 395). What becomes obvious is that multiculturalism is no unified theory, but shifts in meaning according to specific historical, cultural, and political situations.

The national specificity of multiculturalism is also evident in the well-known work of James A. Banks. Relying on a developmental[13] model (see Banks 2009, 38), Banks recommends that students move from provincialism to cosmopolitanism. In his KAME conference presentation he advocated multiculturalism both as reparation for past injustice and as a cautionary note for the future, citing not his native United States but the Netherlands and France as failures of multicultural hospitality. I share Banks (2009, 26) view that ideally "minority[14] groups can retain important elements of their community cultures and participate fully in the civic community." But this assertion elides two vexed questions: which elements and who decides? Banks complains about the Netherlands requiring immigrants to watch "a racy film that offends most Muslims" (2009, 27).

Do "important elements" of "culture" that must be respected include antigay attitudes?[15] Do they include husbands and fathers' jurisdiction over the conduct of their wives and daughters? Why

should not Dutch citizens make clear their own cultural preferences? Why must the "hosting"—not the immigrating—culture always be the one to demonstrate "hospitality?"[16] Why "recognition is still largely a one-way street . . . of white [or hegemonic] culture recognizing non-white [nonhegemonic] cultures only?" Chow (2002a, 113) asks. Such questions ignore the matter of reparation. But do historical injury and present injustice absolve "minority" cultures of ethical obligations to civic hospitality? One thinks of activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mahatma Gandhi.

The struggles those two heroic individuals (Pinar 2009, 145) personified were quite different from each other and from our own. Banks (2009, 26) points out that "ethnic minority groups in the US, Canada, and Australia experience discrimination in both the schools and the wide society." Few would dispute this general point, but are there no differences among these nations, nor differences regionally within these nations, accented by class and gender? Why are we are obligated to *respect* others' cultures? Certainly we are obligated to observe minimal standards of civic courtesy, and if we are serious as students, we are obligated to learn from and about others. But as Appiah (2006, 71) points out, "We can live together without agreeing on what the values are that make it good to live together." Living together seems to me lofty enough an educational aspiration. It does not require us to suspend cultural critique.

As an example of present practices of discrimination, Banks (2009, 30) referenced the infamous case of French prohibition on wearing the veil (*hijab*) to state schools, which he criticized as "desperate" and "undemocratic." Had the matter been in my jurisdiction, I would have allowed the veil, as the wearing of religious (and, more broadly, cultural) symbols is indeed important to many students. But it also seems to me reasonable to embrace secularism as state policy, as it can ensure that religiosity—itself an infamous guarantor of intolerance—remains primarily a private, not public, expression. True, there are merits to both positions: whereas secularity bleached of the sacred can spell cultural disenchantment (after Weber, presumably the problem of modernity in the West), uncritical embrace of religious ritual and belief is provincial and can even lead to terrorism, evident in the cases of conservative Christianity and radical Islam (Appiah 2006, 140). What is key is that the wearing of the veil (or the crucifix) be voluntary, not compelled. I decline to defend your religious faith if its practice is compulsory and/or socially antagonistic. While "Muslim women are freely adopting the veil," as Sheema Khan (2009, 42) reminds, "there are women who are forced to wear it against their will (2009, 143)."

Banks references those convicted of the London subway bombings of July 7, 2005. As British citizens, Banks suggests, these men demonstrated a weak identification with the state. But strong identification with the state—for example, patriotism—can also be a lever for civil disobedience, even violence; consider the case of abolitionists in the United States (Gura 2007, 256–263). Banks (2009, 35) criticizes nation-states for failing to help students "develop a delicate balance of identification," emphasizing both "community cultures" as well as that "knowledge and skills needed to function in an interconnected global world." This last phrase introduces an instrumentalist rationale for what would seem to me to be an ethical issue. Using NCATE[17] language, Banks (2009, 33) asserts that "citizenship education should help students acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to function in their nations as well as in a diverse world society that is experiencing rapid globalization and quests by diverse groups for recognition and inclusion."[18] If that were not ambitious enough, he adds: "Citizenship education should also help students to develop a commitment to act to change the world to make it more just." But this demand merely reiterates the political problem: what constitutes "justice" in a world characterized by incommensurable cultural claims? Given the primacy of cultural difference in his scheme, by whose criteria would the attainment of "justice" be ascertained?

Because his multiculturalism derives from the civil rights struggle in the United States—itself following a century of racial segregation and segregation following two centuries of racialized slavery—understandably Banks (as an American) links multiculturalism with democratic ideals.[19] He links all three to citizenship education. While "citizenship" could be of the "world" (see Banks 2009, 35), typically (and formally) it is associated with the country of one's birth or immigration, implying (again) that multiculturalism does not spell the end of nationhood, even nationalism. KAME conference presentations made clear that the call for multiculturalism in Korea must be understood in the context of Korea.

Rather than following racialized slavery (as in the United States), multiculturalism in Korea, according to Sunah Kim and colleagues (2009, 190), follows the voluntary actions (not involuntary enslavement) of two not necessarily ethnically specific groups: (1) the arrival in substantial numbers of migrant workers and (2) an increase in international marriages. In challenging the Korean tradition of cultural homogeneity, evidently something akin to "racism" is sometimes invoked. Kim points out that the cultural homogeneity of South Korea is also challenged by the presence of North Koreans as

well as by other Koreans who had been living outside the peninsula. We were told that teacher educators in Korea are now being challenged to prepare future teachers to devise nonassimilationist ways[20] of working with the children of these immigrants. To the extent such Korean multiculturalism may involve a "politics of identity" or "politics of recognition" (Kim et al. 2009, 192) will, I suggest, need to be worked out locally, even individually, as well as in state policy directives.

Hand in Hand

The engagement with the other and the engagement of the self go hand in hand.

Hongyu Wang (2009, xiv)

In the 1950s, American anti-ethnocentrism education efforts went under the title "intracultural education," Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (1996, 18) reminds, "a term that implies bridge building among groups that have been out-groups to each other." She points out that such an approach "differs quite strikingly from the present 'multicultural education' promoted by minority groups," animated by the determination to "maintain pluralism and give minority cultures recognition" (Young-Bruehl 1996, 18). Does the contemporary situation represent progress over 1950s encouragement of intercultural communication? Or does the self-absorption of separate groups undermine bridge building among groups historically suspicious of, even antagonistic to, each other? Does not group identity by definition threaten individual identity, at least insofar as individuality represents a subjective reconstruction of ethnic, class, and gendered determinations?

Is contemporary multiculturalism's "blind spot" its "repression" of cosmopolitanism (Posnock 1998, 302 n. 1)? Banks (2009, 38) depicts his sixth stage of cultural development as "cosmopolitanism," characterized by the universality of human rights. "The primary commitment of cosmopolitan individuals is to justice," he (2009, 38) explains, "not to a particular human community." How this view squares with his earlier (2009, 26) embrace of cultural particularism[21] is not obvious. For Nussbaum (1997, 111, emphasis added) there is no ambivalence; she endorses "the world-citizen,[22] *rather than* the identity-politics[23] form of *multiculturalism* as the basis for our curricular efforts." For me, world citizenship is to be subjectively cultivated, locally, including through national identification, but that is another

story (see Pinar 2009). Here I conclude by pointing to those elements of multiculturalism that would seem to preclude cosmopolitanism.

The primacy of "culture" in contemporary multiculturalism carries with it several dangers. First is the risk of an anti-cosmopolitan, indeed provincial, self-enclosure within one's native culture (Miyoshi 2002, 44) risking a self-righteous refusal to consider other cultures as tolerable, let along respectable. Bridge building through dialogical encounter does not preclude critique but requires one's first affiliation be civic, not cultural. Historically, there have been tendencies—as in Germany (see chapter 4)—to conflate culture with nation, thereby de-emphasizing ethnic tensions and conflict within nations (Gunew 2004, 18). The primacy of culture in multiculturalism also risks installing an ahistorical presentism (Lasch 1984), especially as "culture" tends to be reified (McCarthy 1998, 259; Chow 2002b, 112), as comprised of unchanging even "essential" features, as never intersecting with other cultures (see Markell 2003, 165), and not always already "hybrid" (Dimitriadis and McCarthy 2001, 40). Submerged in the present (especially when espousing a precolonial past), "multiculturalism" becomes a "museum" (Aoki 2005 [1992], 268). Class disappears in culture, not to mention individuality, itself often dismissed as a questionable by-product of capitalism.[24]

The primacy of "justice" in multiculturalism risks reinstalling instrumentalism[25] in pedagogical practice. If, as Banks posits, cosmopolitanism requires commitment to justice, do we, as pedagogues, always, and at the outset, know what justice is? Not only the ongoing democratic encounter with internal difference disappears into educational objectives, implementation, and evaluation. The situated (Gunew 2004, 1) contextual character of justice[26]—requiring the active articulation of those experiencing injustice—can dissolve into abstract universal qualities risking cultural homogeneity and pedagogical authoritarianism.[27] Indeed, educators can then focus more on attitudes and behavior than on academic knowledge reinstalling an instrumentalism that reduces pupils to pawns in a political struggle, not students of a social reality they change as they labor to understand it.

The centrality of "identity" in multiculturalism also poses problems, among them a tendency to stereotype when summarizing ethnicities and other groups, as well as the splintering of the social, for example, dissolving shared responsibilities and aspirations. The point of a cosmopolitan education, as Anderson (2006, 70) reminds, is to achieve distance from such identities: "There is, of course, a term that throughout its long philosophical, aesthetic, and political history has

been used to denote cultivated detachment from restrictive forms of identity, and that term is 'cosmopolitanism'." Anderson (2006, 72) emphasizes cosmopolitanism's "reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity," what we might acknowledge as, in Paul Gilroy's (2005, 79) term, "planetary humanism" (Pinar 2009, 149–150 n. 3). There is in such language a contrast with what Anderson (2006, 74) characterizes as "the hermeneutics of suspicion dominating much work on the cultural left." Gilroy (2005, 67) endorses a

> principled and methodical cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one's own culture and history. That too might qualify as essential to a cosmopolitan commitment. This distancing can sound like a privilege and has sometimes been associated with the history of elites, but I am not convinced that it is inevitably tainted by those associations. Indeed, the point of cosmopolitanism is to help us extricate ourselves and others from the past.

While culturally and historically informed,[28] a cosmopolitan education would stress the simultaneity of (1) extricating ourselves from the racist past, (2) as we labor to understand the opaque present, thereby, (3) acting as midwives to the future. To find the future, I emphasize, requires reactivating the past. For the cosmopolitan, the multicultural future looks quite different from the present, in which the acknowledgment of cultural difference is too often a call to arms, a self-promoting particularism presumably avenging past injury by claiming victimhood and "martyrology" (Cusset 2008, 314). "The point of acknowledgement," Markell (2003, 180) reminds, "is to expose ourselves to surprise appearances and unexpected developments." Rather than confining ourselves and each other to the cultures we claim as integral to identity, we might—in our acknowledgment, indeed affirmation, of cultural specificity and difference—encourage their revitalization through reconstruction. Respect for one's culture need not entail its memorialization, however repetitive its ritual practices might be. By situating one's ritualistic practices subjectively and historically, one invigorates ancient rituals with the power of the past, the immediacy of the present, and longing for the future.

By so self-consciously engaging one's present practices—remembering their ancient significance, severing them from contemporaries' prejudices—one honors one's culture not by submersion but by self-reflexive distance from it. Such a cosmopolitan aspiration—the subject's noncoincidence with itself—disassociates itself from smugness

or elitism and other conservatisms while embracing "the eroticization of otherness" (Nava 2007, 71), including the perhaps latent otherness within one's own cultural homogeneity. As Mica Nava (2007, 12) understands: "[C]osmopolitanism…is not only visceral and vernacular but also domestic," thereby gendered, often intercultural, always subjective, and social. Cosmopolitanism may well imply world citizenship, but it also invites the intimacy, even the turbulence, of embodied particular relationships, including with oneself. As Gilroy (2005, 67) makes clear:

> There is another quite different idea of cosmopolitanism to be explored here. Its value to the politics of multiculturalism lies in its refusal of state-centeredness and in its attractive vernacular style. In a sharp contrast with the recipes for good governance that have been pronounced from up above, this variant might be described as a "vulgar" or "demotic" cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitan attachment finds civic and ethical value in the process of exposure to otherness.

Such otherness is not only cultural and never static, as it is also psychic and historical. Cultivating cosmopolitanism requires working from within. Such interiority has long been associated with the concept of *Bildung*, the concept to which we turn next.

PART II

The Subject of School and Society

CHAPTER 4

Bildung in Society and History

I wish to participate in the dialogue[1] proposed by Stefan Hopmann and Kurt Riquarts in their edited collection on *Didaktik*, "generally defined as the art or study of teaching" (2000, 3), a definition drawn, perhaps, from Eric Weniger (2000 [1952], 112), who defines *Didaktik* as "primarily, and certainly in everyday terms, the study of teaching and learning, the study of instruction." If instruction and teaching are subsidiary concepts in US curriculum studies (see Pinar 2006a, 120), it appears we are engaging in a dialogue between differently positioned, as well as historically and culturally distinctive, concepts. Given these "fundamental" (2000, 3) differences,[2] Hopmann and Riquarts acknowledge that such a dialogue will be difficult. Despite the difficulty, I share their conviction that (2000, 4) each tradition can offer the other "substantial insights" and "knowledge."

Acknowledging (see 2000, 4) that curriculum theory has "taught" the *Didaktik* tradition "important" lessons concerning the relationship between school and society, on the nature and scope of educational planning, and on the socially constructed character of schooling, Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 4) assert that the *Didaktik* tradition can, in turn, support curriculum theory's interest in reflective teaching, curriculum enactment, and teacher thinking.[3] As well, *Didaktik*'s emphasis upon content as the "core" of teaching intersects, they suggest, with the "recent awareness" of curriculum theorists that "subject matters" (2000, 4).[4]

Drawing upon Comenius, Hopmann and Riquarts (see 2000, 4) list three elements of *Didaktik*. Teaching, they tell us, requires knowing (1) the content of instruction, (2) from where that content comes, and (3) how content is used. This third element is not a matter of "application" as North Americans might understand that concept, but, rather, "a crucial factor i*nduced* in any level of educational reasoning" (2000, 5). What does this mean? Drawing upon Herbart,

Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 6) describe instruction as "developing" the student's knowledge of his or her "obligations, opportunities, and choices." In Herbart's view, they summarize, "*[I]nstruction is education by content*" (Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 6; emphasis in original). This notion, we are told, constitutes the "core" of German *Didaktik* onto the present day (Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 6).

The most important contribution of Herbartianism, Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 6) stress, was its extraction of *Didaktik* from general educational theory, rendering it a discipline of its own, focused on instruction "under the conditions of schooling" as distinct from other instructional settings like self-education or education in the family.[5] Indeed, the "overwhelming success" of *Didaktik*, they suggest, had to do with being embedded in "certain institutional environments" (Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 7). The centralization of schools in Prussia required a theory regulating the interplay of these organizational domains (e.g., the state curriculum, centralized teacher education, and local schooling).

Certainly here is another historical difference, as in the United States, there has been (until four decades ago and the Kennedy administration's national curriculum reform: see Pinar 2012) a reluctance to centralize curriculum making and to align it with teacher education and local schooling. Despite this historical difference, in the 1960s there were German scholars who imagined that "the"[6] American curriculum tradition seemed to be "far ahead, and much more appropriate, for meeting the needs of a rapidly changing society" (Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 8). In Germany, the curriculum "fever," as Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 9) characterize it, "did not burn very long." The difference in "institutional structure" (2000, 9)—namely that difference between state and federal curriculum control, mentioned earlier—coupled with the strength of the *Didaktik* tradition within teacher education and school administration meant (Hopmann and Riquarts tell us) that the German appropriation of the American curriculum tradition was brief, a kind of "first love" Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 9) describe it, "hot and fierce, but short."

Didaktik did not emerge from these "wonder years" of "curriculum love" completely "unchanged," Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 9) continue.[7] The changes Hopmann and Riquarts identify bear no resemblance to Mager or to Bruner (the names they associate with "the" American curriculum tradition with which Germans had become infected), but more to the critical tradition that would surface after Schwab's famous 1969 pronouncement, during the decade of Reconceptualization (see Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 4).

First, and "foremost," Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 9) explain, "[T]here is a consensus . . . today . . . that *Didaktik* has to be critical, and even resistant," especially when state requirements do not coincide with *Didaktik*'s conception of the "good" of students. (Who determines the "good" of students, asks Tero Autio [2006b], and by what criteria? Where are issues of class, gender, and power in such a formulation?) Second, and "no less important," they continue, *Didaktik* had reclaimed its "old strength" as a "mediator" between the content and the teacher by a "radical turn" toward "content" (2000, 9).

This is, however, no reconceptalization of the synoptic textbook for teachers, as I have proposed (Pinar 2006a). Instead, Hopmann and Riquarts are referring to the substitution of general by specific subject-matter *Didaktik*, that is the "*Didaktik* produced and delivered inside the boundaries of the school subjects" (2000, 9). Just as general curriculum development was replaced by school subject specific areas in the United States (especially after World War II), it appears that in Germany, too, subject-matter *Didaktik* has replaced the previous, more generalized, versions.[8] This fact both fields face.

In order to clarify differences as well as hint at resonances between the two traditions, I will concentrate on the concept of *Bildung*, as presented in the Westbury-Hoppman-Riquarts volume. I underscore two aspects of the concept: the first its historically variable meaning and the second its gendered structure. I conclude with its restructuring by postmodernism.

BILDUNG

Humanity can be realized only in an individual way!

Wolfgang Klafki (2000a, 93)

Key to *Didaktik* is the notion of *Bildung*, defined by Ian Westbury (2000, 24, n. 3) as "being educated, [or] educatedness." He notes that it also conveys the connotation of the German word *bilden*, "to form, to shape." He continues:

> *Bildung* is thus best translated as "formation," implying both the forming of the personality into a unity as well as the product of this formation and the particular "formedness" that is represented by the person. The "formation" in the idea of "spiritual formation" perfectly captures the German sense.

During the Weimar Republic, "spiritual" became "reactionary" (see Jonsson 2000, 24), as the right wing fused spirit with matter, including technology and, specifically, the German *Volk* as institutionalized in the authoritarian nation-state (Pinar 2012, 92).

The major figure in contemporary *Didaktik* has been Wolfgang Klafki, a figure whose ideas, we are told, are still "very much alive" in German teacher education (Gudmundsdottir, Reinersten, and Nordtomme 2000, 332). Klafki (2000b, 144) describes the "first step" in preparing to teach as understanding the *contents of education*, a phrase acknowledging *Bildung* as a "basic" term of pedagogy (2000b, 146). The content of education is not, Klafki (2000b, 147) cautions, an "externally given matter," but

> rather, an organic power contained in the content itself, which has a determining influence on the conceptions and thoughts during assimilation by the mind, bringing them into conformity with itself, and thus effecting internal organization. (Willmann, quoted in Klafki 2000b, 147)

If the site of that "internal organization" is the subjective, we may have found one point of resonance between *Didaktik* and North American curriculum studies, even if we differ over the educational significance of that fact.[9]

Historically, Klafki (see 2000a, 85) tells us, theories of *Bildung* developed (during the period 1770–1830) in response to the "dangers" and the "possibilities" of the bourgeois subject. The association of *Bildung* with the bourgeoisie is shared by German-born US historian George Mosse (1996, 35), who defines *Bildung* as that "middle-class urge to self-education and character building that in central Europe was meant to create good citizens." But for Klafki (2000a, 87) *Bildung* exceeds these associations, as its primary elements include: self-determination, freedom, emancipation, autonomy, responsibility, reason, and independence.

Given these characterological aspirations for education, "creative self-activity"[10] becomes the "central" form of *Bildung*. Klafki (2000a, 88) is quick to point out that the self-determination central to *Bildung* bears no resemblance to what he terms subjectivism. Self-determination and freedom of thought and action can only be achieved through the study of what is "outside" subjectivity: humanity, culture, and the world. I sense in this view von Humboldt's emphasis on the "richness of the other" (1792, quoted in Lüth 2000, 75). Despite the complexity of the concept, the question determining the content

of *Bildung* remains, Klafki says, the same (see Klafki 2000a, 90): "What objectifications of human history seem best suited to open a person who is engaged in his or her own *Bildung* to the possibilities and duties of an existence in humanity?" I am reminded of the basic curriculum question in the US tradition, namely: *what knowledge is of most worth?* The American question is, I believe, the more political one, especially given the rejection of political, and specifically democratic, concerns in earlier versions of *Bildung* (see Tröhler 2003, 760, 773).[11]

To emphasize the inextricable link between subjectivity and objectivity in *Bildung*, Klafki (2000a, 91) quotes Humboldt's fragment, *Theory of the Bildung of Man* (1793): "[Education] can be fulfilled only by the linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most unrestrained interplay." In this sentence, self-formation occurs through that engagement with the world that promises animation. This order of engagement came to imply that the particular dimensions of the world that are potentially the most educational are aesthetic in nature.

Indeed, since Schiller (1759–1805), *Bildung* has been associated with aesthetic education. Schiller regarded aesthetic experience as primarily a "means," not an end in itself, Klafki (2000a, 100) tells us, a "tool" employed in the "formation of humanity's capacity for moral-political reason." In the *Letters on Aesthetic Education*, however, Schiller suggests aesthetic education has value in itself. That value has to do with (in Klafki's words)

> the experience of happiness, human fulfillment, of a fulfilled present in which an expectation always emerges that goes beyond that present moment, a hope, a future possibility of the not-yet-realized "good life" of human existence. (Klafki 2000a, 100)

The meaning of *Bildung* has hardly remained unchanged. At the end of the nineteenth century, its political-moral potential faded as many embraced an exclusively aesthetic conception of *Bildung*, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century (as we will see), it reaffirmed politics. These developments underscore the concept's historicality.

The Historicality of *Bildung*

Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century aesthetes withdrew from political struggle in the public sphere to private worlds where they might cultivate perfection (Janik and Toulmin 1973; Le Rider 1993).

This is one critique of Robert Musil's (1955 [1906]) character Torless, who watches but fails to intervene in the rape of a schoolmate (see Rogowski 1994). Musil was an Austrian writer who denied the uniqueness and autonomy of Austrian culture, regarding it as an extension of German culture. Like George Mosse, Musil emphasized, Stefan Jonsson (2000, 41) tells us, the "intimate" relationship between the bourgeois subject and *Bildung*, especially within the literary genre of the *Bildungsroman*, the novel of apprenticeship. The *Bildungsroman*—Jonsson cites Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1796–1796) and its "great" precedent, Rousseau's *Emile*—introduces its reader to a role model who represents an imaginary solution to the contradictions of modernity, namely the conflict between the unique subjectively existing individual and the faceless automaton demanded by mass society.

In his inward moment, the modern individual is constituted as an autonomous male agent[12] in the pursuit of personal happiness; in his outward moment, he is forced to assume the position assigned to him by society. It is this gendered contradiction—between agency and passivity, assertion and penetration—the *Bildungsroman* tries to transcend. Musil, Jonsson (2000, 27) reports, had "little patience with the jargon of soul, personality, culture, and community." *Young Torless* and—later—*The Man without Qualities* portrayed Musil's impatience.

As the social totality exceeded the everyday horizon of ordinary men and women (as, over the course of the nineteenth century, the rural was eclipsed by the urban) the notion of an individual's self-realization as occurring through harmonious participation in the social was no longer a credible aspiration of education. Just as capitalism could not accommodate (except through commodification) the aesthetic education of the individual, the aesthetic education of the individual could not, by Musil's time, accommodate capitalism. For Jonsson, it is the *Bildungsroman*, a literary genre wherein the social totality translates directly into the self-realization of the individual, that lost its rationale.

In those difficult decades before the cataclysm that was World War I, not all educators were confident that Europe was a world in which their subjectivity-existing students could harmoniously participate. The "progress" of capitalism was unrelenting (despite the political challenges posed by communism and socialism). Today, we live in a very different historical moment than did von Humbolt, when he (2000 [1793–1794], 58) could call for the "linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and

most unrestrained interplay." Indeed, as Tero Autio (2003, 323) has observed,

> [M]any features of personality we used to advocate as worthwhile in terms of *Bildung* and education have been badly depreciated by the political subordination to the sheer interests of commodification and economy.

In addition to the depreciation of subjectivity (see Jay 2005, 328), the political and natural world itself is deeply degraded, a point Klafki (see 2000a, 98, 101) himself acknowledges.

On the Gendered Structure of *Bildung*

Bernadette Baker (2001, 369) characterizes the gendered structure of *Bildung* as "building up from, and then away from, and then back to, Woman-as-Mother." This is the basic movement of boys' coming-of-age rituals worldwide (Gilmore 1990, also narrated in psychoanalytic object-relations theory (see Chodorow 1978). In aesthetic education and the tradition of the *Bildungsroman*, Jonsson (2000, 40) suggests, the feminine—as well as nature and community—enticed the estranged male subject. Art came to evoke and represent these three and thereby harmonized the two sides of subjectivity: the (male) public self, subject to the laws of the world as it *is*, and the (feminine, natural, or authentic) inner self, yearning for the world as it *ought to be* (Yack 1986). By the end of the nineteenth century, such yearning was often directed aesthetically, not politically (see Jonsson 2000, 41).

Soon it would be, however. The "upheavals" structuring Europe one hundred years ago—culminating in World War I—produced a steady stream of conservative reactions. Jonsson (see 2000, 24) summarizes:

> Worried that the intellectual spirit of modernity was too rationalistic and that the emergent social forms were too individualistic, or, even worse, too democratic, German and Austrian intellectuals sought to redress the powers of instrumental reason by asserting the spiritual powers of German culture, and to hedge the leveling impact of the masses by propagating the ideal of personal *Bildung*.

During this historical moment, *Bildung* would seem to be a politically reactionary notion, far from the "critical-constructivist" potential Klafki would later elaborate.

One work that foreshadowed this reactionary response to modernity, Jonsson suggests, was that of the German sociologist, Ferdinand

Tonnies. In *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887, *Community and Society*), Tonnies had distinguished between "natural" and "rational" will, the former grounded in the body. This distinction means, as Jonsson (2000, 26) puts it, "the identity of the individual subject and of the collective is grounded in an intrinsic essence, which conditions those manifestations, utterances, and ways of behavior through which this identity is externalized or expressed." Jonsson (2000, 7) characterizes this subjective and aesthetic structure as "expressivist."

Tonnies made no normative judgments regarding the historical shift from agrarian communities to mass urban societies, from the "living organism" as he characterizes the inhabitants of the former to the "mechanical and artificial aggregate" of modernity (quoted phrases in Jonsson 2000, 26). Tonnies appreciated that the shift was irreversible, and so he thought nostalgia futile. Most of his contemporaries and followers, Jonsson tells us, did not employ the same tone of neutrality; they saw the shift in terms of cultural decline. They insisted that these developments—often associated with Jews (Le Rider 1993)—must be reversed so that Germans might return to their presumably authentic and harmonious past.

By World War I, Tonnies's concept of community had become a popular slogan, and by the 1920s, few doubted that a profound cultural crisis plagued German society. Many scholars and intellectuals attempted to contain the "crisis" by supporting educational, cultural, and political programs aimed at resurrecting the classical *Bildung*, and thereby presumably reviving community. In 1925, Ulrich Peters, editor of the *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Bildung*, suggested that the "German soul" must return to itself; William Stern and Eduard Spranger argued that the integral "I" and the "soul" should be reinstituted as foundational psychological and philosophical concepts. (A professor of education and philosophy in Berlin, Spranger belittled John Dewey's work as "merely" economic and technical [Tröhler 2003, 765].) The educator Aloys Fischer asserted that these concepts should serve to "create the irrational bases and forces of communal life" (quoted phrases in Jonsson 2000, 27).

While taken out of context, these statements, Stefan Jonsson argues, were typical of a dominant discourse during the Weimar Republic. It was a discourse promoted by intellectuals committed to the restoration of a classic *Bildung*, the task of forging a cultural synthesis through the reeducation of the people "to make them believe in an interior truth or communal essence" (Jonsson 2000, 27). Presumably, it was only through such restoration that the German nation could be saved from its precipitous decline. These intellectuals—Jonsson

lists Peters, Stern, Spranger, and Fischer—dismissed modernity (e.g., science and democracy) because they were convinced that modernity distanced the individual from the internal truth of *Bildung*, thereby blocking him or her from expressing the German national vitality. What was necessary, it seemed to them, was a return to a premodern, authentic interiority and a restructuring of external reality, so that reconciliation[13] could be achieved (see Jonsson 2000, 41).

It was, presumably, a gendered reconciliation, at least in part. As Gerald Izenberg (2000) has shown, the feminine was appropriated by several early twentieth-century artists (he focuses on Frank Wedekind, Wassily Kandinsky, and Thomas Mann) to subjectively restructure their masculinity, then considered in crisis and not only in Europe (Pinar 2001). Not only did these early twentieth-century European men summon the feminine within them to face the perils of industrial society, they demanded that "she" be outside his psyche as well, *en personne*, at home, waiting for him to return, triumphant. Man's victory (and self-fulfillment) was judged incomplete, Jonsson (see 2000, 42) observes, without recognition by the woman (his betrothed or, as Baker notes, his mother: it is, incidentally, his mother who rescues young Torless from his gendered crisis at the school). Due to her nature presumably, this feminine figure retains a state of innocence, even naiveté, while the male hero has to suffer the knowledge of alienation and struggle before returning home, if now, allegedly, at a higher level of consciousness.

The gendered fantasy of *Bildung* is now realized: the male subject enjoys, and is vitalized by, an expressive-authentic relationship to his lifeworld and to the world as a totality; his individual self-realization then becomes compatible with socialization (see Jonsson 2000, 53). And more than compatibility between inner and outer is implied, at least for Baker (see 2001, 372); for her, this version of *Bildung* risks the exploitation of the individual by his or her society as he or she is enfolded into its totality.[14]

Contemporary theorists of *Didaktik* appear to appreciate the vexed relation between self-formation and society. Klafki (2000a, 94) acknowledges the "limitations" and "mistakes" of such "collective individualities" in German history—he references the "conquest, subjection, and extermination of other nations, cultures, peoples"—but these go unspecified. In an apparent reference to the rise of National Socialism in Germany, Klafki (2000a, 104) points out,

> *Bildung* degenerated into a stabilizing factor of a class-based society in an authoritarian state; every possibility was also excluded of facing

> seriously that criticism—raised especially in Marx's early works—as regards the realities of bourgeois society and the contradictions of its self-interpretation . . . including its understanding of education.

While disclaiming a "nationalistic" (2000a, 94) reading of *Bildung*, Klafki's general point is that these "mistakes" and "limitations" constitute a "yardstick" for a "critical" perspective he characterizes as "universal-historical" (2000a, 94). At least in this passage, these adjectives seem simultaneously Hegelian and communitarian (see 2000a, 94).

This interpretation is implied in Klafki's (see 2000a, 95) equation of the general or universal in *Bildung* with those "binding" problems that are "central for us all" and for "generations to come," the "key problems of our social and individual existence," insofar as these problems can be "foreseen." Here the Hegelian antecedents of Klafki's view are discernible, as the phenomenology of history seems to settle the matter (although the question of its teleology remains unclear). There is no acknowledgment of how contentious, how unsettled, the matter of "key problems" is, and not only politically. "Above all," Klafki (2000a, 96) concludes, *Bildung* means "the awakening of self-determined *moral responsibility*, *a readiness for moral action*, and the *capacity for moral action*." Understood critically, this includes political action, and Klafki (see 2000a, 98) refers specifically to the accelerating environmental crisis, a point, as Noel Gough (2003) has ably demonstrated, on which our internationalizing efforts might well be concentrated.

For Klafki, critical theory becomes the contemporary core of what he terms a critical-constructive *Didaktik*.[15] In a Klafkian sense, Autio (see 2003, 323) suggests, *Didaktik* is a historical-hermeneutic conception oriented to the future. For Klafki, self-formation—he specifies "reasonableness, capacity for self-determination, and freedom of thought and action" (2000a, 88)—occurs *"only"* through the study of the world: "*humanity, humankind and humaneness, world, objectivity, the general*" (2000a, 88). For Klafki, these elements of Humboldt's formula remain intact today.

This "interplay" (von Humboldt 2000 [1793–1794], 60) between self and world occurs subjectively. As noted earlier, Klafki (2000a, 87) posits "creative self-activity" as the "central form" through which the process of *Bildung* is conducted. Such self-activity must be focused and, perhaps, even restrained; von Humbodlt (2000 [1793–1794], 60) suggests subjective "unity" enables "escape from dissipating and confusing diversity," diversity here understood as an excess of the world.

While *Bildung* occurs subjectively, Klafki (2000a, 88) emphasizes that it is not "subjectivism," as "creative self-activity" occurs in the world.

Hegel stressed the "mediatory structure" of the subjective and the "objectively general" in the process of *Bildung*. Klafki emphasizes this point by quoting Hegel (see Klafki 2000a, 92), namely that the subject "comes" through the other (the "other" meaning the objective, the general) "to himself," to "fundamental reasonableness, to concrete *universality*." In the process of self-formation, the individual "has" to work off his "mere subjectivity" (Hegel quoted in Klafki 2000a, 92); he "has" to "form himself" according to the world already existing, "to make [himself] according to it" (Hegel quoted in Klafki 2000a, 92.). This sounds close to conformity[16] to me, but Klafki (2000a, 92) emphasizes not a politically conservative, but a socially progressive, reading of Hegel: "*Bildung* is possible only in the medium . . . of historical objectifications of humanity, of humanness and its conditions, with an orientation to the possibilities of, and obligations to, humanitarian progress." In Klafki's critical-constructive *Didaktik*, the central concepts appear to be individuality, history, and community particularized in self-formation through intellectual content.

In *Bildung*, the cultivation of personal uniqueness does not occur in isolation but, Klafki emphasizes, only in communication with others. The formation of individuality occurs in communication through processes of recognition (see Klafki 2000a, 93) and, I would add, nonrecognition, as in dialogical encounter with alterity. To this North American ear, Klafki's emphasis upon communication recalls our conception of curriculum as "complicated conversation," an expansive definition of curriculum that includes dialogue and recognition, as well as incommunicability and misrecognition, each accenting ongoing subjective and social reconstruction.

The Centrality of Teaching

In the trope of *Bildung*-as-education, Baker (2001, 413) tells us, the hero is also the teacher under whose tutelage the boy-child achieves knowledge of self and society, an educational process "determined more by the tutor's activity than by any notion of organic, unfolding faculties." The historically key role of the tutor might help explain the emphasis of *Didaktik* upon instruction and teaching, terms I position as subsidiary to the contemporary concept of curriculum in the United States. The centrality of instruction and teaching in *Bildung* supports Autio's (2003, 322–323) characterization of *Didaktik* as the "constant

and critical search for the mode of rationality best suited to contemporary challenges of each time." Autio (2003) locates this search and the faith in reason it implies in the German Enlightenment and its twentieth-century expressions in German critical theory, but in contrast to the critical theory, he (2006b) worries that *Didaktik* leaves open the question of who decides what constitutes "contemporary challenges" and what mode of rationality is "best suited" to address them.

Klafki's "critical-constructive" *Didaktik*—as located within critical theory, and, specifically, within a Habermasian conception of communicative action—employs reason in the pursuit of egalitarian social practices.[17] For Autio, this employment of reason contrasts with instrumental rationality, and helps explain why, he writes,

> the Germans have never felt a burning urge for postmodern discourses which have resulted—as they might see it from their intellectual background—from the critical response to the comprehensive and absurd dominance of instrumental rationality. (Autio 2003, 322)

From my perspective, the employment of reason to produce future effects—whether social egalitarianism or social hierarchies—constitutes instrumentality. If "the theoretical task is to find a content that, through its effects on the individual, will lead towards what is 'other'" (Nordenbo 2003, 334), did *Bildung* escape instrumentalization? In the next chapter, I sketch the instrumentalism of US progressivism.

In this tradition, Autio (2006b) points out, instrumentality is embedded within "the judgmental potentialities of communicative rationality." In imagining that rationality can ascertain ends as well as means, it can co-opt "democratic conversation" concerning "goals" and "power" by self-interested appeals to rational, indeed "scientific" (in the sense of *Geisteswissenschaften*), and thereby "authoritative understanding of reality." For Autio, this danger—of recasting conversation as a means to some other, calculated, ends—remains a problem with *Didaktik*, despite its claims to hermeneutics, humanism, and individuality.

As we have seen, *Bildung* functioned in conservative, even reactionary, ways during early decades of the twentieth century. Even with its critical-constructive cast, how does it fare under contemporary historical conditions? Autio (2003, 323) worries *Bildung* risks commodification under contemporary conditions of postmodernity. No longer, he asserts, can we expect *Bildung* to be capable of realizing "edifying cultural potential" (2003, 323), given that culture itself

has been thoroughly commercialized. Hiller's (2000, 209) depiction of teacher education would seem to support Autio's point:

> The education industry has in recent years been publishing more handbooks for teachers, which evidently sell better if they are presented as series of well-designed lesson crib sheets, increasingly forcing teachers out of their role as instructional designers and claiming them as engineers for learning processes, schooled in communication psychology and motivation theory.

This commercialization and vulgarization of educational culture driven by its reductive instrumentalization of teaching to the management of learning constitutes a crisis shared by *Didaktik* and by US curriculum studies alike. This ongoing crisis has reached its apotheosis in Obama's *Race to the Top* (Pinar 2012, 16).

Autio (2003, 326) describes the reconceptualized curriculum field in the United States "as an up-dated—postmodern—theory of *Bildung*." Certainly there is a resonance between our respective emphasis upon self-formation, in the United States through studies of autobiography and, in Europe, through *Didaktik*'s embrace of *Bildung*. Self-formation through the academic disciplines self-consciously situated in society at particular historical moments constitutes what I have called *currere*, the lived experience of curriculum. While I privilege study, not instruction, as the primary means of such self-formation, the structure of the educational process is not entirely dissimilar.

Internationalization

Tero Autio (2003, 326) argues that our project—enabling the "complicated conversation" that is the internationalization of curriculum studies—consists not in making connections between our "own discipline and another discipline [and] seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable vocabulary." Instead, drawing upon Richard Rorty, Autio (2003, 326) calls for what he terms the "inverse" of hermeneutics, reinterpreting our own disciplinary surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of new disciplinary inventions.[18] This is not a "constructive" activity, he suggests, in that it builds upon what we already know. Rather, such an inverted hermeneutics is "abnormal" and, as such, promises "to aid us in becoming new beings" (Rorty, 1979, 360; quoted in Autio 2003, 326). Is this a postmodern reformulation of *Bildung* or the prerequisite to a post-*Bildung*, post-*Didaktik* conception of European curriculum studies (see Autio 2006a)?

In his notion of an inverted hermeneutics, Autio names one aspiration of the internationalization of curriculum studies, at least as I have participated in it myself and have imagined its potential for my colleagues in the United States. In our encounter with those whose national cultures render their conceptions of curriculum paradigmatically incommensurate (Brown 1988) with our own, what and how we know—including our very subjective structuration of knowledge—can be reconstructed. This is akin to what Hongyu Wang (see chapter 7) theorizes as the educational potential of "exile" and "estrangement." For Wang, this potential resides in a "third space"—neither in China nor in the United States where she studied Foucault and Kristeva but somewhere between—that renders the familiar strange, the self as other. Such educational experience—without that centered and unified subject "whose individual *Bildung* was long assumed to be its telos"—leads, Martin Jay (2005, 260) suggests, to "songs of experience composed in a new and different key." That last phrase reminds us of the landmark contribution of the Canadian curriculum theorist Ted Aoki (2005 [1978]), whose performance of the auditory turn enabled us to hear curriculum inquiry in a new key, transporting us to a third space.

The constitution of community was, for Foucault, "an important, even a fundamental" stage "of the struggle to invent new forms of existence and to invent new styles of life" (Eribon 2004, 328). Creating such culture was, for Foucault, aesthetic, yes. But it was clear from the interviews he gave toward the end of his life that for him such culture is characterized as well by emotional and political structures that enable us "to escape from the much more serious looming danger of the rigors of the norm and of the totality of a 'disciplinary' society" (Eribon 2004, 328). Without escape from the social totality of our daily institutional lives, creating culture, a counter educational culture, cannot occur.

Despite the corrosive effects of commercialization, despite the complicity of universities and schools in that degradation of character commodification compels, we can focus, for the moment, upon our own *Bildung*. Perhaps we can allow ourselves to go into temporary exile, to undergo estrangement from what is familiar and everyday and enter a third space, neither home nor abroad, but in-between, a liminal or third space that, in von Humboldt's (2000 [1793–1794], 60) words, "makes possible the interplay between his receptivity and his self-activity." Can such interplay be institutionalized in the school, through curriculum reform? Let us return to the United States in the 1930s to study one answer to that question.

CHAPTER 5

"Molds" and "Spirit" in the Eight-Year Study

The molds into which education was poured, rather than its essence and spirit, became the goals of pupils and parents alike.

Wilford M. Aikin (1942a, 7)

During the 1930s, the Progressive Education Association conducted a comprehensive study and field experiment with 30 US secondary schools known as the Eight-Year Study. Detaching these schools' curricula from college and university admission requirements for the sake of curriculum experimentation, this remarkable undertaking remains today as perhaps the major school-based curriculum research project in the history of US curriculum studies. Not incidentally, the study provided a crucial career "break" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 91) for Ralph W. Tyler, who drew on his experience as research director of the Committee on Evaluation and Recording to devise his "principles" of curriculum and instruction (1949).

Stories of the Eight-Year Study—by Craig Kridel and Robert V. Bullough, Jr.—merits serious scrutiny not only because it constitutes a landmark contribution to our understanding of the Eight-Year Study through portraits of its primary participants,[1] but also because it enacts a central curriculum practice, the "translation" (Edgerton 1996, 54–55) or "recontextualization"—with this concept's echoes of Rorty (Hall 1994, 5; Roberts 1995, 239–251), Bernstein (Muller 2000, 63), and Derrida, Wittgenstein and Peirce before them (Roberts 1995, 181 n. 3)—of primary (or simply antecedent) texts according to present purposes. Indeed, Kridel and Bullough (2007, 2) characterize their scholarship as an "*act of reclamation*." In their reclaiming of this event, however, Kridel and Bullough risk reducing the Eight-Year

Study to another (if powerful) instance of school "reform" by recasting it as "an opportunity to recall what can be accomplished when educators, students, and parents come together to explore values and to develop practices that represent and reflect the desire to realize our national democratic commitments" (2007, 2). It is not clear to what extent these constituencies "came together," as there are allusions to tensions[2] at various points. But to the extent they did cannot be converted into a formula to be employed regardless of time, place, and circumstance, a reiteration of the instrumentalist-organizational (il)logic of present-day school "reform."

There are other theoretical issues at stake as well. Understanding curriculum as primarily institutional invokes the concept of curriculum *reorganization*, that is, altering the institutional forms through which intellectual content is structured. Curriculum *reconstruction* requires reconfiguration of intellectual content in light of new knowledge as well as reshaping the communicative and institutional forms through which it is enacted. While in the reports of the Eight-Year Study (and, on occasion, in Dewey: see 1920, 134–135) the distinction between the two concepts—reorganization and reconstruction—is blurred (see, for example, Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 85; Thirty Schools 1943, 419), I emphasize the distinction in order to underscore the specificity of the experimentation to which our progressive predecessors devoted themselves. Asking "how can the high school improve its service to American youth?" (Aikin 1942a, 1) and relying on "fuller knowledge of the learning process (1942a, 2), the Eight-Year Study was dedicated to teaching that "way of life we call democracy" (1942a, 19).[3]

That dedication seems to have taken primarily institutional or organizational forms. By focusing on the organization of the curriculum one is, by definition, attending primarily to the "molds" into which education is poured. Aikin is referencing "traditional" education in the sentence quoted above, but his observation seems inadvertently self-referential as well. In the Eight-Year Study's emphasis upon reorganization, on evaluation, and student record keeping, it reiterated the organizational emphasis Aikin associates with "traditional" education. Ralph W. Tyler played a crucial role in this institutional experimentation. For Tyler, central to the reorganization of curriculum was linking evaluation to the establishment of objectives, two of what Tyler (1949) later theorized as "basic principles" of curriculum and instruction. Structuring organizational experimentation through the establishment of objectives measured by evaluation institutionalized the instrumentalism of those engaged in the Eight-Year Study.[4]

Experimentation is integral to democratization, as Roberto Unger (2007, 160) insists: "The experimentalist impulse—at once piecemeal in its method and revolutionary in ambitions—must be diffused through all society and culture." One domain of such experimentation is indeed organizational or institutional. In *Stories of the Eight-Year Study*, we read accounts of reorganizing the curriculum, reimagining the teacher's role, rearranging class schedules, revising forms of student record keeping, and expanding evaluation. These activities are explicitly associated with the school as an institution and less with education as an intellectual experience of subjective and social reconstruction, although the two domains are hardly unrelated.[5] Missing are accounts of curriculum development informed by teachers' advanced study in the arts, humanities, and natural and social sciences.[6] Such study provides "new" knowledge, enabling teachers to experiment intellectually and not only by reorganizing what they know already. Combining intellectual with institutional experimentation is more likely to set the stage for the reconstruction (not merely the reorganization) of the curriculum, enabling "inner reform" as well as "external liberation"[7] (Toews 2004, 76).

Foreshadowing contemporary school "reform" was the revolutionary scale of the Eight-Year Study's aspiration, nothing less than the democratization of culture, the realization of "our national democratic commitments" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 2). With curriculum attentive to student needs at its conceptual center, the school was to become the laboratory of American democracy. "The lasting testimony of the Eight-Year Study," Kridel and Bullough (2007, 5–6) conclude,

> demonstrates that educators can experiment with secondary school practices in ways that lead to greater curricular coherence, stronger democratic communities for teachers and students, and innovative programs that are responsive to the needs of adolescents, regardless of their career and education choices.

The Eight-Year Study was, they emphasize, an "experiment in support of experimentation" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 6). Why, then, the emphasis upon institutional reorganization rather than upon subjective and social reconstruction?

Several secondary-school teachers working in New Trier, Illinois, appear to have appreciated the limits of reorganization, with its emphasis upon "molds." These teachers reported that "quite frankly [we] worked within the traditional subject matter headings, feeling

that it is not so important what you name a class period as what you do in it" (quoted in Kridel and Bullough 2007, 231). Also participating in the study, the Tower Hill School (Wilmington, Delaware) faculty "assiduously avoided the label 'progressive' on the basis that such a designation implies commitment to a fixed set of methods and principles rather than the open-minded, self-critical attitude upon which the school has prided itself" (Thirty Schools 1943, 608). I have long questioned a concept of curriculum design associated with objectives (see Pinar 1994, 123–127), even progressive objectives. Design is more an intellectual (including aesthetic) than institutional form of "curriculum-as-plan" that (like a screenplay: see Pinar 2009, 156 n. 18) precipitates (but does specify) the "curriculum-as-lived" (Aoki 2005 [1986], 144).

The staff of the Aikin, Thayer, and Keliher Commissions respected the academic disciplines, Kridel and Bullough (2007, 143–144) report, because "when applied to genuine issues—personal and social—they knew such knowledge achieved its fullest expression and its greatest value." Can the linking of academic knowledge to subjective and social concerns be achieved without ongoing and advanced study of academic knowledge in the arts, humanities, and sciences? To summarize such scholarship and research for teachers is, I have suggested (see Pinar 2006a, 1–14), one task of curriculum development. Such synoptic texts can offer, as Kridel and Bullough (2007, 103) point out in a different context, "many possibilities for teachers and students to connect academic curriculum to human emotions and personal and social values." If we add "historical moment" to this list, this seems a succinct summary of curriculum development after the Reconceptualization (Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 4).

Reorganization

Since established specialized courses would remain unchanged, the interests and needs of core initially appeared to represent less a curricular shift and more a change in scheduling and instruction.

Craig Kridel and Robert V. Bullough, Jr. (2007, 146)

In *Stories of the Eight-Year Study*, organizational processes (students were involved in curriculum planning: see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 152) seem to have been more important than the subjective and social reconstruction that teachers' advanced study of academic knowledge might have encouraged. Rather than taking advanced graduate courses in politics, culture, science, and art, teachers

engaged in ongoing conversation regarding the aim of education. We are told that participants in the Eight-Year Study came to appreciate that "determining educational aims" required "lengthy discussions" that dwelled on "*democracy as a way of life, a way of living most supportive of human growth and the development of personality*. No other *aim* would prove more important to the Eight-Year Study" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 170, italics added). The italicized phrase asserts a reciprocal relation between democracy and personality that would be restated a decade later as a negative reciprocity between authoritarian personality and fascism (and prejudice; see Young-Bruehl 1996, 49ff.). Missing is the prominence of subject matter in enabling teachers and students to articulate these concepts as lived experience. Moreover, does not this task—discussions of democracy as aim—cast the curriculum as a means to an end? One obvious casualty in such a protocol is the notion of education as "getting lost" (Block 1998, 328), wandering off the paths prescribed by others (including paths prescribed by the state), studying to find one's own way through the labyrinth that is the present.

If the establishment of "objectives" leads to the selection of "content," why not skip the first step and focus on content at the outset, on *what knowledge is of most worth*? As in the case of the Tyler's Rationale—the vignette of Tyler in *Stories of the Eight-Year Study* requires a separate section (see below)—objectives limit teaching and classroom conversation to their achievement. Evaluation—focused on objectives—seals the deal, as objectives can quickly become specific, even behavioral, trivializing teaching and study as they reduce "learning" to behavioral change and scores on standardized tests. Tyler's Rationale, wherein objectives and evaluation are sequentially linked, set the stage for *No Child Left Behind* and *Race to the Top*, the Bush-Obama era of the test-driven curriculum.

We do not require the present to see the errors of the past. Even in the context of 1930s progressive curricular experimentation, the focus on aims or objectives for an entire school seems strangely nonprogressive. If individuality was important,[8] why would the intellectual independence and individuality of teachers disappear into a "social philosophy?" If democratic communities are dedicated to the cultivation of difference, the protection of dissent, and the encouragement of originality and creativity, then in what sense can "forging a school philosophy" be "essential to the formation of democratic communities" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 180)? Does not a "school philosophy" risk becoming a totalizing discourse that obscures individual expressivity and dissent? Does not its formulation quickly become

bureaucratic busywork distracting teachers from advanced study in the arts, sciences, and humanities and the reconstruction such study encourages?

Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde

The idea of the changeless and standard-setting framework turns out to be yet another version of the attempt to see with the eyes of God, even if it is ourselves we see with these eyes.

Roberto Mangabeira Unger (2007, 5)

The strangest of Kridel and Bullough's *Stories of the Eight-Year Study* is the one told of Tyler. From his 1934 speech at a conference on testing, Tyler is portrayed as a courageous defender of the progressive faith, asserting the centrality of the teacher in assessment (see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 75). Just how central the teacher's role could be is not entirely clear, as Kridel and Bullough (see 2007, 75) also tell us that Tyler valorized testing experts. In the final report Tyler and his staff released on the evaluation of the Eight-Year Study, "[O]ne of their most basic convictions" was that teachers must be "intimately involved" in devising "assessment instruments" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 75). In "democratic schools" one would think teachers themselves would devise whatever "assessment instruments" they deem appropriate to employ, consulting "testing experts" if and when desired. What strikes me in the final report is the staggering overuse of tests ("appraisal was to be continuous" [Smith, Tyler, and the Evaluation Staff 1942, 442; see also Aikin 1942b, xviii]). Kridel and Bullough (2007, 82) acknowledge: "Assessment was quite expansive."

Tyler may have opposed one uniform evaluation for all 30 schools, but that amounts to a consolation prize, as Kridel and Bullough (2007, 76) also tell us Tyler recommended that evaluation "begin with school staffs formulating . . . objectives." Specifying shared "objectives" threatens uniformity of practice among school staffs, not exactly an invitation to experimentation.[9] And for Tyler the determination of objectives was the most basic of the "basic principles" of curriculum and instruction.[10] Tyler (we are told) appreciated that evaluation does not provide "indubitable proof of the success or failure of current educational endeavors" (quoted in Kridel and Bullough 2007, 76). As a testing expert (see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 73), did Tyler never suspect that the tail might someday wag the dog? In the 1930s, we are told that Tyler remained focused on the curriculum, not its evaluation. In assembling an evaluation team for the Eight-Year

Study, Tyler's hiring decisions represented the conviction that "content knowledge was more important than knowledge of tests" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 78). "Content knowledge" may have been more important to Tyler in the mid 1930s, but by the publication of *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*, it has been relegated to a means (e.g., "educational experiences") to ends (e.g., the attainment of "educational purposes") (Tyler 1949, 3), the achievement of which would be ascertained by evaluative instruments.

Kridel and Bullough (2007, 94) report Tyler's bemused response to Kliebard's 1970 criticism of his Rationale: the 1949 book was not, he offered, a curriculum theory[11] nor had he sought a "theoretical formulation of what a curriculum should be" (quoted in Kridel and Bullough 2007, 94). Instead, in Kridel and Bullough's (2007, 94) words, Tyler had "merely wished to pose an outline of kinds of questions that should be asked." But by outlining the questions teachers and curriculum developers should ask, in effect Tyler composed a theory of curriculum that demoted knowledge to the status of a step (and not the first step) in a sequence. Despite Tyler's demurral, the book amounted to a "theoretical formulation" that, by 1970, structured practically everyone's (except curriculum theorists' and historians') thinking about curriculum and instruction into four sequenced questions that he inflates into "basic principles."[12]

"An affable man with a mannered smile, a clever retort, and a penchant for helping others," Kridel and Bullough (2007, 96) assure us, Tyler persuaded educators to "reexamine basic, taken-for-granted educational practices and traditions." Given his emphasis upon objectives, that reexamination did not include questioning the pervasive instrumentalism associated with social engineering (see Pinar et al. 1995, 91). Rather than the progenitor of the present calamity in which the curriculum is the tail on the test-harassed dog, Kridel and Bullough offer an image of Tyler as a gentle progressive[13] kindly inviting colleagues to engage in reflection and reconsideration. In fact, Kridel and Bullough (2007, 96) tell us:

> When he urged the use of objectives, he was offering teachers the opportunity to reconsider their educational lives in classrooms, a setting deeply entrenched in nineteenth century educational practices. And when he advised educators to attach behaviors to outcomes, he was placing the responsibility of evaluation in the hands of teachers and encouraging them to look critically at the consequences of their actions. In many respects, his work continues to justify those activities for educators in the twenty-first century.

If in emphasizing objectives Tyler was "offering teachers the opportunity to reconsider their educational lives in classrooms," why do so by employing a concept—objectives—associated with industrial management? Why not use the sonorous language into which Kridel and Bullough translate Tyler's crude concept?

Kridel and Bullough (2007, 96) characterize Tyler as a "facilitator," enabling others to determine educational practice. To facilitate means to "make easier" or to "help bring about," but the installation of objectives as the first and primary step in curriculum planning has only made professional life onerous for teachers. At best, stating objectives is bureaucratic busywork; at worst, it restricts the educational imagination to what policy makers or teachers themselves decide is important and achievable and, too often, behaviorally observable or measurable by standardized examinations. Moreover, establishing objectives disguises the political content of the curriculum by creating the illusion of a rational professional practice independent of ideological investment, especially as objectives are "strained" through those screens.

Could Tyler have been unaware of John B. Watson and the movement in American academic psychology known as behaviorism? If so, that ignorance would seem to constitute professional malpractice. If, on the other hand, he knew, as any informed social scientist of his day would have known, he had to appreciate the inevitable association with behaviorism of his assertion that "[e]ducation is a process of changing the behavior patterns of people" (Tyler 1949, 5–6). It makes matters only worse to claim to be using "behavior in the broad sense to include thinking and feeling as well as overt action" (1949, 6), a definition in which all human experience becomes reduced to "behavior." There is, as well, the implied arrogance that educators have the right, let alone professional obligation, to change how people "think" and "feel." What Tyler "facilitated" was behaviorism's invasive incursion into mainstream educational practices that, by the 1960s, had become omnipresent (see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 94).

The 1949 Tyler was evidently blind to the ways his emphasis upon objectives devalued academic knowledge by reducing it to a means (e.g., a "functioning instrument" [Tyler 1949, 1]). to an external end, even a laudable one like "social sensitivity." Such instrumentality effaces experimentation by determining the destination before the journey has begun. Like basic research in science, educational experimentation requires erudition and judicious judgment as well as the courage to create (or discover) what is not yet known. The specification of objectives—then linking evaluation to these—forecloses

the unknown future as it recapitulates the present. If in the 1930s, as Kridel and Bullough (2007, 87) tell us, Tyler "fully recognized" the "complexity of teaching and learning," he has forgotten it by the time he is formulating his *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*.

Ignoring that dreadful little book, Kridel and Bullough (see 2007, 87) state that Tyler remained devoted to "school experimentation throughout his career." The experimentation in which Tyler professed faith would appear to have been institutional, not subjective or social, certainly not intellectual. His emphasis upon objectives devalues academic knowledge—sidestepping the central curriculum question "what knowledge is of most worth?"—and in so doing shifts teachers' attention from intellectual content to its institutional forms. Although I do not doubt that curriculum "reorganization" had intellectual consequences, it does not substitute for ongoing and advanced academic study, for the subjective and social reconstruction such study can engender. That Eight-Year Study participants were caught up in the larger ethos of social engineering is implied when, still praising Tyler (at one point he is actually described as "one of the most important educators of the twentieth century" [2007, 89]!; at another, Tyler is likened to Dewey [2007, 96]), Kridel and Bullough (2007, 87) depict his faith in school experimentation as meaning that "thoughtful educators, when provided the requisite resources and possessing good data, could develop fruitful experiences for their students and, through ongoing assessment, engage successfully in a process of continuous educational improvement." "Thoughtful educators" not only reorganize what they know already, but they also add to, indeed reconstruct, what they know through academic study. Study, not institutional reorganization, is the site of education. It is study that structures teaching that is itself restructured in complicated conversation with students and others. The experimentation in which teachers are most fruitfully engaged is, then, subjective and social, always intellectual. To focus on institutional experimentation renders teachers bureaucrats, however "progressive."

"Thick and Fast"

> *[E]ven the idea of a free society, based on cooperation among individuals assured of equal opportunity and respect, has no unique and uncontroversial translation into a particular organization of human life.*
>
> *Roberto Mangabeira Unger (2007, 71)*

As a high-school teacher, I wanted homeroom to be more than attendance taking. I wanted an opportunity for students—through solitary meditation and public conversation—to reflect on the day before and imagine the day ahead. From *Stories of the Eight-Year Study*, we learn that homeroom was a "place and time to unify students' interests and studies" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 107; see Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 174–175). That seems an even more grand aspiration than I had entertained in 1969. To integrate students' interests and studies would have required an assistant (or two) and more (I should think) than an hour, let alone the ten minutes I had, half of those taken by announcements made on the loudspeaker.

Ten minutes are exactly what teachers at the Ohio State University School were allocated (see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 107). "Soon," Kridel and Bullough (2007, 107) report, "counseling became part of every teacher's responsibility, and all shared in guidance."[14] Surely "counseling" can begin to be meaningful only when "Sizer's rule" (Pinar 2006a, 128)—no more than 80 students per teacher—is observed. Kridel and Bullough (2007, 108) acknowledge that these new roles were "seemingly overwhelming in terms of time and emotional responsibility," but add that teachers found that the "school day became a manageable, more enjoyable occasion of moving from one student community to another." Even within small schools or small classes within large schools, it must have been, even when "enjoyable," indeed "overwhelming" for teachers to take on these expansive responsibilities (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 108; see Thirty Schools 1943, 161).

While I agree in principle that "all aspects of the school community"—including lunch—can be considered "potential venues for social development," recall it was exactly this scale of the educational vision that scandalized the distinguished and influential historian Richard Hofstadter (1962, 340). By overreaching what it could accomplish, did the Eight-Year Study itself create the internal conditions of its own demise? By 1950, Tyack and Cuban (1995, 101) report, the Eight-Year Study had "faded in part because the participating teachers had become 'exhausted by the demands made on them, [since] challenges came too thick and fast for the faculty to digest them'" (quoted in Tyack and Cuban 1995, 101).

In 1950, Frederick L. Redefer and 29 others involved in the Eight-Year Study—including representatives of 15 of the private and public schools participating in the study—pondered why the Eight-Year Study had faded so fast (see Tyack and Cuban 1995, 100). In addition to the exhaustion of participating teachers, Redefer and his colleagues pointed to a number of external reasons: World War II and

the Cold War had produced a "concern for security [that] tended to strengthen conservatism and authoritarianism" in the school as well as in the society; in such times "everything connected with 'progressive education' was under fire" (quoted in Tyack and Cuban 1995, 100), including in Canada (see Tomkins 2008 [1986], 261ff.) Moreover, a number of colleges and universities either did not know about or disagreed with the finding that the Eight-Year Study programs enjoyed strong results. The experiment had been "too intramural" and had failed to anticipate resistance from parents and trustees (quoted in Tyack and Cuban 1995, 101).

If the pace and scale of the experiment had been exhausting for participating teachers, and if foreign threats to US security had emboldened political conservatives so that progressive educational experimentation was rendered controversial, how can the Eight-Year Study provide inspiration for contemporary teachers? US teachers have never been more exhausted or overwhelmed than they are now—they are fleeing the profession at unprecedented rates (Gabriel 2011, A18), although they left during the Eight-Year Study as well (see Tyack and Cuban 1995, 101)—and political conservatives exploit foreign threats (especially terrorism, but economic competitiveness as well) to mobilize a wide range of reactionary, antidemocratic interventions.[15]

The Significant Thing

The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing.

John Dewey (1920, 177)

Consonant with its echoes of post–Civil War America,[16] the concept of *reconstruction* emphasizes experimentation. To reconstruct, the dictionary tells us, means to "establish or assemble again, to subject (an organ or part) to surgery to re-form its structure or correct a defect." Dewey underlines this last idea in his assertion that thinking—the means of reconstruction (1920, 134)—"takes its departure from specific conflicts in experience that occasion perplexity and trouble" (1920, 138). While Eight-Year Study's participants also pointed to the resolution of "conflicts" as animating the "reconstruction of experience," apparently they proceeded by applying "a consistent philosophy of life" considered "basic to democratic living" (Thirty Schools 1943, 722). Predetermining the

consequences of reconstruction, as Dewey implies (in the epigraph), undermines its potential.

Even when reconstruction begins in correcting defects, it proceeds by thinking transformed by "continued progress in knowledge," thinking that does not necessarily replace but protects "old knowledge from degeneration" (Dewey 1920, 34). Such "progress" requires, Dewey suggests, the "invasion of the unknown, rather than repetition in logical form of the already known" (1920, 34). It asserts the "superiority of discovery of new facts and truths to demonstration of the old" (1920, 31). The emphasis upon discovery of new knowledge denotes reconstruction, while demonstration of what we know already is associated with reorganization.[17]

As the dictionary definition suggests, *reorganization* is devoted to recreating a "coherent unity or functioning whole," as in "the school." It means to "integrate": "trying to organize her thought" is the example the dictionary offers. In addition to the emphasis upon the organizational unit—the school—in the Eight-Year Study, I would point to "core" and "fusion" (Thirty Schools 1943, 162, 257) as curricular instances of "organizing thought." Finally, the dictionary includes the phrase "to set up an administrative structure for" in its definition of "to organize," which, adding the prefix "re" would specify reconfiguring the administrative apparatus (e.g., Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 184–209). Despite its pedagogic intention, appraising student progress could not be free of administrative intent, nor was it limited to tests conducted by others. Appraisal was to be internalized: the Parker School, for instance, dedicated itself to "develop in students habits of self-analysis, self-evaluation, and discrimination" (Thirty Schools 1943, 298). With its Foucauldian echoes (see Baker 2001, 622), such alignment of internal with administrative surveillance threatens conformity, not individuality.

That the cultivation of individuality (individualization) and democratization were inextricably interrelated is acknowledged on several occasions. The Baldwin School's contrast between "individualization" and "individualism" (Thirty Schools 1943, 24)—the former taking curricular form through "work on long individual topics" (1943, 25)—underscores the social relationality, not isolationism, of individualization (see also 1943, 264, 361, 550, 720). In the George School report, the educational significance of knowledge is construed as "the inner compulsion to act" (1943, 362). Suspending for the moment the psychoanalytic complexity of the phrase, such assertion of self-critical curiosity becomes expressed in an "endless

and persistent uncovering of facts and principles not known" (Dewey 1920, 34). Such reconstruction implies

> the individual not as an exaggeratedly self-sufficient Ego which by some magic creates the world, but as the agent who is responsible through initiative, inventiveness and intellectually directed labor for re-creating the world, transforming it into an instrument and possession of intelligence. (Dewey 1920, 51)

The individual is also subjectively reconstructed by her or his agency in the world.

"Individuality in a social and moral sense," Dewey (1920, 194) explains, "is something to be wrought out." It is not a given. Indeed, the democratic project of individuality is threatened by an atomistic conception of individualism. For Dewey, then, individuality becomes an opportunity, a subjective aspiration, and ethical obligation: "It means initiative, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct" (1920, 194). The point of democracy is to encourage such individuality, such "all-around growth" (1920, 186).

While on occasion reducing reconstruction to problem-solving (see 1920, 162), Dewey seems clear that reconstruction requires not the reorganization of existing knowledge to achieve objectives, but the discovery of new knowledge to provide passages to futures that cannot be specified in advance. Like utilitarianism, however, reorganization becomes trapped by the instrumentalism it employs to surpass the past:

> Utilitarian ethics thus afford a remarkable example of the need of philosophical reconstruction which these lectures have been presenting. Up to a certain point, it reflected the meaning of modern thought and aspirations. But it was still tied down by fundamental ideas of that very order which it thought it had completely left behind: The idea of a fixed and single end lying beyond the diversity of human needs and acts rendered utilitarianism incapable of being an adequate representative of the modern spirit. It has to be reconstructed through emancipation from its inherited elements. (Dewey 1920, 183)

In the Eight-Year Study, that "fixed and single end" appears to have been "student needs," in the name of which the curriculum was to be reorganized. Chair of the Committee on Adolescents, Caroline Zachry believed that such "needs" could be ascertained empirically, and that they would prove to be same for all adolescents (Kridel and

Bullough 2007, 126). Such an "inventory of needs" (quoted in 2007, 126; Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 7–8) would provide the "template to design the curriculum" (2007, 126). As Kridel and Bullough (2007, 129) point out, the relation between democracy and adolescent needs was never worked out (see also Bullough and Kridel 2003, 160). The erasure of individuality by a de-individualized conception of "adolescent needs" comprises one "fixed and single end" Eight-Year Study participants failed to leave behind.

Conclusion

> *Both beguiling and disconcerting, this grand experiment continues to capture our imagination.*
>
> *Craig Kridel and Robert V. Bullough, Jr. (2007, 2)*

Emphasizing organizational over intellectual experimentation, the Eight-Year Study is, indeed, "disconcerting," as it privileged the institutional forms curriculum takes over its intellectual substance, in Aikin's (1942a, 7) language its "molds" over its "essence" and "spirit." The distinction between form and substance is hardly absolute, as the juxtaposition of even well-worn academic discourses with present social concerns and organized according to faculty and student interests can animate educational experience. But without the ongoing incorporation of new knowledge[18] into the school curriculum, even creative curriculum reorganization fails to address present circumstances. New academic knowledge, juxtaposed to developments in the public sphere (also in popular culture) and to those ideas students themselves articulate in class, can invigorate existing school curriculum as it provides opportunities for intellectual experimentation animated by the immediacy of the historical moment. Critical of avant-gardism and of naive conceptions of progress that position the "new" as always "better" than the old, an Eight-Year Study for our time would provide, first of all, opportunities for teachers to concentrate on advanced academic study, and not only in education. Curriculum studies scholars can provide succinct summaries and provocative juxtapositions of new academic knowledge that teachers can find helpful in their ongoing curriculum development, an intellectual rather than institutional undertaking, a subjective and social pursuit of understanding, not an always already doomed exercise in social engineering.

The Eight-Year Study was, in Kridel and Bullough's fine phrasing, "beguiling" as well as "disconcerting," seducing many of its participants and successive generations of scholars and schoolteachers into believing that the promise of American democracy can be actualized through the reorganization of the school curriculum. Educators know how crucial schooling can be in one's life; perhaps that autobiographical knowledge prepares us to be "beguiled" by the sheer scale of the progressive aspiration. I am not implying that the education is unrelated to democratization, but I am insisting that the school (as an organizational entity) was never—is not now[19]—the primary means of social reconstruction. Nor is the school the sole lever for upward social-economic mobility, as present-day conservatives self-servingly allege and reproduction theorists rule out (see chapter 1). Education can be enlightening but its institutionalization is an ambivalent friend, ensuring as it threatens its survival.

If education contributes to democratization through experimentation, it does so less by reorganizing its institutional "molds"—the rescheduling and renaming of courses—and more by the invigoration of the intellectual content of those courses offered by animated, erudite, and imaginative teachers attentive to particular students in particular classes in particular schools. In concentrating on the reorganization of the curriculum (rather than its intellectual reconstruction), in overemphasizing the potential of teaching (by expanding the range of responsibilities), in its overconfidence in the claims of learning theory and knowledge of youth, in its identification of the school as the unit of success or failure, and in its overuse of evaluation, the Eight-Year Study helped set the stage for the catastrophe—so-called school "reform"—that has befallen us now. *That* is also the story of the Eight-Year Study.

PART III

The Subject of Educational Experience

CHAPTER 6

Subjective Reconstruction through Aesthetic Education

Aesthetic education is...integral to any educational enterprise.

Maxine Greene (2001, 139)

The fate of the Eight-Year Study remains with us still, as educational reform remains organizational in emphasis, institutionalized as *school* reform. If the public is to be educated in the United States, inner reform is required. That is, what teachers know is the main thing, just as the curriculum is the intellectual and organizational centerpiece of any educational institution. Certainly organizational shifts—small class size is among the most obvious, as it provides the physical prerequisite for animated conversation—are appropriate as teachers judge them convenient. Cramming for tests, especially the standardized kind split off from daily classroom conversation, deforms schools, as it ends complicated conversation and open-ended study, replacing democracy with autocracy. Rather than paramilitary schools, democracy requires aesthetic education. Understanding art (whether as performance or object) as event and as simultaneously continuous and disjunctive with everyday experience, Maxine Greene envisions aesthetic education as engendering subjective and social reconstruction.[1]

The "starting point," Greene (2001, 8) asserts, is experiencing the arts from the "inside," that is, "how they mean." As Greene makes clear, the injunction to experience the arts from the inside—not necessarily as an artist, but nonetheless as a participant within the experience of the art-as-event[2]—is not only a starting point. This point reasserts itself again and again throughout Greene's lectures at the Lincoln Center Institute. The Ciardian[3] phrase at the end of Greene's sentence quoted above reminds us that art cannot be reduced to its

content (such as themes), nor to the intentions of the artist or to its social circumstances (the so-called genetic fallacy). Nor can art be conflated with its political significance or psychological meaning (reception theory). After Jackson Pollack, one must "work from within" the experience of art-as-event, emphasizing the "subjective dimension of our knowing" (Greene 2001, 11). Aesthetic understanding accompanies such working with the "raw material" of art (2001, 10). That adjective recalls the corporeal, even somatic, nature of aesthetic experience (Jay 2005, 146).

Like Susan Sontag[4] in *Against Interpretation*, Maxine Greene distrusts overly intellectualized encounters with the arts; she emphasizes the liminality of aesthetic education, underscoring its "lyrical moments" (2001, 12) comprising the "vivid present" (2001, 15). Through such intensification[5] of perception not only is art apprehended on its own terms, but also the person undergoing such experience can break free of one's socially determined location, one's subject position. For me, such intensification of experience implies self-shattering[6] insofar as the boundaries of the self dissolve into the aesthetic experience that extricates us from identification with—even submersion in—the banal, the provincial, and presses us into the world. Wherever aesthetic experience leads us, however, Greene (2001, 16) reminds that "our lives" constitute the "ground against which we experience works of art."

That phrase—"our lives"—points not only to the primacy of subjectivity in aesthetic experience, but also to its reconstruction through autobiography, as "our lives" are always already narrative extrapolations of lived experience.[7] Aesthetic encounters enable us to discover "unexpected resemblances... between the inner and outer" (2001, 74). In my terms, aesthetic experience provides passages between subjectivity and sociality, as it traverses the space between public and private and, like allegory, remains rooted in the particular while invoking the universal (Mosès 2009 [1992], 99). That relational, reconstructive, potential acknowledged, in these talks to teachers Greene asks her listeners to concentrate on the subjective. When Greene (2001, 18) asks how works of art stimulate aesthetic experience, for instance, she follows it with additional questions that turn us inward, asking us to focus on how art brings "illumination" to our lives. How, she asks, does art "bring us in touch with ourselves?" While it does not remain inside, aesthetic experience seems, for Greene, to occur there, if always in relation to the art as an event in the world (see 2001, 22).

Because Greene is wary of the scientism of American culture, she is careful not to be painted into a corner wherein the arts can be dismissed

as "mystical," beyond rationality, "beyond understanding, beyond words" (2001, 19)." This is a key point. "[T]he more we know," Greene (2001, 29) points out, "the more we are likely to see and hear." Recall that in her critique of interpretation Sontag did not dismiss erudition; it was the evasion of visceral experience through a precious and stylized intellectualization, the superimposition upon aesthetic experience of preextant interpretive grids (whether psychoanalytic or Marxist, for instance) that she criticized. After all, without academic knowledge one might not see this or hear that, and what are missed are not only the subjective dimensions of aesthetic experience, but reality itself (Pinar 2009, vii). Greene is reluctant—is it her progressive training?[8]—to dwell on these intellectual (indeed, academic) prerequisites to liminal experience, devaluing on one occasion biographic information about Aaron Copland, allowing that it is "meaningful" but not of "overriding significance" (see 2001, 203). If such information is meaningful, why not understand it as providing passage to imaginary worlds?[9]

Rather than viewing them as reciprocally related, however, Greene (2001, 58) demarcates "educated understanding" from "mere information" and "pure analysis." "Subject matter" (2001, 193) is important as a device for achieving extra-academic ends (specifically "agency") but not, she adds, for "uncovering some hidden meaning others have predefined." Why would such archeological labor not also engage "agency?" The "ruin" (Santner 2006, xv)—here a metaphor for the historicity and genealogical character of human creation—specifies the simultaneous sense of remnant and excess we experience when we encounter any work of art. Greene's apparent assertion of the "priority of pedagogy over curriculum" (Green and Reid 2008, 23) facilitates an unnecessary distinction between facts and understanding, between academic knowledge and lived experience.

The inflation of teaching is, in part, a consequence of its separation from curriculum. Contextualized in the curriculum, teaching assumes its appropriate scale as informed interlocution, the conducting of multiply-referenced conversation. Split off, or even in a conjunctive relationship with curriculum (as in "curriculum and pedagogy"), teaching devolves into a sometimes behavioral version of "instrumental rationality" (2001, 165). Education devolves into training when it becomes the means to noneducational ends. For many US politicians, for instance, education is a means to increased Gross National Product; for many US education professors, schooling is a means to the achievement of "social justice." Deflecting criticism of their redistribution of national income (from the lower and middle to the upper classes) since 1968, so-called conservatives

in the United States have shrewdly (if disingenuously) insisted that teachers are accountable for the socioeconomic fortunes of their students. Among the casualties in these various versions of instructional instrumentalism are not only academic knowledge for its own sake, but, as well, any concern for its educational significance, for example, study that engenders not only erudition but subjective and social reconstruction also.

Few education professors manage to escape the trap of instrumentalism. At first blush, it seems Greene has in fact avoided it. She (2001, 26) acknowledges that there are students who may not "value" aesthetic education, that all one can do as a teacher is "find a language that may help them attend." "[W]e cannot predetermine what will happen," she (2001, 68) admits, "or package it, or test for results." Like Ted Aoki (2005 [1990], 367), Greene (2001, 142) appreciates that teaching is comprised of "moments of improvisation." She emphasizes: "What we are trying to bring about is neither measurable nor predictable" (2001, 30).

Education may be neither "measurable" nor "predictable" but there is something Greene is still trying to "bring about." It is a lovely thing she wants to bring about, but even a lovely objective is an objective nonetheless, which commits one to acting toward its realization, risking instrumentality. This is where things get ugly, as we must reduce the present to its function in achieving the planned future, as when she asks (2001, 23): "How do we invent the kinds of situations that release people for [aesthetic] moments like these?" Even when the objective is solitude, and the aesthetic experience solitude allows (see 2001, 32), the present becomes deformed as the unexpected becomes, if not an outright impediment, then an opportunity (as in the so-called teachable moment), but rarely the primary point of educational experience. To her credit, never does Greene succumb to the Tylerian (1949) catastrophe of binding evaluation to objectives: "We, as teachers . . . can [never] know what we have done," (2001, 61) she acknowledges. But the slide down the slippery slope of instrumentalism begins in the formulation of objectives, however apparently progressive they sound.[10]

Imagination

We are interested in breakthroughs and new beginnings.

Maxine Greene (2001, 45)

The imagination, Greene (2001, 30) asserts, is "the most focal" of our "concerns." Imagination is perhaps the central concept in Greene's

oeuvre, and not only in this collection of talks to teachers. “Without the release of imagination,” Greene (2001, 65) asserts, “human beings may be trapped in literalism, in blind factuality.” This faith in “the redemptive power of art” (Jay 2005, 163)—one I share, if with trepidation[11]—has affirmed by many, among them John Dewey and (to reference one of my intellectual touchstones) the great Austrian novelist Robert Musil. “In Musil’s account,” McBride (2006, 19) points out,

> the ecstatic experience triggered by aesthetic feeling favors a reshuffling in the individual’s perception of reality and disrupts formulaic modes of experience, releasing the individual from the spell of established pictures of the world and opening up a space for the imaginative play with, and the emancipatory reaggregation of, given elements of experience.

Such “reaggregation” constitutes the labor of subjective reconstruction and its consequence; it is the final phase of the method of *currere*: synthesis.

For Wallace Stevens—whose poem “The Man with the Blue Guitar” provides the central image for the collection—the imagination enables us to discern the “normal” in the “abnormal” (Greene 2001, 83). Its redemptive potential is not restricted to perception, however; for Greene, the imagination seems to portend political possibilities, although these are left unspecified. The first “phase” of “imaginative awareness,” Greene (2001, 31) tells us, is the “focusing,” the “careful noticing.”[12] Accompanying such apprehension of art-as-event, she continues, is “savoring” in “inner time,” the “elaboration of what has been seen or heard, the seeping down” (2001, 31). This inner solicitude cannot easily be conducted in public amidst the clamor of the crowd; Greene (2001, 60) emphasizes “taking time . . . moments of stillness . . . [in] coming to know.” This acknowledgment of the significance of solitude underlines the interiority of study, including its dialogical character, and not only with others. One engages oneself in complicated conversation as well as with others.

Such self-reflexive educational experience is structured temporally. “Because we are different at different moments of our lives,” Greene (2001, 36) reminds her listeners, “the works that we encounter can never be precisely the same.” This acknowledgment of the centrality of temporality in aesthetic experience gestures toward the temporality of educational experience more generally (see too Huebner 1999,

131–142), and specifically at what I have termed the "biographic significance" of study (2004, 36). As we know, the academic significance of a particular work is its importance for the discipline it addresses. Educational significance is mindful of the academic importance of specific works, but it is not restricted to disciplinary considerations. Rather, educational significance forefronts the meaning of the artwork for the individual and for society, meaning that shifts in different moments, both subjective and historical.

Art is, then, no static (however singular) achievement of balance and symmetry, no "form of aesthetic totalization" (Santner 2001, 136). Nor is it a "melancholic" or "romantically ironic index of the incomplete aspect of all human endeavors" (2001, 136). In Eric Santner's (2001, 136) intriguing formulation, art is a "self-interrupting whole—one animated, as it were, by a 'too much' of pressure from within its midst." Aesthetic apprehension enables creative tensionality, as it disallows one from disappearing into the event that is the art object or performance *or* retreating into one's subjective experience of it. "Self-interrupted" through the "excess" of the aesthetic moment, one inhabits a "third space"—on which we will focus in the next chapter—in-between art and subjectivity. The experience of arts pulls us into the world as it refracts the world through our subjectivity; the educational undertaking involves inhabiting the middle while grounded in, attentive to, and engaged with both self and society. Greene (2001, 179) urges us to "recover those moments when imagination, released through certain encounters with the arts, opened worlds for you" (i.e., the regressive phase in the method of *currere*: Pinar 1994, 253ff.). Greene's succinct statement of subjectivity as passage to the world also expresses the reciprocal relation between subjective and social reconstruction.

Note that Greene never retreats into a subjectivity severed from sociality, never withdraws from that public world in which subjectivity comes to form. Nor does she disappear into the public, as did the ideologically obsessed (see chapter 1). Indeed, Greene privileges the reciprocity between the private and the public. She points out, for instance, that Dewey associated the "quality of selfhood with the interests taken in certain things, the desire to relate, to grasp, to *be*" (2001, 149). While in that sentence Greene emphasizes the subjective, what is also at stake (and implied in that sentence) is that it very much matters with what and with whom one becomes. While Greene eschews any Hirsch-like list of facts everyone must memorize, she does emphasize European literature, art, and philosophy. The imprinting of Sartrean existentialism specifically is evident throughout the

collection. Time and again one hears echoes of Sartre's emphasis upon freedom and the choice it compels: "We have only to free ourselves, to choose," Greene (2001, 23) admonishes us. The educational significance of European culture references the specificity of Greene's academic career (see Greene 1998).

While she emphasizes European culture, Greene acknowledges the educational importance of popular and non-Western culture (2001, 206, 184). "Aesthetic education," Greene (2001, 170) asserts, is a process of "empowering diverse persons to engage reflectively and with a degree of passion[13] with particular works of art." Engagement compels us to choose because art engages our agency. Art solicits passion, and Greene appreciates its erotic and emotional elements (see 2001, 169). Even desire is interesting to Greene for its aesthetic potential. Through desire one becomes, achieves selfhood, and acts in the world.

Perhaps because the project of subjective reconstruction is animated by passion, it is not free of suffering. There is an element of Nietzschean self-overcoming in reconstructing selfhood,[14] detectable when Greene (2001, 179) asks if her listeners "cherish" the arts "because they . . . bring you . . . to strain upwards, beyond yourself?" Such self-overcoming is not undertaken according to any split-off set of ideals or social (especially bourgeois) expectations. While both ideals and expectations may provide provocations for self-reflection, including self-criticism, each can distract and thereby undermine critical self-engagement. While informed by reality, the singularity of one's situation requires threading a needle only the individual himself or herself can discern, however, aided by others.

Greene (2001, 39) provides a first-person testimony to self-overcoming when she acknowledges that she herself had to "uncouple" from the "mundane" so that she might "perceive the qualities" in various art forms. Such uncoupling occurs thanks to the engaging qualities structuring the art-as-event; those qualities become discernible, as Greene points out, due to a self-conscious (and possibly chosen) estrangement from the everyday, an existentialist idea she takes for the title of her 1973 *Teacher as Stranger*. Here writing without the existentialist language, Greene emphasizes the role of such distantiation in aesthetic experience:

> It takes a kind of distancing, an uncoupling from your practical interests, your impinging concerns, to see what we sometimes describe as the qualities of things, to make out contours, shapes, angles, even to hear sound as sound. (2001, 53)

The role of distance—conceived as estrangement, even exile (Wang 2004, 135)—is crucial in aesthetic perception, but endorsements of "distance" are not without controversy, as they challenge those experience-based assertions of authority associated with identity politics (see Anderson 2006, 70), what Greene (2001, 186) might criticize as the "crusts of mere conformity."

While we can "only welcome the challenges of multiculturalism," Greene (2001, 184) asserts, it is clear she is not without ambivalence toward its tendencies toward ethnic and cultural essentialism. While welcoming the expansion of the canon (2001, 105, 184, 190, 206), she challenges the subsumption of the individual into collective identity, whether that collective identity is cultural, religious, class based, or ethnic (see 2001, 185). Such a collective identity threatens to totalize subjectivity, restricting its reconstruction to preapproved forms, thereby limiting existential freedom and foreclosing the "power of incompleteness" (2001, 154). Such power is the lure of "what is not yet" (2001, 202).

Conclusion

All this means breaking with confinement.

Maxine Greene (2001, 84)

The primary point of the Lincoln Center Institute, Greene (2001, 146) tells us, is to provide opportunities for teachers to "choose" themselves, to "pursue untapped possibility." This conception of the educational significance of the arts—breaking with the banal (2001, 162)—forefronts intense encounters with art-as-event, requiring us to focus simultaneously on its qualities and on our life histories. What the Institute can provide, Greene (2001, 150) testifies, are opportunities to "recapture" a "lost spontaneity" and the experience of "wonder at the strange." What the arts offer us, then, is the "releasing" of our imagination, enabling us to "move into the 'as-if'—to move beyond the actual into invented worlds, to do so within our experience" (2001, 82). While working within our experience, we are not confined there, as our capacity to reconstruct ourselves is then enacted in the social world, which is then itself, however incrementally, reconstructed (see 2001, 50).

Like artists, Greene (2001, 70) argues, teachers undergo inner transformation as they recreate their "raw materials" (e.g., curriculum materials) through communicative enactments of their subjectivities

with others, specifically their students. Here, Greene seems to me to be articulating the creativity of "free indirect subjectivity" (Rohdie 1995, 156), a phrase devised by Pier Paolo Pasolini. "It is this primacy of style," Pasolini (2005 [1972], 86) asserted (referencing filmmaking but relevant here as well), "that, reanimating the speech of others, causes the material recovered in such a manner to assume an expressive function." Such aesthetically structured teaching encourages students to reconstruct their own lived worlds through their reanimation of the material they study. This subjective restructuring—that process is also an animation, rendering one's intellectual passions "contagious" (2001, 179)—is, Greene notes, "a matter of bringing to the surface forces, stirrings, desires we often cannot name" (2001, 108). There we can represent them, and perhaps not only (if primarily) in language, but as well through other aesthetic forms offered to us by the arts.

Key in such educational experience is the moment of encounter, the juxtaposition of art and subjectivity, a montage of "unlike things" (2001, 118). Should the classroom be anything but such a disjunctive ever-shifting juxtaposition of texts, teachers, and students? While critical pedagogues lament the failures of "resistance" to a world they themselves have decreed as ruled by reproduction (see chapter 1), Maxine Greene is the politically engaged public intellectual who enacts agency *within* the world. In Greene's world the obstacles one faces are restructured as opportunities through *choices* made "as an individual and as a teacher, struggling to be true to what you know and have encountered in your life, trying at once to communicate to others" (2001, 181). By subjectively—passionately—engaging in the complicated conversation that is the curriculum, we can labor, as Greene (2001, 206) asserts, to enable our students to render intelligible their "actual lived situations" and in so doing labor to "transform them." "That," Greene (2001, 207) concludes, "is what the blue guitar can do." It is the best anyone can do.

CHAPTER 7

Currere and Cosmopolitanism

What may exile and estrangement bring to one's life?

Hongyu Wang (2004, 3)

One may choose to go into exile, but estrangement is, ordinarily, an unintended consequence of unhappy events, not an end-state to which one aspires. Not so for Maxine Greene (1973) who, almost 40 years ago, suggested that estrangement enables education. As we have seen in the chapter preceding, an aesthetic education can help us separate us from our situation. Such psychic distance provides opportunities for subjective and social reconstruction, if we ground our present in the past. From there we might discern passages into a future more cosmopolitan[1] than our present proximity permits. With Hongyu Wang (2004, 3) we might ask: "What may exile and estrangement bring to one's life?" As we learn from Wang's powerful posing of the question,[2] its answering requires leaving home.

Leaving Home

Home itself can be a third space.

Hongyu Wang (2004, 9)

Contrary to common sense, home is not preexistent or fixed; it is, Wang (see 2004, 6) suggests, always in a process of creation. The stranger—to whose call Wang responds so remarkably—is the fabled "other" invoked by psychoanalytic and multicultural theory. Wang's conceptualization seems more evocative still: the stranger is another person, yes someone unfamiliar, even (given our parochialism) strange. But the "other" can also be someone quite familiar, a parent perhaps, one's child, or spouse. Who has not discovered something

unknown (which we might disavow as "that's not you!") in someone we thought we knew? Even more intimately (presumably), we might discover the stranger within ourselves.

For Julia Kristeva, Wang (2004, 5) reminds, "woman" enjoys the "peculiar" status of the stranger who is estranged both at home and in the public world. For woman, Wang (2004, 5) suggests, the stranger "whispers" from the "shadow." I am reminded of the famous epistemological metaphor of the campfire (associated with Karl Jaspers). We stay close to the light the fire generates so we may see what surrounds us, but we know the larger world exists beyond those shadows the fire casts.

Wang employs auditory, not visual, metaphors to depict the exploration of what is simultaneously subjective and social, characterizing woman's journey as one "within," in search of "lost voices" and "invisible traces." It is as well a "journey home," the "return" of what is "repressed, excluded, and alienated." During such a journey, home does not stay the same; indeed, it is "renewed" (Wang 2004, 5). *Leaving in order to return home*: this is, I submit, the educational potential of academic study as lived experience, curriculum as *currere*. Ending our narcissistic isolation, our problem of proximity to the present, we can encounter the "other," and in so doing, reconfigure our present, thereby providing passage to the future.

By studying Confucius, Foucault, and Kristeva, Wang was also studying herself, a Chinese woman who had come to the United States to study curriculum theory. She had left home—her nation, her parents—to respond to the call of the stranger. In doing so, she discovered that "home" had become strange: "Going back home does not bring me home, but has turned my mother into a stranger. I have become a stranger to myself too" (Wang 2004, 7). Wang (2004, 7) wonders if the relation between self and stranger is a "central theme" of education.

The teacher-as-stranger and the intellectual-in-exile may be familiar images for students of curriculum theory, but Wang answers her question in Kristevan terms. Not only the defamiliarization of the everyday achieved through exile from one's (literal or metaphoric) homeland and estrangement from one's present circumstances enables the critical distance necessary to think creatively (Anderson 2006, 66). It is, Wang writes, one's capacity to acknowledge alterity lovingly that initiates an educative process. In this "expansive" process—it is a kind of "characterological enactment" (Anderson 2006, 3)—there is a risk of feeling "uncomfortable," even among the "familiar," but such estrangement, Wang (2004, 7–8) suggests, "inaugurates" the very

"possibility" of education. Moreover (here her reference to Kristeva is explicit: see 2004, 8), it is one's own alterity one encounters in the presence of the stranger.

In this double encounter—alterity in the other and the other in oneself—Wang locates the "third space."[3] Wang (2004, 16) explains that this is a space wherein one travels "beyond the current forms of life." It is the third space that opens when the stranger calls one out of oneself, when the stranger inside oneself emerges, enabling one to move away from home toward a destination not yet known.

For Wang, this journey is both a return home and a journey to a foreign land. She records her lived experience in italicized passages throughout the book. She shares with us her intellectual and cultural passage by working her way through three elements of that autobiographical journey: (1) her cultural heritage, represented by Confucius and the traditions associated with that legendary figure, (2) her subjective and political struggle, represented by Foucault and his calls for transgression and creativity, and (3) her gendered journey, represented by Kristeva and her analysis of alterity. Does the first structure the other two? The theoretical and the narrative are, in Wang's work, intertwined (see Wang 2004, 19).

Likewise, these three figures and Wang's analysis of these three dimensions do not remain fixed in separate spheres; the issues Wang confronts reside in a space between and among them, in a third space where she herself—and we, her students—can engage in a course of study inviting us to go into exile and experience estrangement. "Shifting" in this "contradictory" yet "generative space," Wang (2004, 18) tells us, she searches for a "transformative curriculum" (Doll 1993) and a "transcendent pedagogy." It is a curriculum juxtaposing Confucius, Foucault, and Kristeva.

Focusing only on those specific aspects of these figures' works that speak to her own "journey" into a "third space" (2004, 19), Wang invites us to travel with her through these discourses into our own spheres of "self-creation" (2004, 19). Through cross-cultural philosophical inquiry, gender analysis, and autobiography, Wang attempts to rethink intersubjectivity. As an interdisciplinary effort enabling renewal of our understanding of self and curriculum, Wang works to disclose multiple and different layers of reality[4] simultaneously.

To focus on the self, on intersubjective individuality, is, then, to focus on culture, politics, and gender. It is to emphasize alterity. The "transformative" and "creative" third space Wang seeks is, she knows, "impossible" unless she journeys simultaneously "both outside and inside," and unless she listens to the "call of

the stranger" (Wang 2004, 20). This call is to return home, not the home one left, but, instead, a third space "beyond the binaries of self/other, femininity/masculinity, and semiotic/symbolic" (2004, 20).

There, back in a home we may not have known we could inhabit, the self can be "recreated"; there, she suggests, curriculum becomes "self-generative." To listen to the call requires, of course, yearning, and a willingness to endure the hardships of the journey. Wang (2004, 24) acknowledges that it was a "personal yearning" that brought her to the West. In the United States, however, she experienced no "induction into Western selfhood," but, rather, the "deconstruction" of Western traditions, via "the death of the subject" (2004, 24). In the United States, Hongyu Wang met Michel Foucault.

Differentiation, Creation, and Innovation

The care of the self requires one to form a political relationship first with oneself.

Hongyu Wang (2004, 36)

Studying Foucault, Wang discovered there is no essential Western selfhood. Indeed, Wang understands Foucault as rejecting subjective essence, embracing, instead, "critical" and "creative" spaces of subjectivity undetermined by any "essential" self (2004, 25). She quotes Foucault: "The relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity; rather, they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation" (quoted in Wang 2004, 25). Through his rejection of an essential identity, Foucault calls for self-creation.[5]

Wang understands Foucault's call for resistance against the social construction of the "normal" individual as much more than a "negation" of the status quo; it is, she notes, a "creative self-constitution" through challenging the situation and "opening up new modes" of "individuality" from political control by religion, institutions, or media (Wang 2004, 25). Foucault elaborates a "doubled-faced" subject who constantly reconstitutes her or himself—actively reconstructs her or his subjectivity—beyond what she or he has been conditioned or "normalized" to be (see Wang 2004, 27). As Wang (2004, 26) notes, Foucault emphasizes the concrete exercise of "freedom" over the abstract appeal of "liberation."

Wang summarizes Foucault's theorization of such "freedom" in ancient Greece and Rome. These pre-Christian forms of self-care, she

tells us, were a "soul-oriented" undertaking to be continued throughout one's life, with specific attention to the body. It is the "practice of freedom" through "mastery" (2004, 28). Through the regulation of food, pleasure, one's daily regimen, and one's relations with others, including relations with boys,[6] "moderation" replaced "excess" (2004, 29). In its mastery of emotions and regulation of desires, moderation becomes a "virtue" enabling men to exercise power over themselves and others (2004, 29). In this ancient system of ethics, Wang (2004, 30) points out, the freedom of the individual is "closely related" to the freedom of the polis. In contemporary curriculum theory terms, subjective and social reconstruction (through academic knowledge and lived experience attuned to the historical moment) are inextricably intertwined.

In ancient Greek and Roman sexual ethics, then, freedom was based upon rational self-mastery; today, freedom takes the form of resistance against mastery by social domination.[7] In Foucault's ontology of the self, freedom invites transgression against historical limitations, emphasizing the cultivation of creativity and the production of new existential possibilities. Through Foucault's different versions of freedom there is consistency, Wang (see 2004, 31) suggests: freedom is always contextual rather than abstract or universal (see also Ransom 1997).

Critics of Foucault's notion of self-care accuse him of blurring the boundaries among politics, aesthetics, and ethics. Chinese culture does not demarcate among the three, Wang tells us; if Foucault is guilty of blurring boundaries, she is not distressed. Her interest is to support self-creation through "*critical* aesthetics" and "*relational* ethics" (2004, 35). Given many men's expectations of women as nurturers, for instance, men's restructuring of ethical relations with others inevitably invites women's subjective reconstruction.

"For me," Wang (2004, 37) tells us, "the priority of self-care over the care of the other, as masculine as it is, becomes an important moment in establishing my identity as a woman." After all, a complex and critical relationship with self cannot be achieved independent of relationships with others. Such caring for others does not, however, require self-effacement. As Wang (see 2004, 38) appreciates, Foucault's ethics and aesthetics are simultaneously a politics against social submission and a private politics against an essentialized self, creating a passage to a politics of cultural creation, that is, to think, to perceive, and to live "otherwise." Differentiation, creation, and innovation characterize these intellectual movements of subjective and social reconstruction.

Under the Gaze of the Soul

> *Sexuality is not so much about our secret desires as about new possibilities for creative life.*
>
> *Hongyu Wang (2004, 39)*

The care of the self in ancient Greco-Roman ethics was concerned, Foucault insisted, with the mastery of the self. The body was the passage to a beautiful soul. In this ancient period, Wang notes (see 2004, 41), boys' so-called passive sexual positions with adult men were not only "feminine," but also they were immoderate, given the conflation of femininity with the inability to master one's appetites. In sexually aggressive positions, men were, presumably, able to establish virility in the exercise of active freedom.

Especially in his later interviews (see Eribon 2004), when speaking about "becoming gay" and against homosexuality as the secret truth defining the self, Foucault expressed his conviction that sexuality, through the exploration of bodily pleasures, enables us to create new forms of relationship, new forms of thought, new forms of life, and new forms of self (see Wang 2004, 30). In particular, Foucault believed that experimentation with bodily pleasures not confined to sexual desire can, Wang (2004, 39) summarizes, transport one to the "edge" where the (Cartesian) ego dissolves. In Foucault's view (as in Pasolini's: see Viano 1993, 38), the body is not only physiological, but also cultural and historical. Wang (2004, 40) wonders if women can appropriate Foucault's ethics and aesthetics of self-creation to "expand their . . . freedom?"

With the coming of Christianity, self-mastery was replaced by obedience to God: the body today remains, in the West, "under the gaze of the soul" (Wang 2004, 45). Without restructuring this relationship between body and soul, we cannot undertake the refashioning of self. Without the experience of sexual experimentation restructuring the relationship between body and soul, Foucault seems to be suggesting, subjective and social reconstruction cannot occur (see Bersani 1995, 90). In gendered self-care, Wang (see 2004, 46) underscores, the self becomes a site for registering and contesting social injustice.[8]

Such contestation occurs not only in the public sphere, but in the private as well. In Foucault's later works, transgression is transfigured into a rupture within oneself. In several interviews, Wang (see 2004, 47) points out, Foucault claims repeatedly that he writes in order to become somebody else (see also Miller 1993, 33). He seeks not to arrive at some final destination known as "self-knowledge" but,

rather, to travel somewhere unknown, not yet extant. In Foucault's ethics of the self, Wang (2004, 47) notes, an "intense interiority" is transformed into social change. She wonders (see 2004, 48) if, in Foucault's interest in becoming somebody else, there is also a certain gendered element. Is self-sacrifice necessarily negative? Women's self-cultivation is more likely, Wang (see 2004, 51 n. 1) believes, if women can avoid choosing between self-sacrifice and self-creation. To employ Foucault's ideas for feminist identity politics, Wang (see 2004, 50) argues, women need to rethink the dualities already encoded in the Greco-Roman traditions Foucault attempts to surpass.

"To Light the Path Under My Feet"

> *I am deeply suspicious of any efforts to break with the past completely.*
>
> *Hongyu Wang (2004, 54)*

For Wang (2004, 54), to return to Confucianism is an "ambivalent project," and not only because Confucianism has long been "condemned" for persisting problems of Chinese culture, and specifically for "suppressing women." She does so, however, to recover the Confucian antecedents of contemporary Chinese culture,[9] hoping to "reclaim" this tradition in order to create "new forms of life" (Wang 2004, 55). In that phrase we hear the echo of Foucault as Wang confronts her cultural and gendered past. She wonders how Confucius's teachings were converted into a dogma suppressing individual freedom. She (2004, 55) asks: "How can we regenerate this tradition without being caught in its shadow?" Can we Americans ever confront our own cultural past with such self-conscious candor through the school curriculum?

For Confucius, Wang (2004, 56) reports, self-cultivation is fundamental to both individual and society; social reform is achieved through that personal transformation that occurs through education. Morality, politics, and education occur through personal cultivation; this becomes, Wang tells us, a "cornerstone" of Confucius's teaching (2004, 56). Selfhood is, for Confucius, a "lifelong project" that is never finished, an "unfolding process" of "continuous transformation" and "becoming" (Wang 2004, 56). It is profoundly relational: *"[B]elonging*, instead of *identity*" (2004, 128), is the key term. Moreover, Confucius believed that everyone has the capacity to become a sage; he insisted that education is for everyone, not just the elite (see Wang 2004, 57).

Students are guided to different paths, but each path follows the same "Way" (see Wang 2004, 57). To illustrate, Confucius advised one student who was audacious to become more retiring; he advised a timid student to become more aggressive. "This pedagogy of responding to differences," Wang [2004, 58] notes, "indicates that the Confucian Way is not a fixed principle but, instead, is situated." As the US progressives appreciated (see Dewey 1962 (1934); Jackson 1999), the arts must be central in such a curriculum; Wang (see 2004, 59) explains that Confucius's curriculum of self-cultivation begins with poetry and culminates in music.

This is no Western "cult of individualism," in which the collective is condemned for the sake of individual profit and power. Confucius's self-cultivation does not proceed in isolation; it is embedded in relationships with others (see Wang 2004, 59). Wang (2004, 60) quotes Confucius: "[W]ishing to be enlarged himself, [one] seeks to also to enlarge others." Confucius sought harmony without conformity (see Wang 2004, 60). As we have seen, in *Bildung* the two sometimes became conflated.

As in *Bildung*, cultivating an independent personality is a Confucian virtue. Fully realized, such independence can be expressed either in open rebellion against despotic rule or in silent retreat to cultivate one's own inner self (see Wang 2004, 61). Such a search for "inner light," supported by personal integrity and dignity seems, Wang (2004, 61) suggests, "similar" to the ancient Greco-Roman traditions of struggling with the self to achieve a fulfilling life. Study for the sake of the self rather than for the approval of others implies, Wang (2004, 62) points out, that for Confucius self-cultivation was an "end in itself" and that "self-realization is immanent in every person's effort to achieve humanity." The Confucian Way, Wang summarizes, enables both individual and social transformation. If we appreciate the inextricable relation between self and society in Confucius's teaching, Wang (see 2004, 62), explains, we realize that the point of personal cultivation is simultaneously subjective and social. "Unfortunately," Wang (2004, 65) laments, "only one side" of Confucius's teachings was encoded in the "institutionalization" of his teaching. Confucianism—in contrast to Confucius's teachings—functioned to strengthen the control of the state and the family over the individual in general and over women in particular.

As the "state cult" (Wang 2004, 65), the fate of Confucius's teachings constitutes a Chinese "tragedy," Wang (2004, 65) believes. For instance, the degeneration of Confucianism into an "ossified dogma," Wang (2004, 66) asserts, "contributed" to the decline of ancient

China. If, as Foucault argues, the ancient Greco-Roman tradition of self-care was usurped by a Christian compulsion for self-knowledge and a quest for spiritual salvation through self-sacrifice, likewise, Wang (2004, 68) suggests, Confucius's teaching on personal cultivation is "shadowed" by Neo-Confucian metaphysics.

Thinking of the West as it is represented in Foucault and the East as it is encoded in Confucius, Wang identifies limitations in both traditions, specifically regarding the construction and experience of "difference." In Confucianism, Wang (2004, 72) acknowledges, alterity can be accommodated, while in the West there is a tendency to "objectify" the other. However, Wang (2004, 74) believes it is "simplistic" to characterize Chinese thinking as "relational" and Western thinking as "dualistic." Indeed, Wang (2004, 76) finds "common themes" of self-cultivation in both traditions. These are, she believes, "affirmative" themes, among them "lifelong commitment, critical self-reflection, and personal integrity." There are "destructive" themes as well, especially "elitist" and "patriarchal tendencies" (2004, 76).

To become creatively engaged in a dialogue with the West, Wang (2004, 76) believes, it is necessary for Chinese to reclaim the Confucian affirmation of "relationality" while, at the same time, searching for new ways of promoting "individuality." Moreover, and the "we" in the following sentence need not refer only to Chinese but to Americans as well, "I believe we need to generate a new sense of relational individuality, situated in dynamic and complex cultural connections, social interactions, and cosmic processes" (Wang 2004, 76).

How can we generate this new sense of relational individuality? Internationalization may provide one opportunity: "The more profound one's participation in dialogic encounters across differences with others and with the world," Wang (2004, 76–77) writes, "the more deeply and creatively one's own individuality evolves." While one hardly needs to leave one's homeland to encounter difference, the alterity internationalization forefronts cannot be so readily subsumed in local patterns of prejudice and objectification. These "dialogic encounters" may lead to a common curriculum vocabulary, but its aim is not the universalism globalization threatens. "Mutual transformation does not aim at universality," Wang (2004, 77) believes, "but attempts to bring forth the creative imagination of each party, depicting new sceneries of the self while contributing to the other's own self-creation." In this sense, internationalization contributes to cosmopolitanism.

Before departing the city where she had completed her undergraduate degree, Wang went to the home of a professor with whom she

had studied. Appreciated as a "great" Confucian, this professor had always encouraged Wang to "keep going" and to "cultivate a rich inner life" despite the distractions of a "turbulent" world. After saying good-bye, she descended the stairway into the darkness of night; her teacher remained behind her, holding a flashlight to "light the path under my feet." She muses: "Light. Held by a Confucian for me, for my future. This is a powerful image I have always kept deeply in my heart." Years later, struggling with Confucianism in the United States,

> this image suddenly returned. I knew at that moment that, despite all odds and difficulties, I was going to carry and renew this light. It is a light within, shining on a continuous path of an old civilization that could be rejuvenated, a part of me already existing long before I was born. (Wang 2004, 53)

The rejuvenation of Chinese civilization—as Foucault's analysis implies that civilizational rejuvenation is in the West—would seem to be a pedagogical project. It is a gendered one as well.

"Polyphonic Dialogue"[10]

> *Can we imagine new visions of humanity and cosmology through listening to the call of the stranger that is woman?*
>
> *Hongyu Wang (2004, 85)*

While disinclined to use Western feminist theory for a gendered critique of Confucianism (that would be, she says, a "decontextualized project" [see 2004, 79]), Wang is clear that Confucianism is patriarchal. The metaphysics developed in the institutionalization of Confucius's teachings in Neo-Confucianism made women's situation "much worse" (2004, 82). Facing this historical and cultural fact can "plant seeds" for "cultural reconstruction" (2004, 82). She exclaims: "How I wish these Confucian masters had been more loyal to their mothers' teaching!" (Wang 2004, 83). It is clear to Wang (2004, 84) that the "ecology" of Confucian subjectivity, however "relational" and "cosmic" it is, does not offer women a "space of their own."

Despite the patriarchy of Chinese culture (patriarchy and its complement, misogyny, are hardly unique to China, of course),[11] Wang points out that motherhood is regarded an "important stage for education" in contemporary China. The gendered image of teacher—in China, too, teaching is a women's profession—as a "candle" that

lightens the lives of others is a "common" metaphor (2004, 84). Wang confides: "My own mother has been a key teacher in my life. An outstanding professor herself, well loved by her students, she dared to challenge authorities" (2004, 83). Wang's mother's influence and coming of age during a period of official equality between women and men contradicted Wang's social experience of gender (see 2004, 83–84). Following Kristeva's lead, Wang (2004, 84) comes to believe that "psychic transformation . . . is key . . . in rearticulating woman's space."

"Let us . . . listen carefully to ourselves through Kristeva's voice," Wang (2004, 85) admonishes her readers. That voice, Wang (2004, 89) believes, is "revolutionary" as Kristeva's work destabilizes the subject through "regenerating" the significance of the maternal for the human psyche. Wang (2004, 92) characterizes the Kristevan concept of the semiotic (gendered feminine) as the "rejected stranger" whose return challenges the stability of the (especially paternal) subject. This return is inevitable due to the constitution of the subject in spaces between alterities (see Wang 2004, 92). Does the subject come to form, then, in a third space between the feminine and the masculine? Is the call of the stranger an invitation to regress to an earlier state of self-constitution,[12] and there reconstruct subjectivity?

While I have focused on the reconstruction of men's racialized subjectivity (Pinar 2001, 2006b), Wang attends to questions of women's. "What is the feminine after all?" Wang (2004, 93) wonders. "Is it possible," she (2004, 95) asks, for women to surpass their estrangement in language by "embodying the unnamable" and "reorganizing psychic structure" through a "new space" of reading and writing? She answers this question affirmatively, suggesting that the efforts of women to "think the unthinkable" and to "represent the unrepresentable" create passages toward the "unknown . . . world of plural singularity." This last phrase recasts in gendered terms Sartre's conception of historical subjectivity as the "universal singular" (1981, ix) and Zizek's (1991, 156) conception of subjectivity as the "absolutely particular."

It is women's recognition of the strangeness "inside" that enables, Wang (2004, 95) suggests, the transformation of femininity into a "creative site" within society. Not only men create difficulty for women's self-transformation, Wang (2004, 96) implies, pointing to the incest taboo and daughters' developmental movement away from the mother as creating "double difficulty." Despite this double difficulty, Wang (2004, 95) believes that writing "through" and "about" lived experience may enable women to "negotiate" those "difficult

passages" between the maternal and paternal and thereby create new forms of knowledge.

Negotiating passages between the maternal and paternal creates a "generative site." Kristeva's work, Wang (2004, 111) acknowledges, is a "daring" and "inspiring" project, one requiring the rethinking of the human psyche through bringing body into language. It challenges the hegemonic formations of identity, self, and intersubjectivity. Wang believes Kristeva's work holds particular promise for women, inviting the expression of "individuality" and "strangeness" in "new" ways. Kristeva theorizes, Wang (2004, 111) underscores, a "paradoxical community" comprised of "plural singularities." She reconstructs self-other relationships based upon the notions of the stranger within and creative maternity. At the same time, she calls for a new politics of nations.

Despite her enthusiasm, Wang cautions us that Kristeva must be read critically and interculturally. Wang (see 2004, 111–112) recalls that Kristeva learned a number of Chinese characters for her study of differences between Chinese as an ideographic language and English/French as phonetically oriented languages. Wang criticizes Kristeva for imagining the Chinese language as preoedipal. Chinese culture is less about Oedipus, Wang (see 2004, 122) insists, and more about the Tao.

The Third Space

A third space is about passage and making passages.

Hongyu Wang (2004, 149)

While skeptical of it as a universal theory, Wang (2004, 118) has no intention of dismissing psychoanalysis as "a way" of understanding and interpreting human experience. In her criticism of Kristeva (at which I have here only hinted), she wants to complicate the theory by underlining cultural difference. In particular, she wants to affirm the centrality of both relationships and individual freedom in "a cross-cultural third space" (2004, 118). When the maternal is present in language, as it is in the Chinese language, language learning is not necessarily marked by "separation from, or least not a full break with, the mother" (Wang 2004, 118). Wang notes that the Chinese pronunciation of s/he or her/him is the same (see 2004, 116). There is little gender ambiguity or equity, however, as many pictorial representations portray women "kneeling" (2004, 17). Is this a Chinese version of American "gracious submission" (Pinar 2004, 24)?

While keenly conscious of the conservative character of culture, Foucault also discerned power's fragility. For him, culture and power are the background against which new visions of life can be imagined and created. Kristeva subverts the conservative through creativity. In contrast, the Confucian self supports both continuity and transformation (see Wang 2004, 119). Foucault seldom provides a vision of community, but he implies that there can be communities that support the creation of both self and other. Both Kristeva and Confucius focus on the relationship between self and other, but Kristeva pays much more attention to alterity and difference and the deep psychic structures underlying these. While Confucius also attends to the self "within," it is not in any psychoanalytic sense; rather, it is in the sense of an inner cultivation of an independent personality situated in the "ecology of selfhood" (Wang 2004, 120).

When she started this project, Wang (see 2004, 121) reports, she had hoped that Kristeva would enable her to connect Confucius and Foucault, given Kristeva's linking of the social with the individual through creativity. To some extent, Wang concludes, Kristeva does bridge the two when she theorizes how the self becomes individualized and creative through the mother/child bond. However, this bridge is "fragile" given her acknowledgment that relationality is fashioned through separation and division. Kristeva shares more with Foucault, Wang suggests, at least in terms of attending to differences, and less with Confucius when she probes into psychic processes structuring the self. Wang hears echoes of certain Confucian traditions of self-cultivation in Foucault's emphasis upon self-study and self-care. The Confucian emphasis on social relationships seems contrary to Foucault's focus on the subjectification of the self, however, as it does to Kristeva's portraiture of paradoxical self-other relationships. And Kristeva's theorization of "creative womanhood" is "beyond" both Foucault and Confucius (Wang 2004, 121).

Does the work of each complement the others, Wang (see 2004, 121) asks; are intersections possible? Where has her juxtaposition of these three left her? With these questions has Wang's journey come to a cul-de-sac? She acknowledges that while passages can be found among the three, she also faced what felt like were "dead ends," demanding that she take "detours" (2004, 121). The gender issue became, she concedes, a "labyrinth" (2004, 121).

At this point, it was an image provided by Chinese poetry that encouraged Hongyu Wang; it is advice to the weary traveler: "[W]hen you believe you have reached a dead end, another village is actually ahead of you" (2004, 121). Wang (2004, 121) expresses this

conviction pedagogically: "Beyond dead ends," she is convinced, there awaits "another passage," but the difficulty of the journey is something we must not keep a secret but, rather, "share with our students" (2004, 121). Like Confucius, Wang wants to inspire students to stay on their own paths even when the way ahead seems blocked or unclear.

For a time her path is blocked. Wang writes that she is "dazzled/puzzled by the light/shadow of an exit, by the im/possibility of coming out anew" (2004, 125). Here the structure of curriculum development—the synoptic text (Pinar 2006a)—resembles that of subjective reconstruction, as Wang's (2004, 125) self-report suggests:

> I confront this difficult work of connecting bits, parts, and fragments (all are in me nevertheless), self-imposed effort—mirrored back from the imagined anticipation of my readers—of weaving pieces of the self into a true fiction of a cross-cultural gendered space, an imaginative realm embedded in the undercurrent of unsayable interconnections.

It is a poetic and gendered space where words come only with difficulty, an aesthetic space in which one fashions a unified self out of fragments, a "singular rhythm" (2004, 125).

This is also a gesture in response to the other, that alterity that is the knowledge of the other, knowledge that summons the alterity within, otherness rendered silent by circumstance or design. I hear Foucault's call for a "specific intellectual" in Wang's (2004, 129) depiction of the call of the stranger as inviting movement "toward the beyond," but not "beyond" as understood in Western ways as "transcendence," pointing to absolute or metaphysical truth. Rather, such movement "toward the beyond is *with* the web of interconnections. Only through efforts to reach *out* can the deep connections within be touched, felt, and transformed. In a third space." For me, this notion is reminiscent of the tripartite identificatory space of the child (Edelman 1994), the child not as abstract signifier (Baker 2001; Edelman 2004), but as Nietzsche's "overman," not acting on his own behalf, however, but as midwife birthing a new age. Perhaps this time "overman" is not a man, but a woman, not European, but Chinese: a cosmopolitan.

In this "third space," individuality and relationality "intertwine" and "collide," but the image here is not one of dialectical fusion. Rather, for Wang (2004, 131), the two are "separate" yet together, parted yet holding hands, alone yet with the other," enabling us to seek "independence *through* and *for* interdependence." This is neither

the US cult of individualism, in which the social is sacrificed for individual gain, nor is it reminiscent of Soviet-style socialism, in which the individual disappears into the collective.

This is, instead, a third and "gendered story" in which women, not men, are the central characters, women with a "profound sense of interconnection," claiming rooms of their own, wherein "the silence of the relational and the new words of the singular can begin to speak, in a new tongue" (2004, 131). One hears here the echoes of Foucault's self-care, self-invention, and the creation of culture. There is, as well, the sound of Kristeva's symphony wherein dissonance and difference initiate new possibilities (see Wang 2004, 131). In my terms, these are the sounds of subjective and social reconstruction.

These are also acts of freedom "with" instead of "against" the world, reminiscent of Confucius's ideal of "creative unity" between self and other (2004, 136). Here the dissonance of alterity and transgression recede in an experience of reconstruction as rhythmic. Wang (2004, 135) invokes the imagery of ecology as well as music when she acknowledges that the "pain" of invention is made tolerable by the harmony that is the "simultaneity" of "against" and "with" the world around and in us. In such "double difficulty," Wang (2004, 135) continues,

> Pain no longer splits, but, like the stream of a waterfall, laps against our bodies with regenerative force; harmony refuses to support escapism, but like the slope of a mountain, accelerates our breath with inspiring interconnectedness. In such a third space, the violence of dualism is gently guided back into a larger life force, and the self-contentedness of holism firmly curves out toward new openings. In and out, back and forth, such is the rhythm of the third.

It is rhythm of sound without language as its defining feature (see Wang 2004, 146).

A psychic space of embodiment (see Wang 2004, 144), this pulsating third space is not only inaudible but also invisible. "Like the elusive stranger," Wang writes, "as soon as words are spoken to describe it, the third space shifts away." It lies "beyond the mastering of language." Incapable of arrest, indeed as if "invested" in its own absence, the third space "keeps renewing itself precisely at the moment when its own location is displaced" (Wang 2004, 144). It is a space of "dwelling in and stretching out," a "conflicting hybrid interplay of positioning and displacement" produced by "the other in me" (Wang 2004, 147).

About "passage and making passages" (2004, 149; see Daignault 1992), the third space requires "polyphonic conversation" to provide distance from one's "psychic affiliation" (2004, 148). Such disaffiliation enables the teacher to be open to the "student-as-stranger" whose potential is structured by "irreducible singularity"; through the student the teacher's confrontation with "her own otherness within" is mirrored back (2004, 158). After all, "one cannot *educate* without moving oneself" (Wang 2004, 163). "However fluid and relational the self can be," Wang (2004, 177) asserts, the "singular experiencing" of the individual is "essential" to self-cultivation.

In this third space, there is no demand that the subjective and the social stay separate or become fused; it is (after Aoki: see 2005 [1985/1991], 232) in their tensioned movement that education becomes possible (see Wang 2004, 178). And nothing is possible without the "call from the stranger" (Wang 2004, 179). Wang (2004, 181) concludes: "As a call [from the stranger], this book invites all those who are in search of new spaces to join in this journey, a journey essentially educational." She asks: "Are we ready—side by side, connected yet apart—to go?" (Wang 2004, 183) Are we?

Connected Yet Apart

That which is "other" and strange can be part of the I.

Dwayne E. Huebner (1999, 408)

Are US curriculum scholars ready to confront alterity within, a subjective encounter with "double difficulty"? In contrast, it seems easy to accommodate "diversity" outside us, safely segregated in the social. Are we ready to abandon the culture of careerist self-promotion, that cult of individualism within the academic field of education, in order to extend to others, especially to those whose generational locations position them as "other"?[13] Are we ready to participate in "the next moment"[14] in curriculum studies to advance intellectually (see Pinar 2007) the academic discipline of curriculum studies? Can we[15] engage in democratic dialogue with scholars whose national cultures compel questions of curriculum that do not resemble our own?[16]

No monosyllabic declarations of affirmation will suffice, of course. These are complex cultural questions, answers to which imply self-cultivation and social reconstruction. These are—after Foucault—"specific" questions addressed by and to "specific" intellectuals and scholars. They do not require grand events, say, the eclipse of

capitalism (although that cataclysmic event would indeed restructure both the questions and our individual and collective answers to them); they require us to confront the "place" we have inherited and inhabit as individuals and as a field of study. As Wang's work makes clear, this self-confrontation requires study—academic and subjective—as it is ourselves as existing individuals we must reconstruct.

Our self-absorption intensified by the sense of victimhood the 2001 terrorist attacks intensified (and right-wing politicians exploited), we Americans seem unable to attend to the world around us, in us. We suffer the problem of proximity. We require distance, from ourselves. Not all of us enjoy the opportunity of exile, but we can cultivate a state of estrangement. Within curriculum studies, this means studying the work of others, especially scholars working in other nations as well as foreign nationals and immigrants working within the United States. While hardly without historical precedent in the field (see Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 14), the contemporary movement toward the internationalization of US curriculum studies provides an opportunity we can seize to reconstruct ourselves subjectively and socially. To begin, we must study the work of our colleagues who are not like us, who do not share our history, who may not share our interests, and who may not understand curriculum as we do.

Through exile and estrangement, we might initiate what Wang (2004, 135) has characterized as the "pain of invention." Recall that it is a pain made tolerable by the harmony that is the "simultaneity" of being "against and with" the world around and in us. In such "double difficulty," Wang (2004, 135) tells us, "pain no longer splits, but, like the stream of a waterfall, laps against our bodies with regenerative force." Are we ready? Given curriculum studies scholars' internal exile within the United States, given our enforced estrangement from the schools and from those policy makers who would keep us divided not only from schoolteachers but also among ourselves, where else shall we turn but the borders? Let us follow Hongyu Wang (see 2004, 75) in her search for a third space through intercultural conversation, a space wherein new forms of life can be created. To participate in this complicated conversation, let us listen to the call from the stranger.

Epilogue: The Recurring Question of the Subject

> *The questions held by curriculum scholars across generations, one might say, harmonize.*
>
> *Erik Malewski (2010b, 7)*

The character of US curriculum studies remains a project under construction. No one works from a blank slate. No single, even canonical, concept—alignment with society (Bobbitt) or society's reconstruction through human intelligence (Dewey), curriculum development through protocol (Tyler), curriculum practice as deliberation (Schwab), curriculum for the sake of transcendence (Huebner), and humanization (Macdonald)—solves the disciplinary problem of the present moment, a divergent field moving in multiple directions.[1] Together, these historic concepts form a rich and dynamic intellectual legacy from which we can continue to reconstruct the US field, working through its atheoretical, ahistorical imprinting one hundred years ago. The 1970s Reconceptualization of the field may have corrected the former, but the latter condition—a persisting ahistorical presentism—remains very much in evidence, despite the important 2006 effort to inaugurate an intergenerational dialogical encounter at Purdue University. Conferences cannot correct for structural defects, and the disciplinary structure of verticality (Macdonald 1995, 5)—for example, historicality—remains attenuated in US curriculum studies, despite the appearance of important and provocative new work in curriculum history (Autio 2006a; Baker 2009). In addition to this specialization (where, it seems, history is segregated), historicality—as a disciplinary structure—must come to characterize curriculum research generally if intellectual advancement across the field is to occur.

"Becoming historical" is itself a historical project, a legacy of the field's ahistorical past and present. Were we working in a field

mesmerized by the past, unable to notice the present or unconcerned with the future, then "becoming historical" would be redundant, even reactionary. Working in an ahistorical field, however, requires us to compensate for our presentism by emphasizing the history of the field's ideas, participants, and events. Such historicality, linked with the field's preoccupations with the social, the procedural, the deliberative, the transcendent, and the humane, points to a moment when the concept of "post-reconceptualization" might actually convey intellectual content and not just generational succession.[2]

"Becoming historical" restores the field's historic concerns as historic. Bobbitt's preoccupation with society, Dewey's commitment to democracy and the growth of intelligence, Tyler's enthusiasm for procedure (specifically assessment linked to objectives), Schwab's emphasis on deliberation, Huebner's fascination with language and meaning, and Macdonald's embrace of humanization all become intelligible—although not necessarily defensible (thinking of Tyler)—within specific historical circumstances. As scholars, as human subjects, we are responding to a set of inherited circumstances that informs our assumptions, structures our thinking, and animates our imagination.[3] The supersession of these circumstances requires specific and learned analyses and critiques, followed by the post-critical formulations of new concepts and practices, always informed by—even when reconstructing—these prior concepts and practices. This recurring question of the academic subject is also the recurring question of the human subject.

From *Bildung*, we grasp the centrality of the subject to education. We also grasp the subject's intimate and ambivalent association with culture and history, including ever-present dangers of overidentification with community and nation. *Bildung*'s appreciation of the spirituality of study, of inwardness, judgment, and morality, accords it a status of continuing, perhaps intensifying, importance. Recent efforts to "update" *Bildung* (see Løvlie, Klaus, and Nordenbo 2003)—linked with the US field's concern for society (reconstruction not economism) and democratic dialogue: *currere*—position curriculum studies (as a worldwide field) to provide a series of provocative answers to the recurring question of the subject. *Bildung* reminds us that the academic disciplines are also spiritual disciplines that form human subjects who reconstruct not only what they study but also who they are and can be, socially and subjectively. Intellectual labor informed by subjective purpose animates academic study, the very site of education.

The verb form of the Latin concept curriculum—*currere*—underscores the lived experience of study, in solitude and with others,

those "others" being one's contemporaries as well as those who speak to us through print and on screen. Like *Bildung*, *currere* emphasizes the formation of the subject as it dwells on the meaning of academic study for (not only human) life, restructuring—as new events and research occur—questions of culture, society, politics, and the economy. That leaves those of us committed to understanding curriculum critical of US school reform, destructive as such "reform" is of the multifaceted actually existing individual, the person apart from the workplace. "The ultimate interests of the ideological alliance between neoliberal and neoconservative agendas," Tero Autio (2006a, 152) observes, "reflect the incapacity to conceive individuality in other terms than subordination to the personality ideal of the market." The reign of so-called accountability—with its confinement of curriculum to contentless "skills" to be assessed on standardized examinations[4]—represents the final act of a tragedy in play now for centuries, as Autio's seminal study elaborates. To the extent circumstances and convictions allow, US teachers can invoke an ethics of intransigence to authorize their refusal to collaborate in the miseducation of children (Pinar 2012, 10, 48, 237). Noncoincidence with what is enables the reconstruction of reality into what might be.

Such reconstruction—of the US school curriculum, of US curriculum studies—requires the reactivation of the past in the present through academic study. Here I have attempted to do so through the specification of seven remedial actions we can undertake now to reconstruct the character of contemporary curriculum studies: (1) restore the human subject effaced in the name of ideology critique (chapter 1), (2) emphasize the indissoluble links among culture, psyche, and politics, here sketched through my remembrance of Fanon (chapter 2), (3) refuse multiculturalism's tendency to collectivize the subject while supporting cosmopolitan efforts to internationalize culture (chapter 3), (4) incorporate within US curriculum studies *Bildung*'s spiritualization of the subject, conscious of that tradition's triumphs and tragedies (chapter 4), and (5) acknowledge America's apparent compulsion for social engineering through bureaucratic reorganization, thereby working through its legacies of anti-intellectualism and instrumentalism (chapter 5).

Undertaking these corrections would represent disciplinary progress through intellectual advancement, concrete consolidations of which are exemplified in chapters 6 and 7. In chapter 6, I showed the ongoing significance of the aesthetic imagination in the reconstruction of subjectivity and society, threaded through 20 years of talks to teachers by the legendary Maxine Greene. To that lifetime

of labor I juxtapose, in chapter 7, the early work of a less senior scholar, a reverberating effort at intercultural self-understanding undertaken by Hongyu Wang. Finally, in the epilogue, I reactivate the past again, specifically the divide between psyche and politics etched in the field during the early phases of the Reconceptualization (Macdonald 1995, 70, 72, 140–141, 163, 182). It is a divide that remains, expressed recently in the controversy over the concept of the canon in curriculum studies. Professional concerns for the intellectual advancement of the field face a simplistic insistence on activism self-righteously shorn of disciplinary memory. Here I labor to find a future beyond this "moribund" situation by reactivating the past. In the next section, I review—through the scholarship of historian John Toews—the mid-nineteenth-century analyses of Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Marx, analyses that struggled with the same tension between historical overdetermination and the ethical demands for social justice with which we struggle today. "Becoming historical," it seems, renders the question of the subject a recurring one. In our time, it remains a question of reconstruction.

Subjective and Social Reconstruction

Remembrance . . . can only be understood as a category of ethics.

Stéphane Mosès (2009 [1992], 124)

"Historical consciousness," John Toews (2004, 417) explains, aspires to "open up a field of possibility." Nineteenth-century German scholars and intellectuals, Toews tells us, aspired to transform the moment by "acting decisively" and with a sharp sense of one's own "responsibility in the present" (2004, 417). Through the reconstruction of the past, one might reread the present as its ruin, embracing an ethical freedom for the sake of its reconstruction. In contrast to "becoming historical" are contemporary North American efforts one might characterize as "becoming a historian," for example, the teaching of history as a procedure organized according to evidence, perspective, and interpretation (see Monte-Sano 2011). Perhaps the student who aspires to become a professional historian can profit from such a simplistic scheme, but understanding history—or any other subject, including the human subject—cannot be reduced to procedure. "Understanding others," James B. Macdonald (1995 (1974), 95) reminded us almost 40 years ago, "does not provide the basis for planning, manipulating, and calculating. Understanding provides the grounds for relating, for being fully there in the presence and as a

presence to the other." Through understanding one becomes present in the historical world.

Studying history became important to many nineteenth-century Germans not because it enabled them to think like professional historians but because understanding history decoded the character of reality itself. By understanding the historical moment one came to understand oneself as a historical subject. It had become clear that everything about one's life was historical, including one's historicality. The past remained in the present. Such understanding recast one's ethical and political commitment in the present as a historical calling demanding historically informed agency. By understanding the meaning of the present historical moment, one became a character on history's stage, engaged in rewriting its script, simultaneously cultivating one's own character as one fulfilled ethical obligations to others. Such social engagement followed from self-knowledge as a historical subject, the prerequisite for "becoming truly historical" (Toews 2004, 418). For many, that knowledge formed from one's faith in God, and "becoming historical" for the faithful meant discerning God's will in the world (2004, 418).

To conclude his monumental study, Toews (2004, 419) juxtaposes Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Marx.[5] When these two nineteenth-century figures have been juxtaposed, Toews (2004, 420) notes, their contrasts (not their similarities) have been forefronted, namely the "individual inwardness" of "ethical self-choice" in Kierkegaard, as Toews (2004, 420) puts it, and the "external objectification" of "self-activity" through "material production" in Marx. Through Toews's telling analysis, I acknowledge Marx and Kierkegaard's analyses as the imprinting formulations of subjective and social reconstruction as reciprocally related and historically attuned.

It was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Toews (2004, 420) reports, who provided the provocation for Marx and Kierkegaard's analyses. At his inaugural lecture—presented at the University of Berlin on November 15, 1841—Schelling presented himself as a "teacher of the age" (Toews 2004, 1). "I feel the full significance of this moment," Schelling told those assembled; "I know what responsibilities I have taken upon myself" (quoted in Toews 2004, 1). At age 66, Toews (2004, 2) continues, Schelling understood himself as the "living embodiment" of a "philosophy of freedom," in which historically attuned action in the present discloses the future. Schelling criticized the self-enclosing and totalizing structure of Hegel's philosophy, its "conflation" of "being" with what is (2004, 6). While "what is" was for Hegel historical, it was not, Schelling countered, "self-generated"

but instead "instigated by something beyond consciousness" (2004, 6). For Schelling, Toews (2004, 9, emphasis added) explains,

> [S]elf-conscious individuality, and thus personal identity—"character," or "personality"—emerged first through a "free act" that occurred *within the sphere of unconscious being*. Like Goethe before him and Freud after him, Schelling affirmed that "in the beginning was the deed." The "word," the realm of language, consciousness, and individuated personal identity, emerged from this "deed."

For Schelling, then, the cultivation of personhood followed from actions that reconstructed, in Toews's (2004, 10) terms, the "primal indeterminacy of unconscious desire." The verb "reconstructed" is mine—Toews uses "disciplined" instead—and I would extend the source of historical experience (inaugurated by the symbolization of unconscious experience) to include the historical-social world that is known already, as the two domains, while distinct, also intersect. Through his emphasis on "will" and "freedom," Schelling emphasized the reconstruction of the two domains.[6]

The pedagogical potential of such reconstruction was not, however, the point of Schelling's lecture—he would not have used such a term with its distinctively American emphasis on innovation—but, rather, the "spiritualization" of history and subjectivity (2004, 11). As one grasped one's place in the world, Schelling was sure, one came to understand the presence of divine Will in history (2004, 13). While both Marx and Kierkegaard objected to Schelling's metaphysical critique of Hegel, Toews (2004, 420) notes, they accepted Schelling's preoccupation with the "preconscious, prehistorical, unmediated reality of human existence."[7]

How did this preconscious sphere of prehistorical existence manifest in everyday reality? For both Kierkegaard and Marx, Toews (2004, 421) suggests, understanding how everyday social reality—historically contingent and concrete—required understanding of how human beings came to experience that reality not as chosen but as "necessary." Both Marx and Kierkegaard aspired to understand how human beings, themselves constituted by their histories, could become conscious of that constituted character, thereby

> opening the historical horizon for the emergence of a self that affirmed itself as a self-constituting subject not in thought alone, but in existence, and not in denial of the conditions of its freedom but in constant self-conscious awareness of those conditions. (Toews 2004, 421)

In my terms, autobiographical consciousness enables one to grasp how one's life history is embedded in the circumstances of its determination. By acknowledging both the singular and the structural, autobiography becomes allegorical. It is the reactivation of temporality in the flatlined stasis of the present—the "*actualization* of distant time within the experience of the present" (Mosès 2009 [1992], 123)—that "becoming historical" precipitates.

Both Marx and Kierkegaard rejected Schelling's conception of history as the unfolding of a prior metaphysical reality. While history is inaugurated by the noncoincidence of subjectivity—rendering subjectivity both the subject of scrutiny and the site of agency—its source was not supernatural, Marx and Kierkegaard said, but primordial or prehistorical, the sphere of the natural. "The life forces that became the object of will and consciousness in the first historical act," Toews (2004, 421) explains, "also contained within themselves the agent of historical self-determination." While Marx would later endorse a teleological conception of history, there is no such inevitable historical progression implied in Kierkegaard, for whom, Toews (2004, 421) continues, the prehistorical was a never-ending state of desire. The intensification of narcissism[8] and presentism in advanced capitalism—abetted by the information technologies—is historically retrograde, as the desire they aggravate flatlines temporality and ensures subjective dissolution emptied of agency, will, and even consciousness (see Pinar 2012, 151).

For Kierkegaard, desire was doubly defined: it was both physical *in* its sensory immediacy and it was *toward* the physical that desire was directed. (Surely it is such desire that inaugurates the imagination and that renders its uncritical releasing risky.) Toews (2004, 421) explains that for Kierkegaard desire derived from a state of "dreaming desire" in which, Toews (2004, 422) continues, desire manifests as an undifferentiated "presentiment of itself," an "androgynous state." Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 422) reports, understood the archetype of desire as "male sexual desire" for the "feminine object," but male sexual desire fails to "recognize" this desire as in fact directed to "itself." In this sense, as extracted from Adam, Eve symbolized sexual difference—the so-called opposite sexes—*among men* (Pinar 2006b, 64). For Kierkegaard, history (marked mythologically by the Fall) starts with sexual differentiation. "Gender was a choice of self, not an expression of any preexisting, natural difference," Toews (2004, 422) summarizes, "and its result was a sexualization of the relation between the psychical and the physical." From the outset, the desire for knowledge seems sexualized, but that is another story.

This fantasy of the physical—as primordial and as then symbolized—combined in the belief in the "racial" or ethnic constitution of culture, a reductionism that tempts contemporary multiculturalism (see chapter 3). Time changes everything. "The problem facing historical cultures," Toews (2004, 422–423) tells us, became the conversion of such ethnic, or "racial," groupings into "ethical communities." To become "ethical," these communities had to be formed by individuals choosing association with likewise freely acting socially responsible individuals. That "problem"—how to reconstruct primal social (even familial) bonds as ethical (and civic, as public)—remains today, as the apparently pervasive fact of historical overdetermination consigns agency to "resistance" in chapter 1. The question of reconstruction remains as one form of decolonization (as we saw in chapter 2), evident in the tension between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism (as we saw in chapter 3), adumbrated in pedagogies of self-formation (as we saw in chapter 4), and systematized as institutionalized reorganization (as we saw in chapter 5).[9] After the political defeat of progressivism in the United States, the project of forming ethical community gets relocated to the imagination, where its "releasing" reanimates social action, or so Maxine Greene fervently hoped (chapter 6).

One hundred sixty-five years ago, the problem of encouraging free individuals to become ethically engaged with each other (and to strangers) seemed it might be solved by "becoming historical," for example, by excavating the genealogical layers of the unethical present to disclose its prehistorical substrata of undifferentiated desire. Like Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 423) explains, Marx was committed to understanding this "prehistorical state" of "sensuous human existence" not as substrate, as solidified sedimentation frozen in time, but, rather, as alive still with the "potentialities" of "historical selfhood." Crucial for both men, Toews underscores, was the conversion of such historical sedimentation and contingency into subjective and social agency, a political potentiality to be activated through historical selfhood.

For his provocative study Toews relies on a series of unpublished manuscripts composed between 1844 and 1846, wherein Marx, following Feuerbach, construed human beings as "essentially sensuous," meaning that only a "consistent naturalism" could be "capable of comprehending . . . world history" (quoted passages in Toews 2004, 423). World history was, Toews (2004, 423) summarizes, a "reflexive process within nature," in my terms, nature's noncoincidence with itself: subjectivity. Through the self-reflexive labor of self-engagement—described by Marx in quasi-religious terms as

"self-transcending"—human beings produced objectifications of their desire, in so doing created culture whose recurring reconstruction became, retrospectively, history. For Marx, history is the "true natural history of man" (quoted in Toews 2004, 423).[10]

The ethical problems of the present—injustice, inequality, and self-reification—follow from freezing the fluidity of the historical present into apparently timeless structures resistant to reconstruction. The potential of human nature becomes conflated with the material products of human labor, resulting in the differentiation of humanity according to the social processes of production. Through labor, existing human beings transform their "physical life process" into the "historical life process" (Marx, quoted in Toews 2004, 423). With acknowledgment of temporality comes contingency, and the capacity to change the material, including psychic, conditions of self-constitution.[11]

For Marx, it had been the division of labor not gender that had marked humanity's fall from the unity of nature into an unjust social differentiation, specifically class distinction. In that "fall," human freedom—expressed through labor into material products—devolved into political subjugation to what then appeared to be historical necessity. The conversion of physical nature into production, into culture, became degraded so that freedom devolved into "enslavement" to a "second nature," that of "historical existence" (Toews 2004, 424). History's inauguration may have contained the "promise" of "self-constitution," Toews (2004, 424) paraphrases, but history seemed now only a series of determinations, rendering subjectivity epiphenomenal. The pedagogical problem is, then, not resistance but self-constitution, as exponents of *Bildung* have appreciated.[12]

How could human freedom devolve into economic subjugation? What was missing in mid-nineteenth-century subjectivity that prevented people from recognizing and acting upon their freedom? Both Marx and Kierkegaard answered this question similarly: what was missing in (then) contemporary selfhood was *historicality*. Just as the predominance of "power" in social theories of ideological reproduction effaced subjective agency in late twentieth-century US curriculum studies, and just as the 1930s Progressives' fixation on bureaucratic reorganization rather than intellectual reconstruction threatened to restrict curriculum reform to institutional reorganization, externality determined internality in Marx and Kierkegaard's time, wherein subjectivity was experienced not as freedom but as "necessity" (Toews 2004, 425).

The task for both thinkers, Toews (2004, 425) tells us, was to show how the ahistorical—for Fanon it would be the colonized—self is in

fact a historically produced form of existence that can then be reconstructed. Unlike political theorists of the curriculum who fantasized themselves as somehow outside the processes of social reproduction they observed, Marx and Kierkegaard appreciated that self-recognition and self-understanding cannot come from "outside history," as the material conditions of such subjective labor themselves derive from the "practices" of the "reflective ego itself" (2004, 425).[13] Self-reflexively grasping one's own complicity in the social reality one imagines as outside must occur from *within* that reality. And that reality is historical.

From this fundamental realization, however, the analyses of the two men diverged. Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 425) reminds, conducted his analysis through an empathetic "internal" individual lifestyle he characterized as "aesthetic." An "aesthetic" life meant that one's self-definition was crafted according to one's relationships with others. Foreshadowing David Riesman's famous 1950s formulation of "outer-directedness" (Zaretsky 2004, 310), Kierkegaard's aesthetic lifestyle "oscillated restlessly among different interests without a sustained, consistent project grounded in its own values" (Toews 2004, 425). What was missing was subjective coherence. And while focused outward, Toews (2004, 426) notes, Kierkegaard's aesthetic self was "essentially narcissistic." The point of living was "self-gratification" (2004, 426). In this formulation, presentism, narcissism, and a desubjectified sociality are sadly synergetic (Pinar 2012, 146).

Kierkegaard regarded this aesthetic form of existence as characteristic of the 1840s, a "spiritless" age he judged, in sharp contrast to the revolutionary period at the turn of the century. In this earlier, but relatively recent era, it seemed to him that individuals had lived according to passionately held commitments, among them "freedom, equality, and solidarity" (Toews 2004, 427).[14] From private passion expressed through public service, Toews (2004, 427) continues, "consistent identities, or 'characters,' emerged," in part "through 'repetitive' action in the world" (2004, 427). Character is, then, a self-conscious congealing of existential fluidity, of a dispersed subjectivity. "The conclusion is thus clear, almost Sartrean," Zizek declares: "[M]an does not have a permanent substance or universal essence; he is in his very core a man of habits, a being whose identity is formed through the elevation of contingent external accidents/encounters into an internal(ized) universal habit" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 104). He adds: *"[I]n a habit, the subject finds a way to "possess itself"* (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 112).

Not only solitary self-possession (get a hold of yourself!) conducted in rooms of one's own, but also subjective reconstruction occurs

through social action, but not social action calculated as a likely bet. Ethical communities require resolve—determination—to carry them through, quite apart from the likelihood of success. Indeed, "success" is irrelevant during initial stages of social and self-formation, which depend not on chasing the object of desire, but upon the determination subjective coherence constructs. Such coherence is, in part, the reconstruction of desire into resolve. One develops character.

The trouble with Kierkegaard's time, Kierkegaard thought, was that it had no character. By the 1840s, Kierkegaard complained, "character-forming values" had been commodified into "representations of value produced in exchange." Individuals collaborated[15] not as separate subjects "inwardly" reconstructed after "values" they embraced, but stylized through practices of "self-advertisement" calculated to increase the individual's value in the marketplace. Such commodified representations of subjectivity did not "shape character" but standardized it, creating conformity for "public consumption." Rather than solidarity for the sake of improving social conditions, "competition" fractured social life, assigning everything a monetary value, available for sale, to be hoarded by self-serving individuals and groups. Such monetization marked the dissolution of human difference into the "sameness" of "exchangeable commodities" (quoted passages in Toews 2004, 427). It foreshadowed a more pervasive, indeed totalizing, quantification of human experience that would occur in the twentieth century, evident now in the United States in the substitution of scores on standardized exams for individual human subjects engaging in the complicated conversation that is the public school curriculum.

Any effort to extricate oneself from this exchange economy is dismissed as a "strategic move for individual advantage" (Toews 2004, 427). Such cynicism ensures that activism itself devolves into another commodity for exchange in a market of atomized individuals struggling for advantage, visibility, for example, increased exchange value. In our time, such cynicism dissolves differences between sociality and subjectivity, thereby intensifying narcissism and privatizing public life. Kierkegaard depicted the consequences of marketization as "leveling," wherein "individual worth" became an "abstraction," assigned a monetary value, no longer associated with conduct or character (Toews 2004, 428). But unlike those contemporary political theorists who imagine the "individual" as only abstract and the system as only self-reproducing, Kierkegaard discerned opportunities for reconstruction, even within the ruins of the present.

In 1846, Toews (2004, 428) reports, Kierkegaard suggested that in constantly expanding the range of possible consumption, capital's

commodification of social relations extends the scope of self-choice, even though this choice was limited to commodities and related "representations of possible lifestyles." Such an array of commodity and lifestyle options severed the self not only from ethical resolve but also from historical determination. "Whatever" replaces "what must be." Over 150 years ago, Soren Kierkegaard saw postmodernism coming.

During 1842–1843, Toews (2004, 429) explains, Marx also devoted himself to understanding how the social solidarity and that "emancipatory promise" of the earlier revolutionary era had devolved into the "political legitimization" of the "atomized individualism." Despite underscoring the separation of producers from their products and the consequent creation of class division, Marx did share Kierkegaard's sense of individual subjects defined by their "alienated objectifications of self-activity," and the "value of their existence determined by the exchange relations among such objects" (Toews 2004, 429). In such a self-occluding social economy, history and agency fade, as individual subjects are no longer actors but "spectators" (in Kierkegaard's terminology) of their "self-representations," now monetized as "commodities" (Toews 2004, 430). Like Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 430) continues, Marx saw how the "objectification of self-activity became less historically specific and more abstract"—again, one cannot but help think of standardized test scores, as numerals substitute for persons—as "the self in turn became more abstract and 'empty'."

Like Kierkegaard, Marx discerned in this process of abstraction and subjective emptying an opportunity for the self to recognize itself as historical. But, as Toews (2004, 430) explains, this opportunity receded as capitalism intensified: any choice for change occurred only "within the terms of market exchange." Within capitalism, individuals were positioned against each other, in competition for acquisition and accumulation. In one passage in his unpublished 1844 manuscripts, Toews (2004, 431) reports, Marx "echoed" Kierkegaard in observing that this state of affairs had "leveled" all differences as "merely quantitative distinctions," recasting social relations as riddled with "envy."

The central message Marx presented in *The German Ideology*, Toews (2004, 431) reminds, is that subject of bourgeois society cannot free itself from its "historically constituted identity" through "inward acts of self-reflection and self-recognition." This assertion was no reply to Kierkegaard, but to Max Stirner, who had argued (in *The Single One and His Property*) just that. Sounding like the Sartre of *Being and Nothingness*—with his adamant espousal of spontaneity and freedom in the concept of *pour soi*—and like the Erich Fromm of *Escape from Freedom*, Stirner had characterized much of human

reality ("God, state, and society, or love, reason, and labor") as "self-deceiving illusions" constructed to avoid acceptance of one's own "self-creating power" (2004, 431).

This argument was "no sale" to Marx, who decried such self-constitution as an "artificial category" entirely "abstracted" from "material conditions," specifically "servility, poverty, and insecurity" (2004, 431). The point Marx emphasized in his critique of this association of self-reflexivity with self-constitution, Toews (2004, 432) tells us, was that Stirner had overlooked the historical character of each. Like Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 432) explains, Marx insisted that the emergence of the self-constituting individual could occur only historically.

For both Marx and Kierkegaard, then, the shift from being historically constituted to self-constituting was itself historical. I agree: while structural noncoincidence provides the opportunity for subjective reconstruction, that undertaking occurs in specific material and temporal conditions. Subjective and social reconstruction works with the material that exists, whether this "material" is economic, cultural, political, or subjective. Moreover, one works from the past, not the present, immersion in which renders the present opaque and pervasive, and action "purely arbitrary" and "without conditions" (2004, 432). Because subjectivity is noncoincident with itself, subjectivity is capable—if educated—of reconstructing the world in which it finds itself. Such reconstruction, as we saw in chapter 5, relies on bringing "something new into the world" (2004, 432), not only rearranging what is there already.[16]

For Kierkegaard, this "something new" occurred through a "radically personal" and "inward act" of "self-choice" (Toews 2004, 433), a choice—supplementing Stirner, anticipating Sartre—that reconstructed the sedimented historical content of the self into a "new integrated form" (2004, 434). Through individuation one discerns "the root by which he is connected to the whole" (Kierkegaard, quoted in Toews 2004, 434). Through claiming, integrating, and reconstructing what was previously perceived as purely external or repressed as incompatible with socialized self, one recovers memory and agency, transforming both "psychic states" and "arbitrary external relations" into a "continuous integral unity" (2004, 434), what I am calling subjective coherence, however momentary and always under construction. Such subjectivity enables one to find the future in the past. Toews (2004, 434) quotes from Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*:

> For man's eternal dignity consists in the fact that he can have a history, the divine element in him consists in the fact that he himself, if

> he will, can impart to this history continuity, for this it acquires when it is not only the sum of all that has happened to me or befallen me, but is my work, in such a way that even what has befallen me is by me transformed and translated from the necessity to freedom.

In reconstructing oneself, one chooses oneself with "these talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by definite surroundings as this definite product of a definite environment." But by acknowledging oneself as historically produced, a person could "just as well be said to produce himself." Moreover, as historically produced the self is "pressed into the forms of reality," thereby becoming "elastic, transforming all the outwardness into inwardness" (quoted passages in Toews 2004, 434). I would add "vice versa," as inwardness—what I have depicted as private passion—becomes reconstructed as public service.

In such subjective reconstruction, the "empty, decentered self" can become a "centered self" (see Macdonald 1995, 86–88) and its paralysis before endless possibilities (e.g., options of consumption) became the "focused pursuit of tasks" (Toews 2004, 434), projects in Kilpatrick's (1918) vision of self-directed socially engaged intellectual undertakings that reconstruct self and society. "Erotic and emotional instrumentalism," Toews (2004, 434) notes, are transformed into "mutuality and positive reciprocity." Work becomes a "calling," a commitment that constructs an ethical existence converting possibility into historical actuality. For Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 435) points out, "faith" sustains subjectivity in a world foreclosing freedom. I prefer Dewey's (1962 [1934], 15) conception of the religious, one that requires no faith in the supernatural, but embraces the world and its immanence. Reconstruction requires enactment of subjective freedom—for Kierkegaard it is a "leap of faith"—that ruptures the overdetermination of history (2004, 436).

With Maxine Greene, I position "imagination"—not faith—as animating everyday action. The former may be the latter minus the supernaturalism and dogma. I would juxtapose "determination" and "resolve," eschewing "hope" that in our time too often functions as assurance of reduced risk, furnishing the illusion that one's bet is placed on the winning side. Ethical action cannot depend on consequences even as it must take them into account. Ethics is rooted in intentionality, relationality, and commitment as well as consequence. Informed by academic study, solidified through inner strength and habit (even repetition, with a difference), one develops "character," not a de-individuated set of internalized platitudes, but a distinctive

always under-construction individuality engaged with others, including those who came before us and those yet to come, as well as our contemporaries on this shared endangered planet.

In Toews's (2004, 436) account, Kierkegaard sometimes sounds like Dewey in *A Common Faith*. In Toews's terms, Kierkegaard turned to religion not to evade the challenges of historical selfhood but in fact to position those challenges as central to human existence. He did so, Toews (2004, 436) suggests, to forefront the "very act of self-constitution." Not unlike Dewey some 75 years later, Kierkegaard ordained the religious dimension of experience as the marker of "qualitative transformation of human existence . . . from reflective egoism to ethical life" (2004, 436). Dewey (1962 [1934], 47) affirmed that "reconstruction in the direction of the good which is indicated by ideal ends, must take place, if at all, through continued cooperative effort." Solidarity requires individual ethicality not social conformity.

Like Kierkegaard, Toews (2004, 436) tells us, Marx envisioned the enactment of freedom not only through collective struggle but also through the specific life activities of individual human beings. In the 1844 manuscripts, Toews reports, Marx characterized the communist revolution—the abolition of private property through reclaiming production as collective—as the achievement of a "genuinely historical mode of existence" (2004, 436). The alienation of human action in its objectification as modes of production and social structures would end and distinctively subjective expression became possible. Toews (in 2004, 437, emphasis added) quotes Marx:

> It is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers—human reality, and for that reason the reality of his essential powers—that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which *confirm and realize his individuality*, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object.

For Marx the "entire so-called history of the world" was "nothing but the creation of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man; so he has irrefutable proof of his own *birth* through himself, of his *genesis*" (quoted in Toews 2004, 437). Marx had faith that the abolition of private property could only encourage the conversion of human life now overdetermined as "historical product" into "human existence as free historical productivity" (2004, 438). Academic knowledge is likewise "historical product," but its study and reformulation through classroom conversation and

solitary contemplation provide educational opportunities for the subjective expressivity characteristic of "historical productivity."

The self that had been historically produced can now take action in order to produce history. Such a profound shift from overdetermination to creative productivity, Marx cautioned, required "the alteration of men on a mass scale." Foreshadowing Fanon, Marx prophesized that such alteration could only take place in the "practical movement" of the revolution (quoted phrases in Toews 2004, 438). Influenced (not only) by Marx, Fanon, as we saw in chapter 2, underscored the psychic significance of anticolonial violence. Not only revolution, but also decolonization—the historical process following and foreshadowing political emancipation—depended upon psychic reconstruction. For both Kierkegaard and Marx, "becoming historical" would destroy the presentism of bourgeois society where "now" is all there is. For Marx and Kierkegaard, such reconstruction required experiencing the self as "historically particular" and "contingent" (2004, 438). "Implicit in this reconstructive activity," Toews (2004, 438) emphasizes, "was a conception of the self as not only product but also producer." For both Marx and Kierkegaard, becoming historical "meant precisely to experience the given situation of one's own particularity as an actualized possibility and the ground for a new actualization" (2004, 438). That challenge reverberates in the historical moment in which we are so presentistically submerged now.

For both Marx and Kierkegaard, the crucial moment occurs when the subject self-consciously claims one's historicality. At that moment, the subject becomes attuned to the present moment, deciphering its meaning and deciding how to proceed. Both Kierkegaard and Marx—at least in Toews's narrative—seem to me to overstate the extent to which understanding the present historical moment is possible, in part because one is inevitably immersed in it, not looking at it from some outside vantage point. Moreover, while the historical moment may exhibit structure, implying that relative coherence and meaning that makes it a moment, that structure cannot be visible to any one (or group of) observer(s), as we are located differently within it (Aboulafia 2010, 53). Spectator theories of knowledge have been discredited not only due to fact of our situatedness, but also in acknowledgment of our inability to shed our investments in what we see. Impartiality and disinterestedness are indeed possible, but only relatively so. That does not mean that all there is is power. History reveals itself through us; while we cannot claim to know it totalistically, we can labor to discern the moment as it reveals itself to us as historically contingent always fallible creatures.

The recurring question of the subject Marx and Kierkegaard posed in the 1840s was pre-Freud, for example, a subject unaware of its unawareness, perhaps clueless to its own complicity in those constructions of the present the subject had in fact devised. It is not that the subject is a smudge on the mirror reflecting what is—consciousness is rather the light that renders the room visible—but we are located in the room, positioned by its history, a situatedness particularizing our very capacity to apprehend whatever we experience. Such situated sedimentation—call it the unconscious, but it is also, more inclusively, history—positions the subject as implicated in the very readings of the moment that precipitate history's movements, its transformation through reconstruction, its eventual eclipse. While acting through the "new"—the present moment and the knowledge it can bring, noncoincident as well as continuous with the previous one—reconstruction acknowledges that we are working with what we find, according to schemes that are themselves embedded the past, in its ruins, of which we ourselves are embodied instances. Not only the material world—its institutions, including its economic forms—can be reconstructed, so can the subjective means by the world discloses itself: ourselves. The subject can change the world, as Kierkegaard knew, and the world changes the subject, as Marx knew. In Zizek's terms, "[T]he subject is nothing but the self-mediation of objectivity" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 127). Subjective and social reconstruction are coextensive and reciprocally related. When they occur in school, it is through the dialogical encounter that is the complicated conversation that is the lived experience of curriculum.[17]

With Kierkegaard (see Toews 2004, 438) I acknowledge the centrality of human freedom, although I cannot locate its source supernaturally. Freedom is a—perhaps perverse—production of evolution, the historical reconstruction of human noncoincidence, enabling the species to distance itself from as it engages the world it inhabits. In that distance and engagement, everything is imagined and much is materialized. Human history follows, in its horror and heroism, and we remain today swimming in its stream, struggling to stay afloat, to see what's ahead as we try to understand what happened before. While Marx refused the supernatural option, revolutionary action was for him, as Toews (2004, 439) points out, an experience of "self-conversion." Both Kierkegaard's leap to faith and Marx's faith in revolutionary action took place in the specifically situated site that is the historically contingent self.[18] Our circumstances have changed, but not the ethical demand to reconstruct reality.

Decolonization is no simplistic repudiation of the present in order to return to a precolonial state of "purity." Decolonization is, as Fanon knew, a painful reconstruction of an already colonized subjectivity that can only lead to hybrid inevitably "contaminated" culture. Claiming "indigeneity" or "negritude" or "womanness" or "queer" may prove political useful and psychologically enabling if these reactivate (but not pretend to reproduce) the past in the present. As Hongyu Wang demonstrates, academic study can provide passage from past to future, from opaqueness to clarity, from cultural stasis to hybrid dynamism. Reconstructing the self produced by historical circumstances can develop character, an ethical subject who becomes (relatively) free to reconstruct the circumstances of her own futurity. Toews (2004, 439) terms these "reciprocal tensions" as "stereoscopic." As James B. Macdonald (1995 [1974], 79, 81, 82) appreciated, noncoincidence can become the stereoscopic space wherein freedom is imagined and from which it is enacted.

The Character of Curriculum Studies

Similarly, each epoch must tackle that harsh task anew: to liberate tradition from the conformism about to violate it.

Stéphane Mosès (2009 [1992], 119)

Like the human subject, the school subject does not coincide with itself. Both point to, speak with, and listen to the world from within the world.[19] No fantasy of totality, the world is not reducible to material conditions, as these are also psychic, and always historical. The facts we teach are often allegorical, simultaneously particular and general, embedded in an ongoing classroom conversation with specific students, not a generalized—graded—"learner." Students are persons-in-the-making, subjects underway, not outcomes to be accomplished. Power may predominate, but in the curriculum students can learn to experience the power of words, of concepts, and of understanding. The curriculum is no Ponzi scheme wherein present investments pay off later, but, rather, lived experience embodied in children whose futures are inevitably unknowable. In the school curriculum novelty and unpredictability are occasions for adventure, not distractions from time-on-task.[20] As Maxine Greene understood, the imagination animates such adventure, intensifies its pleasure, and encourages exploration. How? "If the aesthetic experience can serve as a model for knowledge," Mosès (2009 [1992], 89) points out, "it is precisely insofar as, through it, the universal is revealed in the

particular." Simultaneously concrete and the abstract, self-reflexive while addressed to the world, and intensely transitory while echoing the immemorial, the curriculum is, then, allegorical.

The double consciousness of allegory invites us to juxtapose the social and the subjective, the ethical and the political, the universal and the particular. In so doing, we teachers can encourage the cultivation of cosmopolitan character. This is an expansive subjectivity, incorporating internal difference and acknowledging external complexity, engaging in ongoing reconstruction. The general outlines of such cosmopolitan subjectivity are evident in Aboulafia's (2010, 75) discussion of George Herbert Mead, for whom education enables "an enlargement of the self, that is, a more cosmopolitan self, which is attuned to inclusion." This is simultaneously solitary and social labor; it occurs at home at one's desk, and it occurs in classrooms where teachers exercise individual judgment to encourage student initiative, interest, and understanding. "Mead," Aboulafia (2010, 76) tells us, "seeks to combine a natural disposition for sympathy, compassion, with the capacity for taking the perspective of others, to yield a morally informed, enlarged or cosmopolitan mentality." To the extent it can—local circumstances, including historical circumstances, weigh heavily—such education occurs through academic study expressed in communicative action (Aboulafia 2010, 6), accenting dialogical encounter (Freire 1968, 75–85).

The world weighs heavily, and appropriately so. "[T]he purpose of schooling should not be about schooling," Lyn Yates and Madeleine Grumet (2011, 239) remind, "but about participation in the world." We cannot contemplate such participation in the world from some Olympian site above the everyday, from subject positions somehow not already mired in the past-plagued present, located somewhere quite specific in a situation still not resolved after all these years. Conversation is complicated precisely because it is haunted by the past, because it occurs in specific places, in singular and sedimented situations that, as teachers, we are always attempting to unravel and understand. No script, no skill set, no score on some sadistic test, the curriculum cannot coincide with itself. "This effort to name and construct and cohere the world that matters does not take place on some idealized plane," Yates and Grumet (2011, 239) make plain, "but is constantly informed by and reacting to events. This world that emerges from curriculum is always in conversation with the world outside schooling." That "outside" world is itself is under assault inside schools.[21]

Like the character of curriculum itself, the academic field of curriculum studies cannot coincide with itself. An ongoing conversation

complicated by history and present circumstances, curriculum studies is a field exhibiting in its scholarship that "double consciousness" that DuBois famously reserved for early twentieth-century African Americans. Not long after his graduate study in Germany—although DuBois probably studied Hegel with George Santayana during DuBois's second year at Harvard (Aboulafia 2010, 98; Townsend 1996, 249)—DuBois affirmed black distinctiveness as self-division, an insight derived from Hegel. Distinctive in DuBois's formulation was the acknowledgment that internalizing the views of others in conversation within oneself cannot be cosmopolitan in consequence if those views are racist. As Aboulafia (2010, 99) states the matter, "[S]eeing oneself through the eyes of others can in fact be a damaging experience." Decolonization requires not resistance but subjective reconstruction.

Why? One cannot expunge that internalized view—there can no return to precolonial purity—but one can work through its disabling dominion, reconstructing what can become a hybrid state. Probably traces of the racist other will always remain. Indeed, DuBois worried that Africans in America had been corrupted by centuries of enslavement, segregation, and internalized racism (Aboulafia 2010, 100). Writ in racial terms, this is the pedagogical problem of the present with which Kierkegaard and Marx grappled some one hundred sixty-five years earlier: how can I—we—remake what others have made of us? This is no technical question of subjective architecture to be pondered in the abstract, as the "I" as well as the very process of reconstruction depend on those specific materials that are at hand. These are our material historical conditions generally, including political legacies and our psychic inheritances, including internalized racism. We do not coincide with these, and so that "third space" Wang describes can indeed be cultivated, and a relative freedom of action can follow. Not procedures but concepts are crucial. Academic study provides language—so key to Richard Rorty, for whom language provided the conveyance of social transformation and subjective edification (Løvlie and Standish 2003, 19; Aboulafia 2010, 16)—that can increase the space of noncoincidence, expanding the self by historicizing subjectivity, thereby providing distance from the present so that opportunities for its transcendence become discernible. Finding the future requires reactivating the past.

Time stands still while cramming for standardized exams. Only through academic study—in solitude and in dialogical encounter with others—can one discern the past, still sedimented in personality and thought and institutions. Only through study can the past become

reconstructed through communication with self and others, both in print and in person. Expressing one's individuality through subject matter—the public discussion of one's private thoughts—cannot be sidestepped if the subjective complexity and coherence required by democracy are to be cultivated.[22] *Bildung*—"the self-reflexive cultivation of character" (Anderson 2006, 48)—has taught us the significance of spirituality in self-formation, its cosmopolitan capacity to open us to difference, and the inestimable importance of those with whom we share the historical moment and its emplacement. Lived experience informs the complicated conversation—*currere*—that is the school curriculum. For the curriculum to come alive, it must be embodied, spoken from the moment as experienced. To this fact ancient forms of orality[23] testify, as Harold Innis knew (Watson 2007, 182, 259, 282–283). Lived time—not condensed by covering content, accelerating as exams reduce the present moment to a means to an end that is the cessation of authentic speech—requires moving at one's own pace, in one's own place, memory intact.

Even academic vocationalism—teaching the school subjects as if students were preparing to be practitioners in those fields (as discussed at the outset of the second section of this epilogue)—suffers under pressures to cram for exams. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration forefronts science—along with technology and mathematics—at the expense of the arts, the social sciences, and the humanities. By deforming educational institutions—places, unlike cram schools, where teachers ask and answer in their own terms *what knowledge is of most worth*?—even science suffers, especially those creative individual explorations of scientific subjects students themselves choose, the sine qua non of scientific research.[24]

In the United States, the historical present demands a professional ethics of intransigence. We can refuse to coincide with what we have been legislated to be. Our calling is not to cram but to encourage children to explore their subjective singularity, their historical subjecthood, through subject matter. Our calling is to encourage the individual child to grow, to develop, to invoke verbs Dewey and his progressive colleagues embraced. While both concepts have been oversystematized during the decades that followed Dewey's pioneering work—systematized as developmentalism, demarcated as stages of cognitive and moral development, diced into learning styles, and reified as developmentally appropriate activities—they underscore the fact that even in this nightmarish moment the present does not coincide with itself. Children do not coincide with who they are, even if expressing who they are is prerequisite to becoming who they might

be. "Slivers of the original truth still exist today, hidden here and there in the depth of our profane world," Mosès (2009 [1992], 82) reminds, and obligation of the pedagogue—that key participant in the complicated conversation that school curriculum—is, like that of the "materialist historian," as Walter Benjamin once suggested in *On the Concept of History*, "consists precisely of gathering up these 'sparks of hope' buried in the past and reviving them (as citations of ancient texts that recover their youth in the new context where they are integrated) in the very heart of the present." This is the allegorical, redemptive[25] character of the curriculum.

The curriculum is site where the recurring question of the subject is posed, informed by centuries of critical thought and creative scholarship reconstructed through solitary study and complicated conversation. Through such study and the self-formation it affords, human beings find their way into the world. Private passion can become public service. Such reconstruction does not shed the past but it does enlarge one's capacity to accommodate its complexity. Such reconstruction cannot occur on a horizontal plane only, as the depth of character is temporal as well as spatial. Reconstruction requires "becoming historical," enabling us to discern the meaning of the present moment. That "lived instant," Mosès (2009 [1992], 104–105) tells us, is "loaded with all the tensions and contradictions that produce a precise historical intersection. This, then, is the revolution Benjamin called for: transposing the experience of lived time from the personal sphere to the historical sphere," enabling the subject to be "both unchanging and always new." Mythological and singular, past and present, private and public, the subject (in both its senses) is allegorical. From such temporally structured and historically informed "double consciousness" we can reconstruct the character of curriculum studies.

Notes

Preface

1. It has been 40 years since curriculum historian Herbert Kliebard (1970) identified ameliorism and ahistoricism—themselves intertwined—as persistent issues in curriculum studies. Today these persistent issues take the form of anti-intellectual opposition to intellectual history as canonical in the field's formation (Pinar 2009, 165, n. 2) as well as a quixotic if insistent emphasis upon social justice (Pinar 2010c, 239; see chapter 1 and the epilogue). In an earlier era when we were focused almost exclusively on the schools, curriculum specialists sometimes reorganized the subject matter already in place, as you will see in chapter 5. Understanding the curriculum emphasizes history, critique, and professional judgment, as this book, I trust, testifies.
2. Diane Ravitch (2000, 123) locates the genesis of "social studies" to the 1918 by publication of the "Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education," formulated by the National Education Association's (NEA) Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education (CRSE). Here alignment with society was paramount, as the CRSE cited three reasons to change the secondary school curriculum: (1) social and especially economic trends, prominent among the mechanization of labor, implying, as Ravitch notes, that industrial rather than academic education was paramount; (2) students themselves had changed, as the population had become larger and more diverse, implying, Ravitch points out, that fewer will proceed to university, and so that curricular alignment between secondary and postsecondary institutions is less important than it had been; and (3) recent advances in educational theory, especially educational psychology, pointing to the importance of "applying knowledge to the activities of life, rather than primarily in terms of the demands of any subject as a logically organized science," implying, Ravitch notes, that the subject-matter curriculum had become obsolete (quoted in Ravitch 2000, 124). It was the CRSE, Ravitch (2000, 127) reports, that created the concept of social studies, one subject of which was history. The chairman of the Committee on Social Studies was Thomas Jesse Jones, a specialist on racial matters who had written the 1917 federal report Negro Education. Ravitch (2000, 127) characterizes Jones as

a "proponent of industrial and trade education" and credits him "as one of the first to coin the term 'social studies'" (2000, 127). Ravitch summarizes social studies as informed by the intersection of "social efficiency," emphasizing the skills and attitudes necessary to succeed in the new social-economic order and "the new history," the content of which would be based on "the pupil's own immediate interest" and "general social significance" (quoted phrases in Ravitch 2000, 127). While Progressives heralded these developments, conservatives (including Ravitch's writing eight decades later) rued them.

3. Other Progressives such as Boyd Bode—who was critical of both classicism (1940, 69, 81) and social reconstruction (1938, 81; see Perlstein 2000, 63)—dismissed Kilpatrick's concept as simplistic (see 1940, 49, 94, 270). Conservatives were also horrified, if for different reasons (Ravitch 2000, 178–182). The criticism of Kilpatrick is, in my judgment, overdrawn. Leonard Waks (2008, 263) is right to call for a revised and "more nuanced" conception of Kilpatrick's "project method."
4. Working from "a silenced and invisible Jewish tradition," Alan Block (2004, 7) has argued, Joseph Schwab deplored the reduction of discussion to transmission. As Block (2004, 6) points out, for Schwab curriculum was discussion, "an engagement in and a practice of the activities of thought and communication" (Schwab 1978, 106). Perhaps predictably, Schwab (1983, 240–241) was critical of objectives, pointing out that "curriculum reflection must take place in a back-and-forth manner between ends and means. A linear movement from ends to means is absurd." He called for "a diversity of curricula" (1983, 242), an attentiveness to "locality" (243). This meant some measure of academic freedom: "Therefore, teacher must be involved in debate, deliberation, and decision about what and how to teach" (1983, 245). All disappear in contemporary school "reform."
5. What Judith Butler (2004, 2) asks in regard to "gender" could also be asked of "race" and "class": "What does gender want? To speak in this way may seem strange, but it becomes less so when we realize that the social norms that constitute our existence carry desires that do not originate with our individual personhood." The question of identity is, then, less "who am I?" than "whose am I?" As Tero Autio (2006a, xi) appreciates, in curriculum studies, when aligned with abstractions (like society, the economy, and, I would add, race-class-gender), "individualization and standardization go hand in hand." Actual individuality requires subjective reconstruction of such "social norms" and subject positions, including official conceptions of "good citizen" and "good worker," which, Autio (2006a, 121) suggests, has meant "a constant remaking of the self tending toward more and more deliberate, rational, and predictable behavior, where the outer control is increasingly removed and replaced by a psychological, namely, inward and subtler one." Subjective reconstruction is, then, not social conformity by another name; the cultivation of character

implies self-overcoming, even self-shattering (Pinar 2006b, 180). "[T]he ego annihilates itself in the very act of its self-determination as purely creative center" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 24). Less dramatically, subjective reconstruction might involve incremental change. In his comparison of George Herbert Mead and Pierre Bourdieu, for instance, Mitchell Aboulafia (Aboulafia 2010, 52) points out that: "For both James and Bourdieu we can learn to improve our lives by reflecting on the kinds of habits or dispositions that we possess and by making a concerted effort to reinforce or extinguish specific ones through our practices."

6. Caroline Zachry directed the Adolescents Study from 1934 to 1939 "to gain increased understanding of young people for the purposes of education" (Zachry 1968 [1940], v). As Craig Kridel and Robert Bullough (2007, 101) report, case histories were composed of 725 adolescents from 10 educational institutions, organized around "personality, community background, cognitive, and physical studies." For Zachry (1968 [1940], 1), "[T]he school is mainly concerned with their [young people] social development. Organized society expects it thus to continue, supplement, and, when necessary, even offset the influence of the home and other agencies in the public interest." The German version of this idea—"to offset the influence of the home and other agencies in the public interest"—was expressed in the concept of *Verwahrlosung*. This "key concept for defining a child's lack of appropriate rearing," Sharon Gillerman (2009, 114) explains, "legitimated the state prerogative to intervene. By definition, *Verwahrlosung* could not be corrected by the individual and required social intervention." By including a section on correctional education in my allegory of the present—Weimar Germany—I am suggesting that contemporary US school reform is likewise structured as *Verwahrlosung* (see Pinar 2012, 7, 99).
7. See, for instance, Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández's references to oral sex (2009, 158) and to young male students' "muscular torsos" that "gleam with sweat" (2009, 178). Because these are gratuitous, such references imply more about the investigator than they disclose about the investigated.
8. In his study of two young black men, for instance, Greg Dimitriadis (2003, 104) volunteers that he was "a single, childless man in my mid- to late 20s while I did this work." Given that "my time was my own," how did this fact allow him "to think in different ways about what reciprocity to this site and to these youth might mean" (2003, 104)? What, exactly, were these "different ways?" Later he acknowledges that he sometimes felt both "fetishized and marginalized" (2003, 106). What is Dimitriadis telling us here: that he was victimized? Mystery morphs into the mundane. We learn that his subjects—"Rufus" and "Tony"—suffer responsibilities (including financial obligations) that "preclude a so-called normal childhood"

(2003, 8). What, one wonders, is *that*? "For many marginalized youth," Dimitriadis (2003, 8) tells us (generalizing from a "n" of 2), "what it takes to succeed at school often works at cross purposes with what it takes to succeed in their local communities." (Cultural and class dissonance between home and schools is a stale story in educational research.) Each young man belonged to a "clique"—this term in contrast to "gang"—a grouping "rooted more clearly in the specificities of the neighborhood" (2003, 31). To become "successful," Dimitriadis (2003, 33) found out, "often means isolating oneself from others, pulling way from the dangers of unpredictable and often pernicious social networks." Like many adults, some young people struggle with money, and their friends—even families—can undermine their efforts to succeed at school. Without studying the intellectual history of the discipline—so-called literature reviews are often unsystematic, crafted as funnels ineluctably leading to a topic already selected and (alas) already studied, rather than developing out of an ongoing vibrant disciplinary conversation (Macdonald 1995, 64)—the reiteration of what we know already becomes likely. Another example of this problem is evident in a long, gossipy, insistently indignant study from which we learn that an elite private residential school is, well, elite (see Gaztambide-Fernández 2009). Given that the author is himself a graduate of an elite institution (Harvard), managed to publish his study with an elite press (Harvard University Press), and teaches now at an elite institution (University of Toronto), there is more than a little irony in his indignation. Perhaps autobiographical confession—rather than ethnographic investigation—might have been more methodologically appropriate? This question appears to have occurred to Gaztambide-Fernández as well; in the appendix he allows that "the imperfections of the ethnographic process always reveal much about the self as well about the research context" (2009, 221). What do we learn when, after recording comments composed by his subjects appreciating his presence during their senior year (see 2009, 216–217), Gaztambide-Fernández summarizes their school in one dismissive word—"bubble"—and wonders if his daughter were to attend "Weston" would she become a "trophy wife" and a class-conscious snob (2009, 219)?

9. It is important to remember that ethnographical studies in education used to be edgy, simultaneously contesting more narrowly empirical studies while providing information the field had not yet considered. Francis Schrag (2008, 213) recalls being recruited to serve on the dissertation committee of the first student who proposed to carry out an ethnographic study—supervised by Philip Jackson—instead of the usual hypothesis-driven empirical investigation. He was recruited, Schrag tells us, because no other educational researcher in the University of Chicago Department of Education would sign on. Forty years ago such research was politically as well as epistemologically

charged, as it was focused on the "hidden dimensions" of "everyday life" in schools (Macdonald 1995, 130, 131). But now the use of ethnography in education, including in curriculum studies, too often devolves into a reiteration of what we know already.

10. It did not help the cause of theory in US curriculum studies that Schwab inverted the everyday professional uses of "theory" and "practice," criticizing the former, endorsing the latter. By "theory" he meant rigid abstract schemes—like Tyler's—that could be applied to any situation. "The plaint of my earlier papers on the practical," Schwab (1983, 242) recalled at the end of his career, "is that professors of curriculum … conceive theory as being immediately applicable to every instance of its subject-matter. Hence, most act as if an adequate theory of curriculum, were it to be found, would tell us once and for all what to do in every grade and every stage of every school in everyplace." For most curriculum studies professors, an abstract scheme—like Tyler's—that could be applied anywhere at anytime was what was meant by "practical." The importation of theory—not in Schwab's sense, but as formulated in the humanities, arts, and interpretative social sciences—to the field characterized its Reconceptualization during the 1970s.
11. Onlookers (and on occasion, insiders) complain about the blurred boundaries of curriculum studies, but the truth is (and not only about curriculum studies) that the discipline is not organized according to boundaries, as if building a fence could stop a breeze blowing across neighbors' backyards. An academic discipline is defined by its intellectual history. History is the disciplinary structure of "verticality" (Pinar 2007). In principle, almost any topic or project could be considered curriculum studies if the throughlines to the field's historical preoccupations are explicitly named and elaborated. In addition to intellectual history, a field's intellectual advancement depends on analyses of its present circumstances, as becomes clear in studies of curriculum studies in South Africa (Pinar 2010a), Brazil (Pinar 2011a), and Mexico (Pinar 2011b). The cultivation of disciplinarity in curriculum studies is not antagonistic to the field addressing the problems of schools, as it sometimes was said to be in other specializations. Siegel (2008, 227), for instance, concluded that "philosophers of education would do well to focus more on advancing the intellectual agenda of the field and less on efforts to improve educational practice." The two undertakings are, in my view, reciprocally related.
12. Expanding, then, my initial emphasis from individual existential experience to the intersubjective engagement that can occur through complicated conversation, *currere* incorporates questions of history, society, and culture as they are personified in individual lives, passionately expressed in public service, a sequence structuring teaching and, more importantly, study. For Nietzsche, W. H. Bruford (2009 [1975], 166) reports, a "passionately idealistic humanism, like love …

is not to be taught." This conceptual expansion of *currere*—in which teaching is subsumed *within* curriculum—has occurred over decades and independent of studies of *Bildung*, but it is clear to me that my very American emphasis upon subjective and social reconstruction cannot be understood as utterly separate from this German tradition. Boyd Bode (1940, 73) protests too much when he snarls that "self-cultivation, is not, in fact, an inner principle at all, but a social pattern borrowed from an aristocratic tradition and masquerading under a false name." *Bildung* has been conflated with class pretension and bourgeois subjectivity, but it is not inevitably so (Gur-Ze'ev 2003, 78), as we will see.

13. "Study," Alan A. Block (2004, 2) has asserted, "like prayer, is a way of being—it is an ethics." Like prayer (see Macdonald 1995, 181), Block continues, study "sacralizes the mundane" (2004, 3). Both "emanate from the silence of awe and wonder" (2004, 3). "In prayer and in "study," Block (2004, 3) suggests, "we acknowledge that our knowledge will never suffice and that what we undertake in the classroom is merely a hint of all that exists outside it."
14. Elements of *Bildung*—not Herbertianism, as was the case for many nineteenth-century Americans—can be helpful now, as well as concepts associated with early nineteenth-century post-Hegelian German philosophy (Løvlie, Mortensen, and Nordenbo 2003; Toews 2004; Gabriel and Zizek 2009). These forms of "historical selfhood" (Toews 2004, 419) I invoke throughout the text and emphasize in the epilogue.
15. Even scientific knowledge is historical (Shapin 2010). Despite the important effort to articulate the "next moment" of "post-reconceptualization" in US curriculum studies—at the 2006 Purdue Conference—by structuring "inter-generational dialogues" (Malewski 2010a, xi–xii), conference conversation devolved into accusation. What occurred, at least at the Purdue Conference, was the deflation of a multi-discursive dynamism by "identity politics" (see Malewski 2010c, 534; see Pinar 2010c, 531 n. 10). Was this event also displaced aggression? Certainly, the intensification of the US federal government's ongoing assault on teachers and teacher education has also contributed to the disintegration of the field's fragile fabric. From my perch just across the border, I could see these events unfold but was just as helpless as my US-based colleagues to intervene, although I tried. By insisting on the importance of internationalization, by establishing an American affiliate with the international association, and institutionalizing the historicality of the field in the canon project, I labored to provide the organizational prompts for intellectual advancement (Pinar 2007). The short-term consequences are mixed (at best); here I try again to contribute to the theoretical labor required for the field to advance intellectually: (1) decentering power as an all-encompassing concept; (2) reintroducing

the inextricability of the subjective and the social as political in a historically specific place, illustrated by the thought and activism of Frantz Fanon; (3) emphasizing the significance of internationalization in understanding the local, specifically questions of "multiculturalism"; 4) reactivating the European past in the American present by reviewing the German tradition of *Bildung*; then (5) showing how one US progressive experiment overemphasized the organizational and underemphasized the intellectual in its effort to revitalize schools and their relation to society; (6) reestablishing the centrality of the imagination in educational experience by reviewing 20 years of talks to teachers made by Maxine Greene; and finally, (7) with the help of Hongyu Wang, I demonstrate the cosmopolitan character of subjective reconstruction through academic study.

16. In addition to the concepts in the title and subtitle, I will address the subjective and social reconstruction that occurs through "complicated conversation," which, I will suggest, summarizes without obliterating the specificity of the subsidiary concepts.

Introducton

1. The late twentieth-century American philosopher most closely associated with the concept of conversation nonetheless eschewed the concept of experience. "The yearning for a lost possibility of fulfilled experience expressed by Emerson, James, and Dewey," Martin Jay (2005, 304) notes, "was thus explicitly spurned by the resolutely anti-redemptive, anti-utopian Rorty." Despite intense criticism (from Westbrook, Kloppenberg, Shusterman, Ankersmit: see Jay 2005, 304–307), Rorty held his ground (2005, 308). Was Rorty's philosophical recalcitrance also an acknowledgment of a historical shift? Jay (2005, 312) quotes Walter Benjamin's May 7, 1940, writing from exile in Paris to his friend, Theodor W. Adorno (himself then only recently relocated in New York), his anguish at "the methodical destruction of experience." For Benjamin, Jay explains, this was "one of the most telling indicators of the modern era's decline into barbarism." I am here indicating my agreement with Benjamin and installing experience as the "figure" of conversation against the "ground" that is the world.
2. As the conjunction implies, they are interrelated, even reciprocally related. While one can—does—reconstruct oneself through study and experience, attempting so shifts one's being-in-the-world, inevitably recasting one's social relations. Each sphere addresses each other. In chapter 5, I emphasize the distinction between reorganization and reconstruction in part to contrast organizational or bureaucratic and intellectual labor. Especially twentieth-century efforts to improve the curriculum have focused on rearranging the organizational character of the school, rather than focusing on its intellectual quality: its

intimacy with the academic disciplines in the universities, its subtlety and nuance, and its vitality, in part evidenced in classroom conversation. Rearranging organizational elements can impact intellectual quality, but by themselves they risk reinscribing an instrumentalism that quickly becomes procedural, as in Tyler's four questions. Gert Biesta (2003, 66) suggests that Herbert Spencer's "famous question" (which knowledge is of most worth?) amounts to installing questions of quality as criteria for decisions about what to include in the curriculum, criteria ideological in character (see Biesta 2003, 67). The "famous question"—severed from Spencer—I invoke as a political, ethical, and historically attuned question. Concern with quality is no narrow disciplinary matter, but a call to subjective and social reconstruction. Reconstruction as a concept—often associated with John Dewey—suffers a tarnished reputation due to its deconstruction by Derrida and Foucault. I share David D. Roberts's (1995, 183) assessment that "French deconstruction also included an element of overreaction that tended to compromise the reconstructive possibility and to blur the point of the posthistoricist extremes." Acknowledging its risks (among them voluntarism, subjectivism, and an anti-intellectual activism), it is, I argue, time to reaffirm reconstruction as the marker of educational experience, installing study—and its modalities, primary among them thought (including reason), critical judgment, and creativity—as the site of education. Study occurs in time (including life history and the historical moment) and place (cultural, political), not in that endless "state of emergency" (see Pinar 2012, 72) installed by standardized examinations.

3. Debates over the meanings of self-formation—so central to *Bildung*—have hardly been limited to Germany or continental Europe. German ideas influenced Americans, including John Dewey and the US pragmatists (Løvlie and Standish 2003, 17, 19). In Britain, W. H. Bruford (2009 [1975], viii) points out, the Victorian "sages"—Carlyle, Coleridge, J. S. Mill, and Matthew Arnold—were among those "greatly attracted by German ideas about personal culture. German ideas proved contrapuntal to the "materialism" that had become "rampant" in England from the 1820s, "owing to the remarkable results of the industrial revolution" (2009 [1975], viii). Twentieth-century British thinkers were also influenced, among them Michael Oakeshott (see Løvlie and Standish 2003, 15–16; Biesta 2003, 74 n. 4; Pinar 2012, 188–193; Arcilla 2003, 140), and to the so-called London School: R. S. Peters, Paul Hirst, and Robert Dearden (Løvlie and Standish 2003, 8). John White less so, Løvlie and Standish (2003, 14) suggest, as his conception of a liberal education accords a greater prominence to an "egalitarian politics of liberalism" than was the case with Peters, Hirst, and Dearden. Løvlie and Standish (2003, 14) characterize his understanding of the "good life" as a form of "ethical naturalism," furthering attenuating his link with

Bildung. It is true that White (2008, 272) characterizes "personal well-being" as a "subjective matter," associated with the "desires of the individual," a view that leads him to criticize as "flawed" attempts to suggest otherwise, specifically Richard Peters's insistence on the curriculum as comprising "worthwhile activities." While a timeless set of worthwhile activities may not qualify as contributing to one's well-being, White (2008, 272) does privilege the role of culture over what he terms both the "individualistic-subjectivist" and the "objectivist approaches," although it is not obvious, at least in this short summary of his thinking, where that gets him, as for him Mozart's European culture and historical moment do not undermine Mozart's timeless significance (see 2008, 273). If so variable, changing, and linked with desire, culture, and history, what can the "self" be? For postmodernists like Patti Lather (2007, 9) "one epistemologically situates oneself as curious and unknowing," as "getting lost," even "self-wounding" (2007, 11). That last phrase—Lather (2007, 11) associates it with inquiry—invokes for me the subjective violence of decolonization, a process I named as "self-shattering" in characterizing efforts at working through racialization (2006, 180–183). In the midst of such subjective dissolution and reconstruction, however, there remains (at least potentially) "that mystical unity which we call the self" (Novalis, quoted in Rauch 2000, 140). And it is this unity of the self and its formation—coming of age—that typify the *Bildungsroman*, often featuring the central character's quest to extricate himself or herself from confining circumstances. In the *Miss Muriel* collection, Mary Helen Washington (1987) points out, Ann Petry ends the male domination reminiscent of her earlier texts by concentrating upon her woman characters more directly, more fully, with less ambivalence. In contrast to the determined and powerless women who populated her 1940s fiction, Washington continues, the characters in Petry's "drugstore" stories enjoy social possibilities for growth and choice. Reminiscent of a narrator of a traditional male *Bildungsroman* (see, for instance, Jonsson 2000, 42; Baker 2001, 369), Washington notes, the young girl in the title story "Miss Muriel" is provided opportunities for self-development. Despite its genesis in Germany, then, the pertinence of *Bildung* as a concept is hardly limited there (see also McClintock 1971, 186). And what constitutes "worthwhile activities"—what knowledge is of most worth?—cannot be ascertained in the abstract.

4. And new and debilitating master narratives have substituted, among them "power," as I complain in chapter 1. As Marshall (1997, 54) appreciates, "[T]he proclamation of the 'post-modern' may paradoxically participate in a master narrative of 'before' and 'after'." In 1922, Robert Musil (1990, 126) complained that "concepts like reason, progress, humanity, and necessity held ghostly sway over our view of life, together with ethical values that are arbitrary or at best

standardized by public opinion: a veneer of order covering chaos." That "fact" was no reason to disclaim such concepts altogether, however, as some contemporary theorists insist (see, for instance, Lather 2007, 11, 40, 43). "At the heart of Musil's intellectual mission," Pike and Luft (1990, xix) point out, "was a defense of the writer's intellect against the German academic model of the mind, a defense of the creative individual." As you will see in chapter 1, among so-called critical pedagogues that concept—the creative individual—is strictly epiphenomenal, an effect of power. If we accord such totalizing power to the concept of power, James B. Macdonald (1995 [1977], 145) noted, "[W]e might as well close up shop." Indeed, the promotion of "power" as the primary concept of curriculum analysis has had catastrophic consequences, among them cynicism, anti-intellectualism, opportunism, and an intensified ahistoricism. No one doubts the preeminence of power in social relations, but it is not inevitably the main force in how professions proceed. Nor should it be. Acknowledging "power," I affirm ethics—expressed and adjudicated through academic study and intellectually rigorous conversation—as primary in the social life of the school.

5. *Bildung*, Bruford (2009 [1975], 236) asserts, "was the necessary complement to the German attitude to the state, just as personal religion had been to self-subordination to the church." *Bildung* was not the only instance of the secularization of religion through education, however, wherein "the school is the child of the church" (Nordenbo 2003, 28). Daniel Tröhler (2006) underscores the religious roots of US progressivism, a fact Dewey seems to embrace (1962 [1934]; see Løvlie and Standish 2003, 5). The Left more generally shows the secularizing of religion as well. "The power of Marxism," George Grant (1966 [1959], 65) observed, "has lain in the fact that it foretold a concrete overcoming of evil in the world, which would be for society as a whole. Here Marx's dependence on the Judaic-Christian idea is obvious. His humanism retains the idea of history as salvation, but rejects its theological framework." While retaining that idea, and supplementing it with some programmatic agenda for its practical realization (Grant 1966 [1959], 65), Marxism, in Grant's judgment, finally fails to accord "sufficient place to the freedom of the spirit," by which he means "that man is more than simply an object in the world, he is a subject" (1966 [1959], 69), with the "ability to transcend any worldly situation" (1966 [1959], 70). To this recurring question of the subject I return in the epilogue through John Toews's juxtaposition of Kierkegaard and Marx.
6. William E. Doll, Jr. (2005, 31) discerns this tendency in *Bildung*, as calling for "an oddly strong sense of self, one that paradoxically entraps the individual within a universal (can one say national!) destiny." It was not always the case (Mortensen 2003, 124). In its first formulations, Nordenbo (2003, 30) tells us, a "tension exists between

Bildung and *Herrschaft* (power and governance), because *Bildung* stands for the 'cultivation of man according to his own definition' while society for its part wants to shape man in line with *its* needs." Later, Nordenbo notes, this tension is replaced by "harmony" between the two spheres (2003, 30, 32). Such "harmony" characterizes the aesthetic education endorsed by the German poet, playwright, and aesthetician Friedrich Schiller. For Schiller, Hansjorg Hohr (2003, 171) explains, the "highest societal achievement" was an "aesthetic state" that "honors individuality" and "feeling" while "cultivating" the "common law." An educated person becomes a "beautiful soul" who lives in "peace" with "herself and the community," Hohr (2003, 171) continues, and indeed, "the law" becomes her "second nature." In contrast to *currere*, defined by subjective and social reconstruction, *Bildung*, Hohr (2003, 174) points out, is defined by "reconciliation" between "individuality" and "community," the "only way of being truthful to oneself, of becoming a *person*."

7. In a lecture Thomas Mann gave to students in Munich in 1923, he addressed the reluctance of many Germans to endorse democracy:

> The finest characteristic of the typical German, the best-known and also the most flattering to his self-esteem, is his inwardness. It is no accident that it was the Germans who gave to the world the intellectually stimulating and very humane literary form which we call the novel of personal cultivation and development. Western Europe has its novel of social criticism, to which the Germans regard this other type as their own special counterpart; it is at the same time an autobiography, a confession. The inwardness, the culture [*Bildung*] of a German implies introspectiveness; an individualistic cultural conscience; consideration for the careful tending, the shaping, deepening and perfecting of one's own personality or, in religious terms, for the salvation and justification of one's own life; subjectivism in the things of the mind, therefore, a type of culture that might be called pietistic, given to autobiographical confession and deeply personal, one in which the world of the *objective*, the political world, is felt to be profane and is thrust aside with indifference, "because," as Luther says, "this external order is of no consequence." What I mean by all this is that the idea of a republic meets with resistance in Germany chiefly because the ordinary middle-class man here, if he ever thought about culture, never considered politics to be a part of it, and still does not do so today. To ask him to transfer his allegiance from inwardness to the *objective*, to politics, to what the peoples of Europe call *freedom*, would seem to him to amount to a demand that he should do violence to his own nature, and in fact give up his sense of national identity. (quoted in Bruford 2009 [1975], vii)

8. Describing the history of curriculum studies in the Netherlands, Wardekker, Volman, and Terwel (2003, 486) point out that US version (they're referencing Tyler and his progeny) was "just about everything *Bildung* theory was not: it was empirical, down-to-earth, transmission-oriented, rather more sensitive to the needs of contemporary society, and maybe most importantly, closer to common sense about education which was still dominated by the empiricist view inherited from the 19th century." Traditional US curriculum studies, as Wardekker, Volman, and Terwel (2003, 486) summarize, "concentrated on the curriculum as a planning document and its construction, not on education as a whole." While the US import retained a "curriculum structure" organized after the academic subjects, no longer were the subjects construed as "capable of inducing personality formation by means of their *Bildungsgehalt*; now, the subjects were valued because of the specific knowledge and skills they contain, which must be transmitted to the pupils" (2003, 486). That shift in emphasis meant that "researchers concentrated on teaching and learning theories, on the *how* rather than on the *what*" (2003, 486). In contemporary US curriculum studies—structured by complicated conversation concerning the key curriculum question *what knowledge is of most worth*?—the "how" is embedded in the "what." Incidentally, Wardekker, Volman, and Terwel (2003, 488) note that my work has not drawn many "adherents" in the Netherlands, "probably because it is perceived in a way as too reminiscent of the outmoded paradigm of *Bildungstheorie*." As I trust this book demonstrates, that reminiscence is not entirely mistaken, although any conflation of the two effaces the democratic republicanism implicit in *currere* as complicated conversation (see note 6, above). The perceptive Tero Autio (2006a, 103) discerns a more general movement "toward the Continental tradition" in reconceptualized US curriculum studies.
9. "Within language," Rauch (2000, 132) points out, "history connects individuals to their cultural past and is relevant to their desire to find meaning in linguistic representation. This is what motivates us to read books, which not only affects our imagination, but incites our potential for change." Reactivating the past through academic study encourages reconstruction, in part through emphasizing subjective noncoincidence with the present: "[T]he return to the original is in fact produced through the creation of the new," as Mosès (2009 [1992], 72) points out in his discussion of Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator." Rauch (2000, 135) underlines the significance of the hieroglyph (one definition of "character," as you will see later in the introduction) as, Rauch suggests, it exceeds representation, thereby opening a "space between signifier and signified which for the time being can only be a temporal space, an interspace between any empty form and a new content or significant." This "interspace" is what Wang—in chapter 7—terms a "third space"—and where Ted

Aoki (2005 [2003], 429) locates "the site of living pedagogy." For Maxine Greene, it is what enables the releasing of the imagination. As Rauch (2000, 137) underscores, however, the "imagination is, in fact, conditioned by language and history."

10. For Paul Hirst (2008, 117), the "development of reason" is the primary aim of education. For Emily Robertson (2008, 204) too, the "cultivation of rationality" was the primary point of education. In contrast, Jim Garrison (2008, 96) concludes that the "real problem of our age is an excessive confidence in the cognitive, knowing dimension of human experience." Francis Schrag (2008, 212) seems to accept that analysis, if focusing on the education of the emotions, suggesting that psychoanalysis is an educational process, arguing that the "talking cure" is more aptly conceived as an educative rather than a medical process. Combining confession with craftsmanship and creativity, Gustav Mahler (like Musil after him) was likewise linking the two.
11. As William McGrath chronicles in his superb study, Mahler was a member of the Pernerstorfer circle, a group of students who went on to make significant contributions to Austrian political and cultural life. Influenced by Wagner and Nietzsche (for whom "*Bildung*" was a "principal preoccupation" [Bruford 2009 (1975), 163]), Mahler, like other members of the circle, associated aesthetic and political purposes with religious ones (McGrath 1974, 113) Mahler followed the "Wagnerian demand for an organic fusion of word and tone" (1974, 124), which Wagner regarded as prerequisite for general cultural revival" (1974, 125). Wagner's music became exploited by the German right wing, including by Hitler who faithfully attended the Bayreuth Festival (Vaget 2002, 162) and by Hans Pfitzner, the "figurehead of a proudly 'reactionary' philosophy of 'German' music and an ardent nationalist" (Vaget 2002, 158), acclaiming German "superiority" in music in "much more militant terms that even Wagner would have intended" (Kater 2002, 178).
12. I am not suggesting that bodies are only "objects" or that "objects" have become important only in the last several hundred years, but the primacy of their exchange—as opposed to sentimental or sacred—value has surely intensified under capitalism. The philosophical disputes over visuality are long and often compelling (see, for instance, Jay 1993a); I emphasized how "observation," now commonsensical in social science (including education) research not only accorded scientific status to the racialization of African peoples, rationalized in the infamous Curse of Ham (Pinar 2006b, 2009, chapter 2). The contiguity of ocularcentrism with the eclipse of inwardness can't be accidental, although their relationship is by no means straightforward or cause-effect. Nor am I suggesting in my embrace of inwardness that we devalue observation. It is one of several highly significant sensory means of apprehension.

13. Subjective structural noncoincidence is not universal, as it—people—can be crushed, forced to coincide with what others demand of them. Ernst Mach (with whom Robert Musil studied at the University of Vienna) argued that the "I" is distillation of sense impressions, changing form and content according to its environment (Jonsson 2000, 58). For George Herbert Mead, it is the "me" that is empirical in Mach's sense; the "I" is, in Aboulafia's (2010, 60) summary, "the *functional* equivalent of a transcendental ego.... One cannot be aware of the 'me' unless there is a subject, an 'I,' present to provide the 'consciousness of' the empirical object, that is, the 'me.' Not only does the 'I' allow us to be aware of the 'me'; it also serves as the 'source' of responses." Definitional differences suspended for the moment, structural noncoincidence can be cultivated, taught, and (relatively speaking) singularly achieved through understanding. "[T]he subject is not identical with itself," Løvlie (2003, 157) appreciates. Not a "property," Løvlie (2003, 158) continues, the "inner freedom" that follows from subjective noncoincidence is the "ongoing self-less interaction between person and things in an aesthetic, creative relationship." It may be "selfless" in what some construe as "Zen-like" engagement, but there is ontological grounding for such "free interplay." When "not a self-identical being," Rauch (2000, 131) explains, "the self is already the principle of highest diversity and therefore the ground of all knowledge." Cultivating inner "diversity"—requiring a psychic expansiveness (Macdonald 1995 [1964], 24), attuned to the natural, social, and historical world—encourages a cosmopolitan comprehension as it sets the subjective stage for complexity, specificity, and universality. These are not end-states of course, but moments of understanding in an ongoing reconstruction of reality, including one's own. Animated by desire, including desire for happiness and demands for justice and recognition, reconstruction includes critique, which Rauch (2000, 131) associates with *Bildung*: "[T]he idea and value of *Bildung* required a learning from the past and a renewal of tradition through critique and commentary." Critique can inaugurate reconstruction; Rauch (2000, 132) explains:

    > This practice of critique consists of translating history and the past into a signifying example for the struggles of the present, a struggle that is at the same time one of representing and hence understanding the present in order to "imagine" a way out. Thus, the critic's task is precisely not to represent the past once and for all but to use it in its materiality and create a representation of the present.

    "For" the present means to address the present in its specificity and uniqueness, thereby triggering its reformulation into the future. I suggest that in a moment (like ours) characterized by presentism, such "address" comes from the past and takes the form of allegory (Pinar 2012, xiv).

14. Subjectivity cannot coincide with itself in temporal terms, as it anticipates the future and is haunted and inspired by the past, a sphere of deferred experience Freud famously termed *Nachtraglichkeit*. In an era of presentism and narcissism (themselves reciprocally related), this temporal blurring intensifies, as distinctions among past, present, and future disappear due to subjective absorption (and consequent dissolution) by an apparently ever-accelerating, ever-intensifying "now." In such—our—historical moment, subjective reconstruction requires installing sharp distinctions among the three temporal domains in order to forestall their blurring and to enable memory, morality, and agency. Douglas McKnight (2009, 514 n. 4) is right: in a historical moment when the past and future fade into a flat-lined present, I make "an almost empirical, linear maneuver" in temporalizing *currere*.
15. I emphasize that this is a structural and not necessarily a thematic structuration of subjectivity, affirming Musil's sense of human being lacking "interior essence" (Jonsson 2000, 26), a widely held assumption, including during Musil's time, when intellectuals undertook—in Jonsson's (2000, 27) summary—"the task of developing a cultural synthesis and of reeducating people so as to make them believe in an interior truth or communal essence, which in the view of these cultural leaders had to be realized, both individually and socially, in order to save society from imminent decline." The diagnosis may have been accurate, but the educational prescription—perhaps due to the emergency of the moment—may have invited the very decline it was invoked to avoid. In educational research today "space" risks becoming a trendy term denuded of culture, history, and politics (see, for instance, Gulson and Symes 2007). "Place" is preferable, supplemented by sustainability studies.
16. As Karl Joachim Weintraub (1978, 375) points out, that "famous old phrase" has, over the centuries, "come to mean something quite different from what the inscription at Delphi meant to say." Weintraub notes that Goethe—who took the original inscription to say simply to "take some care of yourself, take note of yourself, so that you may obtain a sense of how you stand towards your equals and towards the world"—construed the command as distracting humanity from the "outside world, thus drawing him into a false inner contemplation" (quoted in Weintraub 1978, 375). For Goethe, Weintraub (1978, 376) explains, the two are coextensive and reciprocal, indeed inseparable. Long before Lasch, Goethe knew that—in Weintraub's (1978, 376) summary—"wisdom lay not in perpetual self-searching and preoccupation with the self but in active involvement in the world."
17. Gottfried Benn (1886–1956) was an expressionist poet who served as a military doctor during World War I. Throughout the 1920s, Benn's poems and essays sought to relocate literature outside of history. After a brief infatuation with the Fascism, he retreated into an "inner migration." After World War II, Benn became a major literary figure

in the Federal Republic of Germany (see Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg 1995, 744).

18. Servitude—sometimes chosen, as in its sexual forms such as S&M (sadomasochism)—is infinitely variable. In modernity—with the segregation of youth in schools and the creation of youth culture (in part by capitalism, in part by politics: Filene 1998, 206)—socialization renders individuals in conformity with norms and fashion, liable to manipulation. "Conformity is the rule not only in society at large," historian George Mosse (2000, 82) observes, "but especially among teenagers living together." In addition to parents' preoccupation with their children's safety and progress—their yearning for their children to conform to their fantasies for them—are children's tendencies to copy each other. The educational injunction to cultivate individuality, creativity, and critical judgment faces not only political headwinds, but it also faces resistance from many children and their parents.
19. Practical life cannot be reduced to the application of technology and efficiency, as it is also a matter of learning from experience, and not only through instrumentalist means, such as calculation. "Practical reason," Rauch (2000, 137) reminds, "is an ability to judge from experience. In other words, practical reason proceeds in an *unconscious* comparison between the past and present in terms of reflecting on the affective state at hand. Practical reason, because it is imaginative, is related to the pure power of history as it shapes the subject in its perceptions of the present." But by inflating "power" as an explanatory concept so that history and subjectivity became incidental, political theorists conceded to conservatives any sense of practicality, a fact they constantly bemoaned not as their own error but as fated by "power," as I point out in chapter 1.
20. Critique is hardly specific to curriculum studies, of course. It was considered central to the philosophy of education, at least as Leonard Waks (2008, 251) conceived that field: "I took a philosopher to be a social and cultural critic [and] pointed to ways of living more freely." Engagement with the world, informed by academic knowledge: such ongoing critique was an ethical practice as well. This was not a widely held view among philosophers of education at that time. Against the professional mainstream, Waks (2008, 253) felt that "one should take on contemporary 'real world' problems that one found troubling, think very hard about them in ways guided by the philosophical tradition, and contribute to their resolution in communications to professional and public audiences." In that final phrase is the important acknowledgment that scholarship in education is also sometimes directed to the public. Alas, philosophy of education—like curriculum studies in the United States—is imperiled by the authoritarian demand for "what works." As Francis Schrag (2008, 217–218) laments: "Today, I perceive the voice of the philosopher to have largely been drowned out by that of the policy wonk, often one trained in economics or other forms of 'scientific' research."

21. "Another topic that is a gap in the educational conversation," Jim Garrison (2008, 98) notes, "is listening," a point James B. Macdonald (1995, 29) also affirmed. Patchen Markell (2003, 38) includes "listening" among a wider range of practices she associated with "acknowledgment, which *can* be expressed in a wide range of acts and practices—taking a risk, withdrawing, speaking, listening, welcoming, polemicizing, claiming a right, refusing to claim a right, mourning, celebrating, forgiving, and punishing—yet it is reducible to none of these, and none of these, as such, an instance or mark of acknowledgment: everything depends on how and why they are done, and in what contexts." The moment, the place, and the person *always* matter. It is the "lived" in the lived experience of curriculum: *currere*.
22. The concept of business ethics has only seemed more an aspirational than an empirical subject. As Robert Musil (1990, 155) observed in 1923: "Capitalism today is unspeakably cruel, but has altruistic phrases in its mouth."
23. Teachers' judgment—focused on answering, over and over again, the classic curriculum question *what knowledge is of most worth*?—is indispensable to classroom life. Many scholars of education have known this fundamental fact: Hugh G. Petrie (2008, 169), for example, insisted that "we must substitute a notion of teacher judgment for that of 'applying' research to practice," even as teachers were being silenced by politicians and profiteers, aided and abetted by a compliant news media. (Nearly 70 percent of teachers, according to a MetLife survey, complained that their voices were not heard in education debates [Gabriel 2011, A18].) Not only is teachers' professional judgment dismissed as irrelevant, elementary free speech is threatened as well. A high school English teacher in suburban Philadelphia was suspended for a profanity-laced blog in which she complained that too many of her students were "disengaged, lazy whiners." Thirty-year-old Natalie Munroe reports that students become "angry when you ask them to think or be creative.... The students are not being held accountable." One of Munroe's former students, Jeff Shoolbraid, agreed with much of what Munroe said, but judged her comments as inappropriate for a teacher! He continued: "As far as motivated high school students, she's completely correct. High school kids don't want to do anything.... It's a teacher's job, however, to give students the motivation to learn" (quoted passages in Walters 2011, A5). Here is another "student" converted to consumer, emboldened to silence teachers' judgments as if teachers were department store clerks. Under such circumstances there can be neither teaching nor learning.
24. With fewer university positions funded, those occupying them are besieged not only by federal school "reform" but also by vitriolic politics internal to schools of education under siege. These conditions plus a continuing internalized ahistorical ameliorative orientation within US curriculum studies suggest that the future of the field

worldwide may well lay outside the United States, in (for instance) Brazil (Pinar 2011a), where an intellectually vital field generates new concepts as it engages with its intellectual history and present circumstances.

25. Interpretation can be misinterpreted as "anything goes," but as Rauch (2000, 9) points out, interpretation itself is informed by tradition, itself historically shifting and embedded in the very language we use to interpret the present. Tradition, she (2000, 9) asserts, is a "communicative process of transmitting experience and meaning." Without knowledge of tradition—in disciplinary terms the field's intellectual history—communication is curtailed. That is why reconstructing the canon in curriculum studies is so important, a project I undertake next.
26. Waks (2008, 258) recounts that by 1974 it became clear to him that instrumentalism was "utterly sinister." Waks (2008, 258) concluded that

    > technical rationality, the straight line adjustment of means to ends without consideration of contextual factors, has such an enticing simplicity that it attracts people, eclipses their capacity for more complex forms of thought, and then, like a mental disease, derives them in all sorts of blind, irrational directions, with vast destructive results on the surrounding contexts.... The fact that socialist bureaucrats also embraced his sort of work rationalization, however, convinced me that it was alluring not only to capitalists but to anyone seeking domination.

    With politicians and profiteers having succeeded in scripting the school curriculum, Waks (2008, 259) notes, we are now witnessing "a true night of the living dead!"
27. In "an age of hype, self-promotion and bullshit," Schrag (2008, 218) notes, an emphasis upon "argument" is even more educationally valuable, a view also endorsed by Martha Nussbaum (see 2010, 51). For Harry Frankfurt (2005, 7), a feature of the pervasive "bullshit" characteristic of our time is the widespread practice of "*deliberate* misrepresentation," not limited to politicians and school "reformers" but "common to capitalism. In the old days," Frankfurt (2005, 20–21) points out,

    > craftsmen did not cut corners. They worked carefully, and they took care with every aspect of their work. Every part of the product was considered, and each was designed and made to be exactly as it should be. These craftsmen did not relax their thoughtful self-discipline even with respect to features of their work that would ordinarily not be visible. Although no one would notice if those features were not quite right, the craftsmen would be bothered by their consciences. So nothing was swept under the rug. Or, one might perhaps also say, there was no bullshit.

The emphasis upon outcomes encourages "cutting corners," including misrepresentation, but "what the person really wants," Frankfurt (2005, 57) suggests (after Saint Augustine), "is not to tell the lie but to attain goals." The character of curriculum studies includes an ethical sense of craftsmanship, which eschews an exclusive insistence on outcomes. Consequences are key, but they cannot be ascertained at the outset, nor must they be aligned with "goals."

28. In 1923, Musil (1990, 169) was clear how these converge in particular places: "It appears that the question of the European: What am I? really means: Where am I? It is not a matter of a phrase in a process governed by laws, and not a matter of destiny, but simply of a situation." Articulating the specificity of situation is prerequisite to working through its legacies, a point acknowledged in my initial formulation of "place" (Pinar 1991) but lost in "abstract, homogenous" conceptions of "space" (Jay 2005, 313 n. 4).
29. This is a vast subject sometimes associated with poetry, a genre capable of invoking the "living present" (Mariniello 1994, 123). Here I am emphasizing its intertextuality; its unconscious character, emphasized by Pasolini, also informs its complexity. "Although oral language participates in our conscious life," Mariniello (1994, 123) points out, "it flows from the unconscious. The unconscious dimension of spoken language is repeatedly emphasized by Pasolini and finds confirmation in his film theory where unconscious language, like dreams, constitutes the oral language for which film is the written language." While working from very different intellectual traditions (political economy, communications theory) and political circumstances (Canada not Italy), Harold Innis also appreciated that orality provided "the essential basis for the formation of the personality and culture" (Watson 2007, 114).
30. Slavoj Zizek (1991, 45) suggests that "reality itself is nothing but an embodiment of a certain blockage in the process of symbolization. For reality to exist, something must be left unspoken." The intellectual labor of conversation is articulation of what remains unspoken, however unending such a process must be; such "working through" (LaCapra 2009, 25) engenders transformation of the situation.
31. "Carl Rogers," Diane Ravitch (2000, 392) records derisively (in her critique of the progressive tradition), "contended that schools should ignore traditional learning and concentrate instead on 'personal growth' through 'encounter groups' and 'sensitivity training'." Rogers—remembered too for his conception of unconditional positive regard—was hardly alone in embracing the learning that could occur through dialogical encounter. The importance of "human relations" has been acknowledged in the US progressive tradition for decades, quite apart from applications of group process to classroom life (see Glasser 1969) and the laudable tradition of group counseling in schools (Mahler 1969).

32. To cram means—*Webster's* again (1975, 265)—"to study hastily for an imminent examination." Hastily implies efficiency, without the lived time meditation and contemplation require, and it instrumentalizes efforts toward an impending event, not recollecting elements of one's own educational experience toward an original conclusion of one's own. Given the obesity crisis—especially among US teenagers—the prior definition of cram ("to eat greedily or to satiety: stuff") may not be entirely incidental: are the two in some sense homologous? Recalling David M. Steiner's likening of teaching to a tennis serve (see Foderaro 2010, A19), another definition—"to thrust in or as if in a rough or forceful manner"—is relevant as well: "jam" is a synonym.
33. As noted earlier, the phrase derives from Aoki (2005 [1985/1991] 232), but it is not foreign to *Bildung*, where it hints at the expansiveness of an aesthetic education. Ernst Von Salomon ([1930], in Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg 1995, 303) explains:

    > Education in the German sense (*Bildung*) means giving form, both inner and outer. Form, however, can only be given where there is content, and content comes only from an idea. An idea always manifests a connectedness.... An idea is something mutual. It grows out of the tensions between one individual and another. Where there is tension, there is also connectedness.

    The point that self-formation occurs through forms provided by cultural, specifically academic, content is crucial for those who fantasize they can clean the slate and start anew by finding "what works." North American readers may associate "connectedness" with relationality, even democratization, but for Salomon (1902–1972) it portended a chilling even murderous solidarity. A member of the Freikorps from 1919–1921 and imprisoned for his role in the 1922 assassination of Walter Rathenau (the foreign minister of the Weimar Republic), Salomon's autobiographical novels registered his contempt for the Weimar Republic. Later he wrote propaganda films and was interned by the Americans at the end of World War II (Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg 1995, 758).
34. Ravitch (2000, 312) quotes Walter Lippmann, who in 1940 complained (against Dewey) that "there is no common faith." Instead of transmitting a common cultural heritage, he continued, education had become "egoist, careerist, specialist and asocial." No doubt still engaged with Dewey (see Pinar 2012, 234–235), Lippmann managed to omit Dewey's supplementation of "transmitting" with "rectifying" that heritage, social reform as a secularization of religious faith, very much preferable to the self-promoting careerism accompanying capitalism's commodification of education. Indeed, I wish to retain in secular form the religious calling for education, "religious" as defined in Dewey (1962 [1934], 80) as the "ideal" in human relations, which I would extend to the traditional virtues: piety,

reverence, and devotion, for example, "spirituality." Like Dewey, I decline the insistence of the devout on the existence of a supernatural being and upon institutionalized dogma and regimen. With James B. Macdonald (1995, 146–147), I endorse "religious socialism"—the "basic ideas" of which are "the *person* and *social democracy*"—as the core "values" that "undergird" (1995, 145) my work in US curriculum studies.

35. After acknowledging the failure of US school reform, including its failure to address questions of alienation among the young, Kenneth A. Strike (2008, 247) concludes that "the cure for alienation is not bribery or threats. It is community." Even the palliative possibility of community—for me palliative only (and not necessarily even) when it is a "community of memory" (Toews 2004, 206)—faded for Strike's fellow philosopher of education Francis Schrag (2008, 217) who concluded that even the Deweyan hope for radically restructured schools was an "utopian aspiration." Nor, Schrag concluded, after decades of experiments, is teaching likely to be "advanced by scientific research in psychology or education." In the mid-1960s, working to formulate "principles of educational practice ... whose significance can then only be seen in the results of practice based on them," Paul Hirst (2008, 118) now recants, acknowledging the "inadequacies of this account." While suggesting that "teaching does imply learning," Nel Noddings (2008, 139) disclaims that "teaching must produce learning of exactly and only the material pre-specified as objectives, nor does it mean that a particular effort to teach X to a class will result in every student's learning it." I wonder what the link between teaching and learning can possibly be? As long as human beings remain human—structured by imagination, exercising will, unpredictable in conduct, and infinitely complex in constitution and desire—the demand that students learn—insofar as it is reduced to efforts to produce results (usually quantifiable)—is thankfully doomed. As did James B. Macdonald (see 1995 [1974], 88) before him, Michael A. Peters (2008, 157) appreciates that such "deep education" is ultimately "spiritual," and that realization animates, not vitiates, its political character.

36. The assumption that educational reform is *school* reform, that educational experience can be stimulated by organizational rather than intellectual changes is a long-standing, but fortunately not universal, assumption among policy makers. Leonard Waks (2008, 264) criticizes Larry Cuban, Michael Fullan, and others for their endorsement of organizational change as primary, as if learning and school reform could follow from the actions of so-called change agents. Instead, Waks suggests that schools (and their institutional norms) follow broader shifts in society. For me, following social shifts can also be unfortunate; the education of the public must also provide opportunities for social and subjective reconstruction of these shifts. The

past—where we can discover the "new"—seems crucial. Discussing Franz Rosenzweig's conception of redemption, Mosès (2009 [1992], 51) points out that "as a category of historical time, utopia proposes to the imagination only a new combination of elements already known; Redemption, on the other hand, rises up against all waiting, with the unpredictability of the brand-new." While reconstruction cannot promise redemption, it does rely on "the unpredictability of the brand-new." In chapter 5, I underscore the importance of maintaining ongoing intellectual links between research in the academic disciplines conducted in the universities (and elsewhere) and the school subjects as taught in K-12 institutions. These links are not ones of "following" only, as teachers themselves must reconstruct what they study in light of the ongoing conversation with specific students in their particular classrooms. I am not suggesting that new information (as becomes available through research at the universities) is itself sufficient. Rauch (2000, 153) emphasizes that it is not "new information . . . that may change the subject; rather, the text's language, allegories, idioms, and rhetorical structures affect the subject by rousing unconscious memories." In my view both dialogical structures and that "new information" comprise the curricular obligation of the teacher committed to educating the public. After all, how can language be separated finally from what it conveys?

1 The Unaddressed "I" of Ideology Critique

1. Geoff Whitty allows that "the newness of the new sociology of education is misleading" (1985, 8). In its assertion of power as primary and in its avowedly Leftist political commitments, however, the "new sociology" did distinguish itself from positivist or phenomenological versions. Regarding the issue of culpability, Michael Young confesses to his role in the present state of things, acknowledging that it was his own scholarship (with Geoff Whitty) that was responsible (see 2008, 164).
2. Probably derived from a simplistic structuralism, ideology critique bifurcated power, abstracting it from representation. Dominick LaCapra (2009, 27) appreciates that "ideology should rather be understood in its flexible and multifarious forms that cannot be reduced to the opposition between systematic articulation, on the one hand, and practice that is divorced from discourse, on the other." He adds, importantly, that "ideology should also be seen in terms of subject formation involving the role of fantasy and (positive or negative) identification" (2009, 27). The latter analysis remains unaddressed in ideology critique (as shown in this chapter), and it remains unaddressed in its conceptual progeny—identity—spawned by the fixation on power, the tendency toward conceptual totalization, as well as authentic efforts to testify to past suffering and

injustice. Indeed, when "identity" first preoccupied academic debates over three decades ago, it was a welcome challenge to a patriarchal Eurocentrism, demanding and receiving recognition and inclusion of what before had been excluded knowledge: race-class-gender. In recent years, the triumvirate has become catechismal; strong tendencies toward a strategically dysfunctional essentialism now vitiate the labor of recognition, inclusion, and comprehensiveness (see Posnock 1998, 25). Rather than emphasizing the heterogeneity of the social, multiculturalism has devolved into "the balkanized domain of identity politics" (Cusset 2008, 157).

3. In her magisterial *In Perpetual Motion* (2001), Bernadette Baker shows how dependent the humanities and social sciences have become on the concept of "power." In the research on lynching, however, historians discarded "power" as insufficiently specific a concept for understanding the peculiar phenomenon (see Pinar 2006a, 104).
4. While sharing Allan Luke's endorsement of cosmopolitanism, I suspect that "learning beyond the nation" must occur by learning *through* the nation, as national history and culture provide the context through which especially educational expressions of globalization are materialized. This point I will make in chapter 3.
5. Has it "changed" or simply disappeared, at least in Michael Apple's work? Dennis Carlson (2006, 96) reports that "ideology is missing entirely" from Apple's 2001 *Educating the "Right" Way*. Certainly it is not missing from the Texas public school curriculum. Conservatives on the Texas Board of Education lobbied to require teachers to emphasize the importance of "capitalist enterprise, the military, Christianity and modern Republican political figures" (Brick 2010, A17; see also McKinley 2010, 1). Such specificity might render "power" concrete and "ideology" less abstract.
6. Apple acknowledges the genesis of his work in reproduction theory but insists that his journey has been one toward agency: "This was a path that took me from neo-Marxist analyses of social and cultural reproduction, to an (unromantic) emphasis on agency" (2006, 203). Madeleine Arnot seems to disagree, asserting (see 2006, 24) that Apple glossed the contradiction between reproduction and agency from the outset.
7. Understanding curriculum as primarily political was discredited over 20 years ago, decried as liberal (Liston, Bowers, and Strike), even reactionary (Wexler), voyeuristic (Ellsworth), and as lacking a moral foundation (Beyer and Woods). (For a summary of these charges with specific references, see Pinar et al., 1995, 266.) "Critical" scholarship demonstrated a remarkable resistance to these devastating criticisms by disavowing dialogue and avoiding self-critique. Instead, it defensively devoted itself to reproduction (of itself). This lack of intellectual advancement, this reiteration of the same, and its decidedly

overdetermined quality are what suggest to me that psychological mechanisms (specifically the "fort-da" phenomenon) are at work, as I will suggest later.

8. Young allows that "instrumentalism...necessarily reduces the space and autonomy for the work of specialist professionals, both teachers and researchers" (2008, 93). He suggests that "[r]eal improvement will only be possible if the knowledge base of the new curriculum is expressed in syllabuses generated in association with the specialist knowledge producing communities in the universities and the professional bodies" (2008, 194). I would supplement this "knowledge base" with the professional judgments of individual teachers, as not only academic freedom is served when the individuals' intellectual interests and ethical commitments animate their reconstruction of recommendations proffered by various professional "communities." Ruthless rich men do not count as a professional community or constituency; in addition to his self-interested support for technology in schools, Microsoft founder Bill Gates arrogantly promotes his pastimes as academically significant, pledging (with fellow billionaire Warren Buffet) $1 million to promote bridge in schools, a card-game they enjoy (Hu 2011, A18).
9. The boundaries between "critical pedagogy" (Kincheloe, 2004) and the "new" sociology of education blur, at least for many younger US scholars: see, for instance, Hill 2009, 5. In the most recent collection on critical pedagogy (Kincheloe and McLaren 2007), sociologists like Wexler are included (Wexler's PhD is in sociology, not education). Apple is conspicuously absent, perhaps because he has dismissed critical pedagogy as amounting to "romantic possibilitarian rhetoric" insufficiently "based on a tactical or strategic analysis of the current situation" (2009, 8), a criticism curiously self-referential as well. There is in education a tendency toward tribalism wherein the lines of descent are not biological but institutional, as where one took one's PhD and with whom are decisive in determining genealogy and subsequent membership in what sometimes seems more like a social club than an academic field.
10. Drawing upon phenomenological ("temporal"), pragmatist ("experience"), and psychoanalytic ("working through") language with postmodern concepts ("aporias"), Patti Lather recasts the "impossible" as opportunity: "That is precisely the task: to situate the experience of impossibility as an enabling site for working through aporias" (2007, 16; see also 2001, 189). On at least one occasion, such "ontological stammering" (Lather 2001, 189) morphed into "straight talk" when Lather stripped naked in a hot tub to discuss her research with colleagues. No "modernist metaphysics of presence" (or, god-forbid, "subject-centered agency": Lather 2001, 189) here: "[A]n apparent nakedness is but a mask that conceals a will to power"

(Lather 2007, 17). If power rules supreme, even the naked truth is in principle another form of dissimulation.

11. Postmodernism is the broader (sometimes summary) term for a series of post-Marxist theoretical developments in the West, prominent among them poststructuralism (see Pinar et al. 1995, 450ff.). Postmodernism itself is no monolith; when first introduced—see Doll 1993—it appeared to be a very contemporary form of progressivism. Doll himself used the concept—as associated with science as with art—to provide a "perspective" on the curriculum that resulted in his famous four R's. For Doll, postmodernism itself has been incorporated into complexity theory as his heuristic for theorizing curriculum (see Trueit in press). Today, postmodernism seems less something new than something old, a "tired, even exhausted modernity; a modernity that has lost its faith in its own dreams and promises" (Reichenbach 2003, 93).
12. Lather (2001, 184) critiques critical pedagogy as a "boy thing," a reference less to anatomy (although it is that, evident in the essentializing title of the collection in which her chapter appears) than it is to the "masculinist voice" of "abstraction, universalization, and the rhetorical position of 'the one who knows.'" This (de-individuated) one who knows is the unaddressed "I." These in fact nonanatomically associated qualities are everywhere evident in Lather's exuberant embrace of undecidability and contingency.
13. The hegemony of ocularcentrism in those epistemologies associated with modernity is well documented: Descartes saw truth in clear and distinct ideas requiring a "steadfast mental gaze" (quoted in Warnke 1993, 287), while Bacon posited observation as the prerequisite for objectivity, linking knowledge itself with sight and the other senses (Autio 2006a, 21). Such a privileging of the visual has hardly gone unremarked, as evident in the work of Bergson, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (Jay 1993a; Levin 1993). In Lather's version of postmodernity, space replaces sight as sensory metaphor as we "move" toward what is "unforeseeable" (2001, 192; see Pinar et al. 1995, 463; Pinar 2006b, 69).
14. Peter Taubman (2009a) notes that the repetition-compulsion mechanism provides a particular pleasure "beyond the pleasure principle, and here jouissance is an appropriate word—the pleasure in suffering." Taubman also notes that while the fort-da game

    > provides some control it also sustains the pain/pleasure of the mother's leaving. Critical pedagogues, it has always seemed to me, derive not only their identity but also pleasure from finding horrors "out there" which they can then fantasize fighting. They reproduce what they resist, which is not, of course, to say that there aren't horrors in the world, but the ones they tend to reproduce and resist are ghosts and abstractions and

transcendental forces haunting schools, the curriculum, the nation. I actually think they engage in very little muckraking journalism as one critic mentioned. I would prefer that to what they do write. At least it would be specific.

15. A glaring example of this contradiction is Apple's exhibitionistic invocation of an apparently ideology-free individual—himself! (see Apple 2004, 159ff.; also 2006, 205ff.). In this contradiction Apple is not alone (see Whitty 1985, 2; Anyon 2006, 40). Biesta (2003, 68) also acknowledges this general problem with the "sociology of knowledge," namely its assumption that "its own knowledge about power relations stands outside the realm determined by these relationships."
16. Bill Green (2009) associates conspicuous consumption with critical literacy.
17. Joe L. Kincheloe died suddenly on December 19, 2008. While critical here of his most recent treatment of subjectivity, I am appreciative of his earlier efforts to engage with the facticity and historicity of "place," including its subjective sedimentation and social significance (Kincheloe and Pinar 1991; Kincheloe, Pinar, and Slattery 1994; Pinar 2010b).
18. The "unexamined I" is no recent lapse of those on the Left; recall that Elizabeth Ellsworth alleged that "the desire by the mostly White, middle-class men who write the literature on critical pedagogy to elicit 'full expression' of student voices . . . becomes voyeuristic when the voice of the pedagogue himself goes unexamined" (1989, 312). Ellsworth's suspicion is verified as the unaddressed "I" voyeuristically imagines teachers as "conduits."

2 Decolonization and Subjective Reconstruction

1. These subjectively restructuring temporal phases are, I am suggesting, also political practices that enact Fanon's emphasis upon the subjective reconstitution of the social in his revolutionary thought.
2. These four books—listed in the references—remain influential today. "The current engagement with issues of coloniality/postcoloniality is," Teresa Ebert (1995, 220 n. 1) emphasizes, "deeply indebted to the work of Fanon although Fanon often becomes the 'unsaid' of these discourses." I trust this chapter contributes to rendering Frantz Fanon "said" in postcolonial discourses in North American curriculum studies.
3. Among those Europeans who took Fanon seriously was Roland Barthes, whose 1957 *Mythologies* theorized how "innocent" or well-intentioned citizens reproduce those forms-of-being that support colonialism. Barthes constructed an inventory of the psychosocial forms around which consciousness becomes constituted as "white," middle class, and, especially, racially supremacist (see Sandoval

1997, 86). Sandoval (1997, 88) positions Barthes as "one of the first white Western critical theorists to develop an analytical apparatus for theorizing white consciousness in a postcolonial world." In my genealogical study of whiteness, I labor to contribute to this very project (2006b).

4. Influence did not travel only one way. Fanon was also influenced by African American writers, among them Richard Wright, to whom he wrote expressing his admiration for Wright's work and his interest in conducting an in-depth study of it, requesting titles he might have missed (see Fabre 1991, 191).
5. Due to the polemical character of his writing, Fanon has sometimes been dismissed as a writer of only political consequence. Some cite the political character of his work in order to forgive even the most obvious problems that plague his most popular writings. Jock McCulloch (1983, 205) positions himself in-between: "Unfortunately Fanon's style has encouraged a preoccupation with his biography and with specific aspects of his theory, to the detriment of a recognition of his major intellectual achievement." For me, it is the relations *among* his life history, intellectual activism, and accomplishment that render Fanon such an intriguing figure.
6. While a medical student at Lyons, Fanon somehow found time to study philosophy and literature. He attended the lectures of philosophers Jean Lacroix and Maurice Merleau-Ponty while he studied Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx and Lenin, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre (see Zahar 1974, ix).
7. Like Foucault, Ewa Plonowska Ziarek (2001, 38) points out, "Fanon associates political action with the invention of new modes of life," arguing that "aesthetic self-relation does not close the circle of self-reflexivity of the knowing subject but intensifies the force of dispersion and discordance within the subject." Indeed, such dispersed and discordant self-reflexivity—both the prerequisite and consequence of subjective reconstruction—"opens the passage to pure exteriority," as "the self-relation is at the same time an interruption of all relatedness." Simply said, without subjective reconstruction, decolonization cannot occur and vice versa. Ato Sekyi-Otu (see 1996, 6), however, disputes this formulation of a reciprocal relation between the two, insisting that, for Fanon, "the psychic and the psychological deserve in the 'colonial context' the status of dependent rather than determining realities." In this view, only after political liberation does self-decolonization matter. Without it, liberation cannot be institutionalized. I do not doubt that subjective reconstruction matters differently at different historical conjunctures in different revolutionary situations. Whenever it most usefully occurs—before or after or during political liberation—my point is that it must occur. Otherwise—as Fanon predicted—we suffer the reinscription of colonialism disguised by black masks. Contemporary Uganda and

Zimbabwe are among the many contemporary examples of the catastrophic failure of Africans to decolonize subjectively after political independence.

8. Fanon was preoccupied, Irene Gendzier (1973, 29–30) tells us, with "two questions," both centered on communication. One was the question of communication between men, and second was the question of communication between men of "different color." Communication was undermined by objectification and possession, ideas elaborated by Sartre, whose work Fanon studied and admired. Part of Fanon's contribution is his racialization of those philosophical concepts. There are controversies over Fanon's gendering of such communication (see Sharpley-Whiting 1998).
9. In McCulloch's view (1983, 131), Fanon was never entirely successful in integrating his practice as a clinical psychiatrist with his commitment to African socialism.
10. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 131) suggest that Fanon refused the cultural boomerang of *négritude* with its uncritical celebratory consciousness of black identity, endorsing instead a "revolutionary antithesis" in terms of physical violence, thus enacting boomerang in political rather than in cultural terms.
11. "Blowback" is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US government's international interventions that have been kept secret from the American people. Article posted on September 27, 2001 (October 15, 2001, issue): Blowback by Chalmers Johnson. Retrieved on July 9, 2006, from: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011015/johnson
12. I employ scare quotes around the word to underscore that there is nothing conservative about many US "conservatives," radical revisionists of American history (lying about the founding fathers' religious convictions, for instance), of Christianity as well (replacing the spiritual piety and humility of that tradition with self-righteous intolerance and political aggressivity), and of democracy (now construed as the opportunity to bilk the poor, provide welfare for the rich, and institutionalize a predatory capitalist culture of commodity fetishism). "Conservative" political tactics sacrifice democratic dialogue for political advantage; in their demonizing of politically vulnerable minorities, they are reminiscent of fascists' tactics 80 years ago in Germany. Here they are performed by neo-fascists American-style (John Yoo and Dick Cheney come to mind, but Michelle Bachman and Glenn Beck are examples as well). Many white southern Republican congressmen and senators amount to neo-Confederates. (For the neo-Confederate argument, see Pinar 2004, 119–121; 2009, 164, n. 5) These two anti-American traditions were savagely combined

in George W. Bush. Both are now evident in the mob psychology of the so-called Tea Party Movement (Lilla 2010, 53).

13. Fox News is the most conspicuous site of disinformation in North America, but its disregard for facts is surely matched by the pronouncements of school deform fanatics and profiteers, who insist that teachers, not students, are accountable for students' educational achievement, and who convert the complicated conversation that is the school curriculum into cramming for standardized tests measuring intellectually vacuous "skills." As (I write in April 2011) Republican-dominated state legislatures not only strip public school budgets but also limit or eliminate historically established rights to collective bargaining—could a more explicit assault on teachers be made?—officials continue to lie. "This is in no way, shape or form an attack on teachers; it is a comprehensive effort to reform a system," offered Tony Bennett, the superintendent of public instruction in Indiana. There, in Indianapolis, demonstrators have besieged the Capitol in opposition to bills supported by Dr. Bennett and Gov. Mitch Daniels, a Republican, that would limit teachers' collective bargaining, allow principals to set class sizes and school hours, and to lay off teachers based on job performance, not years of service (Gabriel 2011, A18). As in colonial servitude, knowledge and experience are irrelevant. A longtime participant—Chester Finn—in school deform predictably blames the victim: "They are reaping a bitter harvest that they didn't individually plant but their profession has planted over 50 years, going from a respected profession to a mass work force in which everyone is treated as if they are interchangeable, as in the steel mills of yesteryear" (quoted in Gabriel 2011, A18). The consequence is clear—destruction of a profession that teaches in the public interest—but the cause is glossed. The profession was targeted by the right wing, starting with Richard Nixon's demand that schools go "back to the basics" (see Pinar 2012, chapter three). Curiously, that "argument" is no relic, as it was invoked by Republican Bob Huff of San Bernadino, who criticized a bill in the California state senate requiring students to learn gay history; "[H]e worried that the bill would water down the state curriculum and distract students from learning the basics" (Medina 2011, A11).
14. Not only are teachers asked to bear salary reductions, but also class size increases dramatically. In Detroit, for instance, the authorities are considering a deficit-reduction proposal that would increase high-school class sizes to 60 students (Dillon 2011a, A12). In order to further their ruthless assault on schoolchildren, teachers, and other public servants, the Republican governor of New Jersey Chris Christie lies (Pérez-Pena 2011, A1).
15. The emergency of daily life—wherein experience "[c]an neither be possessed nor internalized...too 'large' to be contained within the

boundaries of the individual self or ego" (Foster 2005, 176)—is the context of my study of cosmopolitanism (2009).

16. While for decades I have opposed a national curriculum—as at the university, school curriculum, I have argued, should be determined by teachers in consultation with university professors and representatives of the general public—this specific proposal seems defensible in light of the erasure of academic knowledge by standardized testing focused on "skills." Indeed, the statement signed by a bipartisan group (including Randi Weingarten, president of the American Federation of Teachers, and prominent Democrats, including Richard W. Riley, secretary of education under President Clinton; several Republicans also signed, including former governor Tom Kean of New Jersey; Chester E. Finn, Jr., an assistant secretary of education under President Ronald Reagan; and Susan B. Neuman, an assistant secretary of education under President George W. Bush) excludes "performance standards, textbook offerings, daily lesson plans or rigid pedagogical prescriptions." A "sequential set of guidelines in the core academic disciplines," the national curriculum guidelines "would account for about 50 to 60 percent of a school's available academic time with the rest added by local communities, districts and states" (quoted in Dillon 2011b, A12). This stipulation protects academic—intellectual—freedom. Conspicuously absent from the original signers is former school deformer Diane Ravitch (2010, 231), who has been a strong advocate of a national curriculum.

3 Multiculturalism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism

1. These motives—self-understanding toward dialogical encounter with difference—are central to my argument for the internationalization of curriculum studies. As Hongyu Wang (2009, xiv) points out: "Unlearning involves the capacity to step out of oneself, to look at the self from a distance in a new light. This process is not possible without engaging others' lenses to examine one's own worldviews." Like decolonization (see chapter 2), such self-examination precipitates subjective reconstruction, even "self-shattering" (Pinar 2006a, 19), "becoming someone who is different," as Terry Carson (2005, 6) points out.
2. Ross Posnock (1998, 191) tells us that the concept of "cultural pluralism, which became better known many decades later a multiculturalism," was coined in 1915 by Horace Kallen, a German-born Jew and devoted student of William James at Harvard. Kallen began to formulate the concept as early as 1905 in conversation with the brilliant black undergraduate Alan Locke, in response to then-dominant demands for "one hundred percent Americanism," a purity that immigrants could presumably achieve by losing their native

cultural identities in the "melting pot." Kallen met Locke again in England, where Locke was the first black Rhodes scholar at Oxford and Kallen was on a fellowship. They continued their conversation, with Locke again asking, "[W]hat difference does the difference [of race] make?" "In arguing out those questions," the phrase " 'cultural pluralism,' the right to be different," was born (Posnock 1998, 191). Replacing "cultural pluralism"—in North America the concept has been degraded to a slogan—might be "diasporic studies" (Gunew 2004, 37), at least insofar as we attend to population flows and immigrant experience. Mediating "both postcolonialism (global) and multiculturalism (local)," Gunew (2004, 107) writes, "the notion of diaspora [conveys] an endless process of traveling and change rather than simply being framed by leaving and arriving, with mourning or nostalgia as its dominant markers." In this respect, does the primacy of cultural identity in multicultural education memorialize loss? For some, "culture seems to have become a matter of 'entitlement' rather than struggle" (Chow 2002a, 114).

3. This eighteenth-century philosopher placed language at the center of human identity, arguing that "people should devote themselves to the study, preservation, and advancement of their own languages and cultural traditions, as well as to the study of other languages, and the understanding of the forms of life they express" (Markell 2003, 51). Why? For Herder, who "exalted the notion of *das Volk*, believed that "all individuals branch out from the nourishing identity of the collective" (Jonsson 2000, 36). This indissoluble link between individual and collective identity is evident in certain historically specific forms of *Bildung* (see Baker 2001, 360; Uljens 2003, 49; see also Klafki 2000a, 94).
4. "In 1971," George Tomkins (2008 [1986], 272) records, "the federal government formally recognized multiculturalism by declaring, in Prime Minister Trudeau's words, that Canada was a nation of two official languages but not official culture. Cultural pluralism was asserted to be 'the very essence of Canadian society' with the government committed to assist all cultural groups toward full participation in the society; one result was an impetus to multiculturalism in the curriculum." Inclusion in the Canadian curriculum does not guarantee manifestation in Canadian society, including within Canadian teachers' subjectivities (see Carson 2005, 4–5). In his examination of criticism of the Alberta social studies curriculum, Richardson (2002, 72) found that "the way multiculturalism was examined in schools often led to minority cultures being subsumed under the dominant culture's ethnocentrism and its modernist preoccupation with progress and development."
5. In the United States, as Gunew (2004, 7) points out, multiculturalism is most persistently associated with education rather than with centralized state, as it has been the case in both Canada and Australia.

The Canadian concept of "mosaic"—wherein cultural identity is presumably preserved—contrasts with the US conception of "melting pot," wherein cultures of origin presumably disappear into a homogeneous "Americanism." Not all Canadians have taken the concept of "mosaic" at face value (see Regenstreif 1974, 54). Indeed, Vickers (1994, 362) calls the "mosaic" metaphor a "myth," devised to define Canada by disavowing the United States, disabling Canadians from confronting "the realities of the Canadian experience." Others believe the Canada and the United States are converging in their policies and practices; Seymour Martin Lipset (1990, 218), for instance, believes that "particularistic demands by minorities have led to increased institutionalization of multiculturalism on both sides of the border." Within Canada, "a backlash against the mosaic concept is occurring," Lipset (1990, 187) reports. (And Resnick [2005, 43] reports, "[T] here has been a good deal of *ressentiment* by English Canadians about official bilingualism at the federal level, all the more when successive Quebec governments have been promoting French unilingualism within Quebec's borders.") While Canada's multiculturalism may not be distinctive from other Western democracies, it is the only country to have constitutionalized its commitment, for example, section 27 of the Canadian Constitution (Kymlicka 2003, 375).

6. When "identity" is forefronted, "the experience of identification comes to supplant the experience of action" (Markell 2003, 187). Even descendants of historically and present-day injured groups can profit from working "through resistance to question one's own deeply cherished assumptions and beliefs in order to unpack socially sanctioned values and perspectives," as Wang (2009, xii) writes (if in a different context). That would constitute decolonization, a subjective as well as political undertaking, as Fanon (see chapter 2) and Wang (2009, xx) fully appreciate.
7. "Yet by making the protection of the state, the distribution of resources, and the institutionalization of rights dependent upon one's recognizability as the bearer of an identity," Patchen Markell (2003, 175) points out, "the politics of multicultural recognition risks subjecting the very people whose agency it strives to enhance to powerful forces of normalization, binding them ever more closely to who they are, and heightening their indifference, or even hostility, toward other possibilities of existence." "Multiculturalism must be linked to other philosophical ideals of Canadian identity," Calliou (1995, 48) asserts, adding: "A cornerstone ideal of this uneasily shared territory . . . is peacekeeping." In her summary of contemporary Canadian curriculum studies, Cynthia Chambers (2003, 223) affirms peacekeeping—as well as multiculturalism—as "Canada's international trademarks." In the United States, such nationally distinctive multiculturalism becomes another expression of national

exceptionalism: "To be sure," Rowe (2002, 74) acknowledges, "the identification of multicultural education with American culture ended up reinforcing American exceptionalism and the mistaken idea that US multicultural society is a model for the world." Does Canadian pride in its multiculturalism portend a Canadian exceptionalism? On occasion, it does (see Sumara, Davis, and Laidlaw 2001).

8. As I emphasize in my conclusion, the concept of "culture" can imply homogeneity and presentism, as if "culture" were one unchanging reality. As Martha Nussbaum (1997, 127–128, italics in original) points out: "1. *Real cultures are plural, not single*. . . . 2. *Real cultures contain argument, resistance, and contestations of norms*. . . . 3. *In real cultures, what most people think is likely to be different from what the most famous artists and intellectuals think*. . . . 4. *Real cultures have varied domains of thought and activity*. . . . 5. *Real cultures have a present as well as a past*." Nussbaum's first point is reflected in Yatta Kanu's (2003, 77) observation that due to "centuries of Western European impact on Africa (from missionary and trade activities to outright colonization), for example, it is no longer possible to postulate a unitary Africa over/against a monolithic West—a binarism between a distinct self (as African) and 'other' (as European)." As a concept, then, "culture" is usefully juxtaposed to history, politics, and subjectivity, as these temporalize and particularize an otherwise static abstraction. As subjective, historical, and political, culture becomes subject of our critique, reconstruction, and, possibly, respect.
9. By "study" I do not mean test preparation, but self-formation through the juxtaposition (and subjective reconstruction) of academic knowledge and lived experience (Pinar 2009, 170 n. 14). As Wang (2009, xii) points out: "Multicultural education must attend to and transform teachers' subjectivity as much as it must attend to creating new strategies for educating students from diverse backgrounds." While "transform" risks an instrumentalist pedagogy, as a depiction of the consequences of study, the verb becomes a self-reflexive judgment, not a pedagogical call to arms. The distinction is evident in Wang's work with graduate students in her multicultural education class (Wang and Olson 2009).
10. Markell (2003, 174) reminds us that "real political conflicts may arise between the project of mitigating cultural domination and the project of feminism." International debates over clitoral circumcision in Africa would be one example. The US feminist Barbara Christian recalls Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta's defense of clitoridectomies as necessary for the preservation of African culture. She remembers too when, in order to preserve the traditional culture, Kenyan policy makers prevented women from escaping their backbreaking lives in the countryside by migrating to towns. Men do not, Christian (1985, 146) comments acidly, "seem to be necessary to the continuation of culture."

11. At the KAME conference ChangLu (2009, 141) explained that in China the education of women is also an "essential component" of multicultural education. Chinese multiculturalism is attentive also to the children of impoverished parents; rural education is an important imperative as well. Evidently this concern for "class" also informs multiculturalism in Europe; Seyla Benhabib (2006, 174) asserts that "multiculturalism in contemporary Europe concerns not only ethnicity but also, and very prominently, class." Not only officially and bureaucratically, then, does the nation-state influence multicultural education; by formulating educational policy, it attempts to intervene responsively and appropriately. The nation is not inevitably an agent of oppression as simplistic critiques of nationalism imply nor does the advocacy of internationalism and cosmopolitanism depend on its eclipse.
12. In the textbooks they studied, Young Chun Kim and Jae Hong Joo (2009, 375) found a "Western perspective" that depicted European imperialist aggression as "new voyages [that] made it possible to ignite European capital development and . . . pave the road to the emergence of a single World history." Ignored was "the fact that most world regions were already involved in an economic cooperative partnership even before the West began to actively formulate and merge the idea of capitalism into the world market" (Kim and Joo 2009, 375), thereby limiting "the phenomenon of the Industrial Revolution to England or the West" (2009, 378). Such Eurocentrism has long been criticized in the West, specifically in the United States (see, for instance, Gunew 2004, 7; Pinar et al. 1995, 328).
13. Long prominent in educational theory and practice, stage theories of education—associated with concepts of developmentalism—have in the last decade come under critique: see Schecter 2011, 250–255.
14. "[E]ven relatively benign representations of minority groups," Gunew (2004, 75) worries, "contribute to stereotyping. Calling it ventriloquism accentuates the power relations involved and certainly raises questions about whose voices we are hearing and who the 'we' are." On that latter point, Amada Anderson (2006, 116) alleges that "multiculturalism has introduced a particularly onerous version of piety in the form of the politically correct person." In Western popular culture—Robyn Wiegman (1995, 126) analyzes brilliantly the 1985 film *Enemy Mine* (dir. Wolfgang Petersen), but the examples in high culture are also numerous (Pinar 2001, 1103)—the accused trades "historical position of privilege . . . for a heroic place alongside the oppressed. Here, the threat often attributed to multiculturalism of eradicating the history and achievements of white (and) masculine 'civilization' is warded off by a glorious embrace of difference that preserves the centrality of the white male as it offers the specular assurance that race and gender have been represented and addressed."
15. In Uganda, proposed legislation imposes the death penalty for some gays; their family and friends could face up to seven years in jail if they

fail to report them to authorities. Even landlords could be imprisoned for renting to homosexuals (Associated Press 2009, A3). In January 2011, David Kato, a high-school teacher and the most visible gay-rights advocate in Uganda, was murdered. Just a few months earlier, a Uganda newspaper had featured an antigay diatribe with Mr. Kato's picture on the front page under a banner urging, "Hang Them." As with homosexuality more generally, this antigay assassination was also ascribed to non-African sources, specifically to US evangelicals. "David's death is a result of the hatred planted in Uganda by US evangelicals in 2009," Val Kalende, the chairwoman of one of Uganda's gay-rights groups, said in a statement. "The Uganda government and the so-called US evangelicals must take responsibility for David's blood" (quoted passages in Gettleman 2011, A4). Jeffrey Gettleman (2011, A4) acknowledges that the African continent is "full of harsh homophobic laws." In northern Nigeria, he notes, gay men can face death by stoning. In Kenya, often regarded as one of the more Westernized nations in Africa, gay people can be sentenced to years in prison. But Uganda, he allows, "seems to be on the front lines of this battle," as conservative Christians with antigay beliefs "wield considerable influence." Uganda's minister of ethics and integrity (!), James Nsaba Buturo, a self-described devout Christian, has warned, "Homosexuals can forget about human rights" (quoted in Gettleman 2011, A4). Is hatred of homosexuals an important element of Ugandan "culture" that "respect for cultural difference" requires us to preserve? If the human rights of sexual minorities is protected in the Netherlands, why not alert immigrants—through watching a film—that tolerance is expected?

16. "To welcome someone says more about the welcomer than the welcomed," Markell (2003, 180) observes. "Equally important, it does not necessarily indicate that the welcomer is full of warmth toward the welcomed" (2003, 180). Civility does not require respect. Moreover, is it not incumbent upon guests—should they wish to remain—to observe the rules of the house?
17. NCATE is the acronym for the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, a reactionary and in recent decades a powerful force in the miseducation of US teachers (see Pinar 2004, 211–216; Taubman 2009b, 75). While each is important, "skills, knowledge and attitudes" are not equivalents. The first is embedded in the second and the third follows from as it informs the second. Knowledge is paramount. And not necessarily for "functioning," with that word's economistic echoes. Paul Bové (2002, 221) worries that "the appetite for multiculturalist Americanist knowledge lies, if anywhere, in the jaws of the transnationals for whom such cultural knowledge, whether intended to be subversive or oppositional or not, is knowledge only of and for a market."
18. Anderson (2006, 28) cautions "against naïve conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining

in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily." This requires us to temper "inclusion" with assertions (as the Dutch have done with the "racy movies" James Banks implies render immigrants victims) that "certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices" (2006, 28). Homophobes need not apply for residency in the Netherlands. Inhospitality to homophobes—to racists, misogynists, neo-fundamentalists generally—is, in my view, ethical action a moral multicultural education requires.

19. "Confronted with the history of domination, anti-Semitism, and racial terror," Ewa Plonowska Ziarek (2001, 64) argues, "democratic theory and praxis have to envision a new conception of justice that would reflect multicultural society without reducing it to the war of particular interests." That is the issue Banks sidesteps in his developmentalist view of multicultural education.
20. KAME conference participant Yan Xiuying (2009, 122) pointed out that the effects of teaching are not limited to curricular content and teaching methods, but also by teachers' "non-intellectual factors," among these emotions and attitudes (2009, 123). While I share Xiuying's (2009, 130) aspiration to "improve teachers' cultural awareness," I worry that insistence upon "correct cultural opinion" substitutes one homogeneity for another. In my view, multicultural sensitivity must not efface teachers' intellectual independence. The importance of the professional autonomy of teachers is indicated in Suk-Ying Wong's (2009, 100) allusion to the forefronting of "choice" in teacher education.
21. Banks is hardly alone in his faithfulness to particularism; indeed, his is moderate compared to others. Gloria Ladson-Billings and William Tate (1995, 62), for instance, seem to reject multiculturalism as "mired in liberal ideology that offers no radical change"; they replace it with "critical race theory [that] rejects a paradigm that attempts to be everything to everyone and consequently becomes nothing for anyone, allowing the status quo to prevail. Instead, we align our scholarship and activism with philosophy of Marcus Garvey, who believed that the black man was universally oppressed on racial grounds, and that any program of emancipation would have to be built around the question of race first." So much for a cosmopolitan acceptance of difference, specifically gender difference: recall that Marcus Garvey's movement—the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) had no interest in racial integration (Van Deburg 1997, 43), emphasizing instead "independent manhood" and "the ideas of force and dominance" (Franklin 2000, 96). The organizational structure of the UNIA was not "separate and equal" but "separate and hierarchical" (Franklin 2000, 96). Garvey targeted his message to African American women who valued "marriage,

motherhood, and a single-income family" (Franklin 2000, 96). "Ironically," Donna Franklin (2000, 98) points out, "when Garvey was convicted of mail fraud and jailed from 1925 to 1927, his second wife, Amy Jacques Garvey, a feminist, became his representative and spokesperson." While an important and intriguing historical figure in US race relations, Garvey is no cosmopolitan choice for aligning one's scholarship.

22. Scholars have noted "the homogenizing impetus" in the term "citizen of the world" (Gunew 2004, 55). Against that tendency Sneja Gunew (2004, 55) references James Clifford's term "discrepant cosmopolitanism" (also cited by Cheah 2006, 87) as "useful," as (paraphrasing Clifford) it resists not only the provincialism of localism and the relativism accompanying cultural particularism, but also the capitalist or technocratic monoculture that globalization threatens. The cosmopolitan charge to exceed the circumstances of one's upbringing—what James Macdonald (1995, 128; see also 143) specified in pedagogical terms as "helping each person transcend the parochialism of his/her own time"—takes different curricular forms according to national setting and the historical moment.
23. "In our own day," Ross Posnock (1998, 6) laments, "the ideology of authenticity is enshrined as identity politics, the dominant form of multiculturalism." In my view, the reduction of one's variegated subjectivity to ethnic or gender or class (e.g., any collective) identity constitutes an act of violence. Maxine Greene (2001, 152) notes: "The cruelest thing we can do under such a rubric [multiculturalism] is to categorize young people, to know them by their category, whether we call it 'Asian,' 'Hispanic,' 'African American'." Like William James (Posnock 1998, 192), Greene renounces "identity thinking," itself—in Anderson's (2006, 2) view—a consequence of "the alliance between poststructuralist critique of reason and the form of sociological reductionism that...threatens to undermine the vitality of both academic and political debate insofar as it becomes impossible to explore shared forms of rationality."
24. For many on the educational Left, "the individual"—recall it is the "individual" who is said to have human rights—is discredited as an economistic term, as in so-called possessive individualism, for example, the right to exploit in order to accumulate capital, ignoring that "liberal individualism is the ideology of international capitalism, which generates it in order to compensate for the fact that capitalism erases individuality" (Dean 1994, 160). Influenced by neo-Marxism, various scholars emphasize a "critical multiculturalism" that "focuses on the material historical production of difference rather than on 'culture'" (Palumbo-Liu 2006, 127). "The much larger question that is lurking behind multiculturalism," Rey Chow (2002a, 113) asserts, "remains finally, that of the relation between culture and power, between representation and social equality." Rejecting

poststructuralism's pantextualism and pinpointing the individual as multiculturalism's imaginary site of cultural transformation, Peter McLaren (2007, 292) laments that "[t]he field of multiculturalism has, regrettably, overemphasized contingency and the reversibility of cultural practice at the level of the individual at the expense of challenging the structural determinations and productive forces of capital, its laws of motion, and its value from of labor." Masao Miyoshi (2002, 45) accuses multiculturalism—with its "façade of internationalism and cosmopolitanism"—of "ignoring the multitudes in hopeless economic isolation and stagnancy," and of installing an "aggressive rejection of any involvement in the affairs of, for, and by the other." I have formulated a project—enacted already in South Africa (Pinar 2010a), Brazil (Pinar 2011a), and Mexico (Pinar 2011b), and now underway in China and India—that incorporates these various theoretical traditions and agendas into concrete exchanges among scholars over the intellectual histories and present circumstances in their own countries. While hardly guaranteeing international understanding and the internationalism such understanding might encourage, this autobiographically based form of *currere* (as complicated conversation across culture and nation) does demonstrate the centrality of "international dialogue" (as embraced by Joshee at the KAME conference) to cosmopolitanism.

25. As Cheah (2006, 261–262) points out, instrumentalism "is in fact inhuman because in itself, it cannot lead to, and indeed is inimical to the achievement of, what is proper to humanity, moral freedom." But Cheah (2006, 259) believes, "[T]here is no solution to the instrumentalization of human relations since this is rooted in the very nature of economic development within the structure of capitalist accumulation." While there may be no generalized "solution," we educators can contest instrumentalism by discarding educational "objectives"—especially as their achievement constitutes criteria of assessment—and emphasizing the ethical, historical, and cultural significance of academic knowledge, as we do when we ask the canonical curriculum question: *what knowledge is of most worth*? (James B. Macdonald [1995 (1981),165] once expressed suspicion concerning the question because he feared it could "easily be transposed into the Tyler Rationale." What was of most worth to Tyler was proceduralism and assessment, as you will see in chapter 5.) Discarding objectives, Wang (2004, 156) answers that key question for herself: "Now, every time I walk into a multicultural education class, I tell my students: I don't have a purpose for this class and I assure you that we will not walk out of this class at the end of the semester with any overarching consensus; it is the experiencing of thoughts and the re-experiencing of life and self that really matter." Academic knowledge juxtaposed with lived experience reconfigures subjectivity: the persons we are and will become derive from our reconstructions of lived experience in the world.

26. Is "justice" an abstract universal only? While universal—equality before the law, for instance—is "justice" not always already inflected by national location, cultural particularity, and historical moment? While Banks ended his KAME presentation juxtaposing 1920s African American poet Langston Hughes with the 2005 French riots, the racial prejudice that blocked Hughes's dream of equality and freedom 90 years ago may not be the same racial prejudice Banks associates with African immigrant youth in France. Gunew (2004, 9) notes that "racialization is always an arbitrary process and those charged terms belonging to the rhetoric of nationalism are always part of a discursive chain of difference rather than being rooted in any 'natural' referential system." One difference in the racial situations in contemporary France and the United States resides in the histories of African Americans and African immigrants to France. The peculiar practice of lynching in the United States underscores such national difference (Pinar 2001). "In Canada," Gunew (2004, 47) reports, "there has also been a history of seeing Ukrainians as 'black' in the sense they were not perceived to be part of the English/French European axis." In France, there are curricular efforts under way to contest anti-immigrant feeling and embrace diversity (Soysal 2009; Soysal and Szakács in press). Sharilyn Calliou (1995, 57) reminds: "Racism begins in denial, denial that we are, quite simply, one species." To the extent that is the case, does not multiculturalism—with its emphasis upon particularism and difference—risk injustice?
27. Cheah (2006, 145) worries that "the moral universalism of human rights discourse can, paradoxically, be used to justify economic globalization as a form of postcolonial civilizing mission." Instead of an exclusively normative cosmopolitanism, Cheah (2006, 158) advocates a basket of considerations: "In sum, the third voice [of human-rights discourse] articulates a new universalism that is mindful of systemic economic, inequality, genuine cultural diversity, and gender." Cheah (2006, 161) asks: "But what if the globalization of capital is uncontainable? What if a de facto, oppressive universality that cannot be transcended by normative action?" Does that danger, I ask, disqualify "normative action"? Does not ethical commitment require pedagogical action regardless of the prospects of its effectivity? We must, I counter, work from within.
28. Not only history but also individual life history informs subjectivity. Curriculum as *currere* is that complicated conversation the juxtaposition of academic disciplines, society, and historical moment engender. As Joe Kincheloe (1998, 131) suggests: "Pinar's original construction" [of *currere*] achieves a "new relevance" in the "socio-personal dislocation" marked by "race, class, and gender-based pathologies." "A *currere* catalyzed by advances in feminist theory, post-structuralist deconstruction, and the sophistication of qualitative research strategies," he continues, enables to study the "late twentieth century crisis

of identity," and in so doing, explore the "genesis of our [multicultural] ways of seeing and the nature of our consciousness construction." Today *currere* contests the very concept of identity as collective and causal, and asks that we distance (not divorce) ourselves from those intellectual movements—including those Kincheloe (1998, 131) lists—that contributed to the reification of "identity" in contemporary curriculum studies.

4 *Bildung* in Society and History

1. This dialogue was initiated by Professor Bjorg Gundem of the University of Oslo by convening a 1995 conference on North American curriculum studies and *Didaktik*: see Gundem and Hoppman 2002. I presented an earlier version of this chapter as the presidential address at the 2006 triennial meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies, held in Tampere, Finland, chaired by professors Eero Ropo and Tero Autio.
2. There are terminological differences as well: Peter Menck (see 2000, 181–182) distinguishes among curriculum theory (*Lehrplantheorie*), subject-matter didactics, *Didaktik* analysis, and the lifeworld of children. The more inclusive definition of curriculum in the US field—as "complicated conversation" (Pinar et al. 1995, 848)—would subsume these various domains within it.
3. Ian Westbury (2000, 27) tells us that "*Didaktik* provides models of teacher thinking," but in the Hopmann-Riquarts collection, these are implied only.
4. Hopmann and Riquarts (2000, 7) point to the "fragmentation" in US curriculum studies, specifically the separation of curriculum from pedagogy; such a division is, they tells us, "fundamentally opposed" to the "holistic approach" of *Didaktik*. Due to this fragmentation, they continue, "content was lost in American curriculum studies." While pedagogy is not separated from curriculum in the US tradition (see Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 13), they are accurate on this point, and I have, in recent years, offered examples (see Pinar 2001, 2006a, b, 2009, 2012) of the reincorporation of "content" into US curriculum studies. The example Hopmann and Riquarts cite—Shulman's "pedagogical content" knowledge—does not, in my view, accomplish the reincorporation of content to curriculum studies but, instead, elides the binary. See endnote 8.
5. In reviewing a draft of this chapter, Tero Autio (2006b) found the term "contribution" to be "ironical" in this context. *Didaktik's* "extraction" from general educational theory, he pointed out, coincided its being embedded in the "bureaucratic-administrative controls of the nation-state, veiling its bureaucratic-administrative function by claims to disciplinary legitimacy." As for Herbartianism, Autio claims it reduced the complexity of education to "proceduralism"

and instrumentality, rationalizing sequence that, in the US context, became behaviorialized. Indeed, in his 2006 presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies, Autio suggested that bureaucratic-administrative control became restated, in the United States, as the prediction of behavior. Since *No Child Left Behind*, "behavior" itself has been reduced to test-taking. It is in this sense that I have asserted that accountability in the United States is a form of neo-fascism (2012, 181).

6. There is, of course, no one American curriculum tradition, a fact belied by the use of "the" in the Hopmann-Riquarts's sentence. The only specific reference they make to "the" US field is to "Mager or Bruner" (2000, 9), two quite different, even adversarial, intellectual traditions within US curriculum studies. Strange indeed that certain German scholars thought the US field "far ahead" of the German one, and just as Schwab pronounced the US field "moribund" (see Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 8). Not only national context complicates dialogue across borders, so does the historical moment, which often differs according to place.
7. Künzli and Horton-Krüger (2000, 42) write that the consequences of the "affair" with US curriculum studies was that "German *Didaktik* became ideologically suspect and considered outdated."
8. The reference Hopmann and Riquarts make here (see 2000,10) is to that work of two Americans (Lee Shulman and Walter Doyle) and of one Israeli scholar, Miriam Ben-Peretz. The distinctions among the works of these three seem stronger than their similarities: it is not obvious to me how they are "dealing with the same set of questions" (Hopmann and Riquarts 2000, 10). There are no footnotes to the work of these three scholars, but in his 1992 handbook chapter, Walter Doyle focuses on the institutionalization of teaching in the United States, specifically, how the construal of teaching as classroom management has eclipsed the curriculum as topic of public debate and educational research, rendering the curriculum invisible. Shulman (1986), too, focused on the eclipse of curriculum by teaching; he is famous for his concept of "pedagogical content knowledge" (1987), which attends to the subject matter of teachers and, more specifically, to the knowledge teachers require to convey subject matter to students. It is, he suggests, that mix of content and pedagogy that is uniquely the province of teachers. Teachers' own particular form of professional understanding includes, he asserts, (a) knowledge of learners and their characteristics, (b) knowledge of educational contexts, ranging from the workings of the group or classroom, the governance and financing of school districts, to the character of communities and cultures, and (c) knowledge of educational ends, purposes and values, and their philosophical and historical grounds. Shulman's model focuses more on the first rather than the second modifier in his concept, except insofar as pedagogy is regarded as an order of content.

Gudmundsdottir, Reinersten, and Nordtomme (see 2000, 319) also link Klafki and Shulman as "working theoretically with concrete and practical issues." That is a rather vaguely stated link.

Of the three scholars Hopmann and Riquarts cite (see 2000, 10; Gudmundsdottir, Reinersten, and Nordtomme [see 2000, 320] reference her work as well), Miriam Ben-Peretz (1990, xv) affords teachers the most active role in the formulation of content: "To sum up: teachers are encouraged to see their major role in the partnership of curriculum development as that of informed and creative interpreters who are prepared to reflect on their curriculum and to reconstruct it." (I, too, forefront that verb, as do scholars in South Africa and Brazil, if with different terms, "translation" in South Africa (Pinar 2010a, 232), "enunciation" in Brazil (Pinar 2011a, 199). Ben-Peretz's subsequent work focused almost exclusively on teachers, including teachers' memories of teaching (1995) and their experience of the teachers' lounge (2000). From my experience at a National Curriculum Conference, chaired by Professor Saul Feinberg (and at which Professor Ben-Peretz spoke), held in Jerusalem in February 2005, I would venture to say that Miriam Ben-Peretz is regarded by many as the dean of Israeli curriculum studies.

9. I am referring to the autobiographical tradition in North American curriculum studies (Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 10). I choose "resonance" to emphasize the fact that there is no simple correspondence of the two traditions' interest in self-formation through educational experience, a point amplified by Autio in his review of this manuscript. Autio (2006b) underlined Klafki's use of "assimilation" in the passage I have quoted; Klafki, Autio wrote, seems to assume that "content itself" has "organizing power," implying that we know how consciousness works or, more probably (in Autio's judgment), that consciousness is secondary in Klafki's formulation. In *Didaktik*, Autio continues, the subjective suffers a subsidiary even "subjugated" position; what is important is outside subjectivity, the content, wherein characteristics of subjectivity are presumably installed. He concludes that the emphasis upon content in *Didaktik* implies that the locus of determination resides outside the subjectively existing individual. Individuality is defined in "collectivist terms"—as "humanity"—that is to be realized in individual ways. Autio's analysis is, in general, shared by Daniel Tröhler (see 2003, 759), who notes that, especially in early twentieth-century conceptions of *Bildung*, "the individual person can perfect himself only in the framework of the typical characteristics of his *Volk*—the German *Volk*." In my conception of *currere*, the individual's study of his or her self-formation implies skepticism toward the national culture and character, including as these inform subjectivity. Historically structuring the anti-intellectualism of American culture are, I note (after Hofstadter), religion and business (see in 2012, 231–232).

10. This phrase recalls William Heard Kilpatrick's (1918) emphasis on the educational project as providing an opportunity for "creative self-activity."
11. Recall that as late 1918 Thomas Mann proclaimed that he was an unpolitical man and proud of it (Gay 2001, 73). A few years later he changed his mind, declaring his allegiance to the parliamentary democracy of the Weimar Republic (Gay 2001, 74, 126–127; Weitz 2007, 254; Bruford 2009 [1975], 232). Bruford (2009 [1975], 245) suggests that "Mann finds a modern substitute for the church in humanism." In my view, if we fail to reappropriate religion, incorporating it in, say, a revised and planetary humanism (Pinar 2009, 149 n. 3), then it remains split off, liable to extremism and fundamentalism, and our humanism devolves into narcissism.
12. Klafki (see 2000a, 89) acknowledges the gendered dimension of the classical concept of *Bildung*.
13. Autio (2006b) emphasizes the nostalgia and detachment from, even aversion to, history implicit in such "reconciliation." I have stressed the interiority of education (Pinar 1994) and its relation to the external restructuring of reality (Pinar 2004), but I conclude not with "reconciliation" but "reparation" (Pinar 2006b) and "reconstruction" (see chapter 5). In politically polarized America, I recast the "synthetical" moment of the method of *currere* as "self-mobilization" (Pinar 2004, 239). This represents no "reconciliation" with an archaic past, of course. Rather, "synthesis" is the final (if recursive) moment or phase in an ongoing regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic social and self-understanding enabling social reconstruction through academic study (Pinar 2006a, 2009).
14. This is a crucial difference in emphasis from Klafki's contemporary concept of "co-determination" (see also, Autio 2003, 322) as it is from "postmodern" assertions of *Bildung* not as inner development through incorporation into social totality but egalitarian participation in an ongoing democratic conversation (Løvlie and Standish 2003, 23), even Deweyan forms of experimentation (Reichenbach 2003, 96). It is a flexible concept indeed.
15. Klafki (see 2000b, 141) tells us that his study of the Frankfurt School (he lists Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas) as well as his ongoing dialogue with theorists committed to revising traditional German pedagogy led him, from the late 1960s onward, to theorize a "crucial constructive science of education" and, within this framework, a system of "critical-constructive *Didaktik*." In this phrasing, "critical" is to be understood in the sense of "social criticism." In terms of *Didaktik*, Klafki explains, this implies "constant reflection on the relations between school and instruction on the one hand (their goals, contents, forms of organization, and methods) and social conditions and processes on the other." The concept of "constructive" indicates an emphasis on practice, and on "reform." Klafki is,

of course, not alone in emphasizing the link between *Didaktik* and progressive democratic politics (see Schnack 2003, 272).

16. Conformity implies nonthinking acceptance of the status quo, while its conscious "cousin"—solidarity—implies self-chosen, self-critical, and self-conscious participation in a common cause, an important distinction to be sure, but one that can fade in (especially political) practice. In his discussion of Klafki's critical-constructive *Didaktik* and its commitment to egalitarian social practice, Autio (2003, 323) posits "solidarity as a precondition of egalitarian practice," a notion, he tells us, based on "the moral conviction intrinsic to the very meaning of *Bildung*." Such moral conviction recalls, Autio continues, the classic notion of "general *Bildung for all*, as the right of every person, without qualitative or quantitative gradations in status determined by social origins or future positions in society" (Klafki 2000a, 103), or as in Humboldt, "[T]hat each and every person, even the poorest, should receive a complete education" (Klafki 2000a, 89; both passages quoted in Autio 2003, 323). The slippery slide from solidarity to conformity can be demonstrated by reference to the key issues of academic or intellectual freedom.

    US teachers appreciate the constraints on their intellectual freedom installed by local—and federal—political interests, especially, authoritarian interests (Pinar 2012, 2–3). In Germany, Weniger (2000 [1952], 119) allows that while there is a "danger" associated with an "omnipotent state pedagogy," the "freedom" of pedagogy is most strongly "guaranteed" by the state. Even a cursory historical review recommends qualification of that statement. Certainly one cannot trust the administrations of US president George W. Bush or Barack Obama to protect academic freedom; indeed, the legislated foreclosure of such freedom is nightmarishly evident.

17. Klafki (see 2000b, 142) makes this social definition explicit in his concept of instructional planning, wherein teaching and learning are understood as processes of interaction, that is, as processes in which relationships between people—between teachers and learners and between the learners themselves—play a central role. These processes must, therefore, be comprehended not only as processes of acquisition in which subject matter and problems are confronted, but also as social processes or processes of social learning. Certainly this is one sense of the US concept of curriculum as "complicated conversation."

18. Autio's notion of an inverted hermeneutic resonates with Patrick Slattery's (2003, 652) depiction of a postmodern hermeneutic, "grounded in aesthetic experience and poststructural subjectivity" while "attentive to the Aristotelian sense of *applicato*." Slattery (2003, 652) continues:

    > An educational experience which incorporates *Bildung*—without separating learning from its application to oneself as

> happens in technical, managerial, and behavioral models—encourages interpretation within lived world experiences and intersubjective contexts. It is here that forms of self-encounter emerge where various human communities are imaginatively engaged in individual and social transformation; where administrators and educators—management and labor—all recognize and act upon their mutual needs as well as the broader interests of the environment and marginalized global societies; where teachers and students are aesthetically present to subject matter rather than assuming they possess it and can manipulate it in decontextualized projects. (Slattery 2003, 652)

This is *Bildung* with a messianic—in Walter Benjamin's sense (see Wolin 1982)—inflection.

5 "Molds" and "Spirit" in the Eight-Year Study

1. Craig Kridel and Robert Bullough composed nine portraits or vignettes concluding with a chapter entitled "Reexamining Secondary Education in America," followed by two appendices, one listing the 30 schools, the second listing associated testing bureaus and projects. Among those participants portrayed are Wilford Merton Aikin (1882–1965), V. T. Thayer (1886–1979), Eugene Randolph Smith (1876–1968), Ralph Tyler (1902–1994), Alice V. Keliher (1903–1995), Caroline Beaumont Zachry (1894–1945), Harold Alberty (1890–1971), Boyd Bode (1873–1953), and Margaret Willis (1899–1987). Kridel and Bullough have long been interested in biography: see, for instance, Kridel (1998) and Bullough (1979). In Bullough's recent work, however, the biographic interest recedes in favor of case studies of so-called teacher development in which, curiously, subject matter (let alone intellectual reconstruction) plays no role whatsoever (2008, 202, 205, 228).
2. Kridel and Bullough (2007, 7) acknowledge that "teachers brought differing degrees of enthusiasm for curricular experimentation." There were "tensions" (2007, 52) regarding replacement of the Carnegie unit, the organizational documentation of study, as well as "fireworks" as faculty began a "sixteenth-month struggle" (2007, 53) over "independence" from the Carnegie Foundation (see also 2007, 58–59) and from demands for annual standardized testing (2007, 55). (While the former was achieved, the study was besieged by tests, over 200 of them [2007, 82]!) There was "tension" (2007, 77) between Smith and Tyler, although the two coedited the final report on evaluation (1942). From the outset, Kridel and Bullough (2007, 60) report, participants pursued "very different, often contrasting, agendas." Elsewhere, Kridel (in Lipka et al. 1998, 18) underscores that sponsoring organization, the Progressive Education Association, was no "unified front."

3. As Judith Green (2008, 35) points out, democracy *is* institutional. It is also "deep," at the subjective "level of habits, practices, attitudes, and hopes in daily living" (Green 2008, 35–36). One limitation of the Eight-Year Study—at least as it is refracted through the Kridel-Bullough book—is that it emphasized experimentation as institutional. Ignored was any "inward form" implied by *Bildung* (Nordenbo 2003, 26). "[I]nstitutions change," Gabriel asserts, "but they are always changed from within" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 91). Even when Eight-Year Study focused on daily practices (and these were often associated with "behavior"), it is the school that was judged effective or not. For instance: "If pupils, then, shortly before gradation from high school have not developed such interests [which promise individual happiness and common welfare], or if their interests lie in a few fields which are inappropriate to their talents and opportunities, the *school* has failed" (Smith, Tyler, and the Evaluation Staff 1942, 314, emphasis added; see also 434, 457). Accompanying this devolution of democracy to its organizational structures was dilution of the concept to social processes: "Democracy was reduced merely to learning how to get along with others, a matter of human relations" (Bullough and Kridel 2003, 165). Despite a cautionary note concerning "institutionalism" (Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 154), the experimentation of the Eight-Year Study seems structured by it.
4. Laurel Tanner (2009, 214) complains that Tyler's second and third principles receive less attention than the first and fourth, but given Tyler's positioning of these *between* objectives and evaluation—never mind that he "dedicates almost half of the space available (62 pages) to the treatment of educational purposes and their determination," as Tero Autio (2006a, 114) points out—that seems inevitable. So positioned, as Tanner (2009, 214) herself acknowledges, principles two and three become reduced to "what learning experiences will be most suitable for attaining the objectives and how shall learning experienced be organized." Tanner (see 2009, 214) associates the significance of Goodlad's work with its attention to these neglected second and third principles. In the final paragraph of *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*, Tyler (1949, 128) invites readers to devise different sequences. (My thanks to William Schubert for making this point.) Whatever their sequence, the four "principles" remained, and they institutionalized instrumentalism as they eviscerated subjectivity and sociality, reducing intellectual reconstruction to bureaucratic reorganization.
5. Reorganization and reconstruction become related through creative curriculum design, as in the use of "juxtaposition" in curriculum development. "The strategy of juxtaposition," Janet Miller (2005,144) and her colleagues suggest, "is one that invites inconsistencies, ambiguities, ambivalence, and foregrounds the fact that there

will always be 'unspoken themes' that cannot or will not be interrogated." While that last point is important, for me the curricular value of juxtaposition is also its invitation to interrogate those themes occluded by an exclusively logical or developmental sequencing. I am no dialectician, however, and juxtaposition does not necessarily yield synthesis, incorporating the juxtaposed. That is not to say something "new" does not emerge, however, only that its appearance may well be surprising, unrelated to what occurs before. Discussing Walter Benjamin theory of history, Mosès (2009 [1992], 113) points out that "it is not a matter of subsuming the present and the past within a common category but, on the contrary, of generating a new reality from their conjunction." For an extended discussion of juxtaposition, see Pinar 2009, 154 n. 13.

6. Not only did advanced academic study in the arts, humanities, and sciences play no prominent role in the study, but also on occasion there appear instances of outright anti-intellectualism. Consider Caroline Zachry's (1968 [1940], 526) apparent positioning (never mind the binary) of "study" as secondary to what students "do" in the school:

   > Classroom study and discussion of history, economics, of government and politics are not academic if they are carried on by young people who are engaging in such experiences, with teachers who are themselves active citizens. In these circumstances, discussion of democratic ideals is not mere lip-service.

   The slur upon "academic" is underlined by the apparent assumption that classroom discussion amounts to "lip-service" (see also Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 159). It is not obvious to me how student councils and the extensive documentation of students' private situations—including anatomical and sexual references (see Zachry 1968 [1940], 185, 140)—and the forefronting of vocational guidance (see Zachry 1968 [1940], 519) improve upon the academic understanding of democratic ideals. An exaggerated interest in the student profile is also evident in *Appraising and Record Student Progress* (see Smith, Tyler, and the Evaluation Staff 1942, 409–429).

7. Toews (2004, 76) is referencing here the "generational cohort" assumed "positions of power" in the regime of Frederick William IV, but early nineteenth-century interests (among many in what would become Germany) in distinctions between outer appearance and inner life reiterates *Bildung's* twin emphases as it accents the organizationalism of the Eight-Year Study (see Toews 2004, 78, 79, 129).

8. Aikin (1942a, 132) asserts: "Our people prize the individual human personality above everything else." Evidently, it was the student's, not the teacher's, "individual human personality" that was prized (see note 9).

9. Not only was singleness of purpose recommended for each school; discovering the "chief reason" for *the* school's "existence" constituted

the second "major principle" guiding all 30 schools in the Eight-Year Study (Aikin's 1942a, 18). Both concepts—"chief reason" and "the school"—can occlude the academic freedom of individual teachers. "Although there should be differences among the schools," Aikin (1942a, 36) allows, "growing out of the differences in home background, interests, needs and purposes of the student body, the major goals should be the same throughout the city." Where is an acknowledgment of intellectual differences among the faculty? Where is any invitation to teach what and how one finds subjectively expressive, historically responsive, and pedagogically appropriate? As Sharon Todd (2009, 106) points out, "[D]emocracy is an ongoing project of struggle, rooted in human pluralism, that actually can be undermined by calls for harmony and consensus." In the Eight-Year Study, the emphasis was upon "common beliefs" (Kridel and Bullough 2007, 12) comprising the "school philosophy" (Bullough and Kridel 2003, 166) expressing "faculty unity" (Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 167, 208, 210).

10. "We are devoting much time to the setting up and formulation of objectives," Tyler (1949, 62, emphasis added) explains, "because they are *the most critical criteria* for guiding all the other activities of the curriculum-maker." Tyler suggests teachers start with student "needs," a sticky wicket as the Kridel-Bullough discussion of the concept makes clear (see 2007, 130; see also Bullough and Kridel 2003, 151; Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 7–8). I say start with teachers' individual replies to the canonical curriculum question *what knowledge is of most worth*? That ongoing question incorporates concerns for students and society in its attunement to the historical moment through juxtapositions (see note 5) of "new" and canonical academic knowledge. In the *Bildung* tradition (Nordenbo 2003, 36 n. 4), this question becomes what is the "most appropriate" curriculum for a "liberal education?"
11. The reference to curriculum theory obligates me to point out an overstatement in *Stories of the Eight-Year Study*, a one-sentence reduction of contemporary curriculum theory to identity politics (see Kridel and Bullough 2007, 167). While, I, too, have decried the excesses of identity politics (see Pinar 2009, 22)—the phenomenon also shows how curricular concerns for social justice, when stripped of that concept's historicity, can disintegrate into a compensatory cultural particularism—the entire US field can hardly be reduced to that phenomenon. While not "blind" to race, class, and gender (2007, 44), Kridel and Bullough (2007, 9) "wish" the study's participants had addressed "more directly such issues." Those rare references to class are usually in the context of other points (see Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 167, 227, 236, 254). As Kridel points out, only brief attention was paid to noncollege-bound students (in Lipka et al. 1998, 27), often (but hardly always) associated with working-class and poor families.

Thirty Schools' graduates did acknowledge the importance of racial, religious, and class tolerance (Chamberlin et al. 1942, 122; see also 116). The only reference I found to women (and then, parenthetically) occurred in *Exploring the Curriculum* (42). I found only one reference to "Indians" (also in *Exploring the Curriculum*, 270), and that to the indigenous peoples of Central America.While obviously not of paramount concern to participants, nonetheless "race" was referenced regularly in the schools' depiction of their participation in the study (see Thirty Schools 1943, 32, 103, 234, 276, 380, 544, 709) and in *Exploring the Curriculum* (see 17, 18, 45, 51, 88, 258, 319, 330). In its Motion Picture Program, Kridel and Bullough (2007, 103) note, the Keliher Commission did excerpt *Fury* to depict a lynching. There was, Kridel tells us elsewhere (in Lipka et al. 1998, 31), a Secondary School Study for Negroes (a project of the Commission on Secondary Schools of the Association of Colleges and Secondary School for Negroes) that was "very much within the experimental tradition of the Eight-Year Study and the Southern Study."

In the Adolescents Study (conducted from 1934 to 1938), the concept of difference seems confined to heredity (see Zachry 1968 [1940], 40) or to psychology rather than to culture or ethnicity or politics: "Differences in economic status, in national and ethnic origin, largely ignored among playmates in the elementary-school age, are not unlikely in adolescence to give rise to keen self-doubt and hostility. The adolescents' increased *sensitivity to difference* may here be supplemented by parental attitudes" (Zachry 1968 [1940], 363, emphasis added). On one occasion difference, "abnormality" was valorized positively, that in a reference to the Ohio State University School's Mr. Weidemann's seventh-grade mathematics class, who concluded that "the only *normal* characteristic about an individual is his *abnormality*" (Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 64–65).

12. In his canonical essay on the intellectual history of the field, Jackson (1992; see Pinar et al. 1995, 25–41) points out that Tyler extended Bobbitt's two-step model of (1) defining educational objectives and (2) devising learning experiences by adding two additional steps, the third involving the organization of learning experiences, and the fourth requiring their evaluation. Representing no reconceptualization of curriculum development, the work of both Bobbitt and Tyler "lie[s] within the single tradition of the curriculum specialist as advice given to practitioners" (1992, 27). Jackson wonders why Bobbitt and Tyler were so widely read; he looks for those rhetorical qualities of their books that might explain their wide influence: "Most notable among these [rhetorical] qualities is the strong appeal to common sense" (1992, 27). Common sense, one might add, that condemned teaching to implementation, setting up the profession for its "gracious submission" (Pinar 2004, 65) decades later (see Taubman 2009b).

13. The only criticism Kridel and Bullough [2007, 96] allow themselves is that Tyler "worked within the safety of the status quo." That is evident in Tyler's resolution of the "uneasiness" (2007, 85) he is reported to have felt between the study's dedication to experimentation and the demand (by the General Education Board) to develop tests. Tyler chose to develop tests. Later, he expressed pride in doing so, claiming to have introduced "evaluation" (even coining the concept "assessment") to education (2007, 91). In the era dominated by standardized testing, this seems a dubious legacy indeed.
14. The truth is that the Ohio State University School faculty "objected" to the ten-minute homeroom period, "feeling that guidance could not be scheduled and that meeting a group of students for 10 minutes was a waste of time. The plan was soon abandoned" (Thirty Schools 1943, 723).
15. In early 2011, the sadistic stupidity of school "reform" became unmistakable during efforts in several states—prominent among them Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin—to strip teachers and other public servants of collective-bargaining rights. The particularly bitter political standoff in Wisconsin over Governor Scott Walker's determination to sharply curtail collective bargaining for public-sector workers ended abruptly on March 9, as his Republican colleagues in the state senate successfully maneuvered to adopt a bill doing just that (Davey 2011, A1). "You feel punched in the stomach," said Erin Parker, a high-school science teacher in Madison, responding as well to anti-teacher invective expressed during public protests there and online: "*Oh you pathetic teachers*, read the online comments and placards of counter-demonstrators. *You are glorified baby sitters who leave work at 3 p.m. You deserve minimum wage*" (quoted in Gabriel 2011, A1). Trip Gabriel (2011, A1) reports: "Even in a country that is of two minds about teachers—Americans glowingly recall the ones who changed their lives, but think the job with its summers off is cushy—education experts say teachers have rarely been targets of such scorn from politicians and voters."
16. "If a firm plan for educational reconstruction had been implemented at the war's end (including integrated public schools)," Joel Williamson (1984, 51) suggests, "a great deal of suffering might have been prevented" (see also, Tyack and Hansot 1990, 88). Once southerners regained political control of the South in 1877, "Negro education was the primary target" (Trelease 1971, 294). In addition to its racial association (Du Bois 1975 [1935]), including "the radical reconstruction of black subjectivity" (Mercer 1994, 302), "reconstruction" has also been associated with gender, and not only with feminism (see, for instance, Braidotti and Butler, 1994, 40) but with the "reconstruction of masculinity" (Kimmel 1996, 333), not a restoration but a shattering of patriarchy, itself with racial implications. These modalities of "deep democracy" (see note 3) could be

addressed in a reconstructed (but probably not in the reorganized) school curriculum.

17. Even rearranging—through juxtaposition—what we know already can produce new knowledge, but in the Eight-Year Study such potential was narrowed by the insistence on objectives and tests. Further, in making the curriculum accessible to students—central to the communication conversation assumes—there can remain a transmission model embedded in emphases upon student learning with its consequent installation of evaluation as key in its assessment. Despite its sophistication, for example, a recent essay risks reinscribing this organizational emphasis with its linking of curriculum design with "school-based learning" (Grimmett and Halvorson 2010, 257). To "sustain authentic human learning" (2010, 254) tempts the design of a "system-world" (2010, 242), not providing knowledge for conversation complicated by subjectivity, history, and society, but by knowledge itself. In my view, then, curriculum creation is not necessarily systematic or primarily organizational, but emphatically intellectual, the medium of subjective and social reconstruction. While such embodied self-reflective knowledge-informed thinking does indeed have the "power to restructure the human life-world" (2010, 249), it is the individual—teachers and students—whom I encourage to engage that power in his or her own way, toward his or her own end, in consultation with others. While we dwell in language, the dwelling's design does not determine how we live there, and it is this ongoing unpredictable process of deciding how to live—what to think, how to remake one's experience in light of the never-ending surprise of feeling and perception—that is ongoing curricular question faced by the subject. Peter Grimmett and Mark Halvorson (2010, 251) appreciate the problem of instrumentalism suggesting that it follows from a devaluation of temporality. This important insight accords significance to historicity, although evidently we differ in our view of the scale of that significance, as Grimmett and Halvorson (2010, 254) almost imply that the past is a vestige to be cleared away in order for the future to appear, while I argue, the future can be found only through the past. Reorganization becomes presentistic insofar as it rearranges what we know now, while reconstruction assumes historicity, for example, returning to the past in order to find our way into the future.
18. Even Bobbitt (1918, 43, 49, 64) emphasizes the "new" with his term "curriculum discoverer." Alas, what is "new" in Bobbitt's curriculum is learning ever-more efficient performance of adult activities. In the reports of the Eight-Year Study, the "new" is associated with solving those problems posed by adolescents. Advanced academic study—when not caricatured (see Giles, McCutchen, and Zechiel 1942, 260–261)—seems limited to learning theory (see 154.) and "workshops" (219ff., 262, 297, 303, 307) focused

on organizational, not academic, issues. There is one reference to "new knowledge" in Aikin's summary (see 1942a, 23), but it is to subjective knowledge, for example, students "seeking deeper and broader meaning in their maturing experiences." Despite the claim that "we are trying to develop students . . . who desire . . . to explore new fields of thought" (1942a, 144), Aikin emphasizes that the "source of the curriculum is to be found in the concerns of youth and in the nature of the society which the school serves" (135). How "new fields of thought" can be explored by students without teachers engaged in sustained academic study is not obvious. Absent in the study, at least on any systematic basis, were university faculty outside colleges of education. (Herbert E. Hawkes, Dean of Columbia College, constitutes one exception; see Aikin 1942a, 147–150; also Cremin 1961, 256). The closest reference to "new knowledge" in the study of the Thirty Schools' graduates is "the assembly and organization of masses of new materials" (McConn 1942, xviii). In *Exploring the Curriculum* there is one appreciative acknowledgment of advanced study in one's field (see 225). In the humanities, "new" knowledge enables ongoing articulation of the historical moment (Roberts 1995, 126). Its centrality in the natural sciences requires no elaboration.

19. Even critical pedagogue William Stanley (2007, 384) observed recently: "It is clear that schools alone are in no position to create a new democratic social order." This is no new insight, of course. "By the eve of World War I," Robert Westbrook (1991, 192) reminds, "Dewey was more fully aware that the democratic reconstruction of American society he envisioned could not take place simply by a revolution in the classroom, that, indeed, the revolution in the classroom could not take place until the society's adults had been won over to radical democracy."

6 Subjective Reconstruction through Aesthetic Education

1. While Greene does not employ these terms, her conception of aesthetic education engages teachers and students in projects of ongoing self-reflection, stimulated as it is focused on the art-as-event, a fundamentally subjective undertaking that not only refers the subject to herself but also draws him into public world as well. In so doing, subjectivity and sociality are reconstructed, however, locally and incrementally. While (in Greene's conception) the world is not unchanged by the eventfulness of art, such change does not only occur by itself; it invites action (simultaneously subjective and social), hence the appropriateness (in my view) of the concept of "reconstruction." Not only progressivism is prominent in Greene's conception, so are traces of *Bildung*, as Dewey's philosophy reiterates,

Løvlie and Standish (2003, 5) argue, "the idea of the basic interrelatedness between self and world found in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* and throughout Hegel's philosophy." For Schiller, as for Greene, in aesthetic education there is a synthesis of sensory experience and rationality (Nordenbo 2003, 33; see also Hohr 2003, 171).

2. Also a key concept in curriculum studies in Brazil (see Pinar 2011a, 203–206), the eventfulness of art is evident in a/r/tography, a concept and practice devised by Rita L. Irwin, in which the boundaries among teaching, research, and art-making blur. As the chapters in the two collections testify (Irwin and de Cosson 2004; Springgay et al. 2008), a/r/tography engages the artist-teacher-researcher into positions of disjunctive distantiation from and intense engagement with everyday existence. Such distantiation and engagement permit, indeed invite aesthetic-intellectual reconstruction that bracket as it hyphenates naturalized understandings of knowledge, teaching, and the school. While, as Greene (1973) has observed, encounters with the arts do not in themselves guarantee "wide-awakeness," they can open spaces—"third spaces" as Ted Aoki and several of his former students in the Irwin–de Cosson collection testify—which stimulate social engagement through self-knowledge. (Hongyu Wang [2004, 179] also invokes the concept of "third space" as engendered by encounters with alterity.) Like Maxine Greene's conception of aesthetic education, a/r/tography brackets the everyday and the conventional as the artist-researcher-teacher enacts art from multiple lived perspectives, enabling one to emerge from submerged realities and to see oneself, and art, as if for the first time.
3. On another occasion Greene (2001, 157) poses the same Ciardian (see Ciardi 1960) question: "How does it mean?" By replacing "what" art means with "how" we emphasize the eventfulness of art. By focusing on—Greene prefers "noticing"—art-as-event one can also articulate its thematic content, especially as that is conveyed through aesthetic means, for example, sound, structure, rhythm, and imagery.
4. I (1998) juxtaposed Maxine Greene and Susan Sontag not only to underscore Greene's intellectual range and accomplishment, but also to testify to her status as a (New York) public intellectual. The "public" or worldly character of Greene's pedagogy is rendered explicit by regular references to what we used to call "current events," among them Columbine (2001, 123), neoliberal school "reform" (2001, 134), and the Christian Right (2001, 165). Such references remind us that the "lived" in lived experience is historical as well as subjective, and that for Greene the private and public can never be definitively demarcated from each other or from history.
5. More typical than images of intensification in Greene are images of space to specify the heightening of consciousness aesthetic initiation invites. For instance, Greene suggests that through participants'

encounters with the arts the "audible world expanded" (2001, 37). In another passage she emphasizes that the "more we know" the "more we see and hear and feel" (Greene 2001, 155). I confess to recoiling from the proximity of such images (of "more") to those of consumption in consumer capitalism, but Greene's point stands aside from the compulsion to accumulate: aesthetic experience enables extraordinary experience from which we do not emerge unchanged. In emphasizing art's blasphemous challenge to the banal, Greene rejects the elitism of "haughty connoisseurship" (Greene 2001, 19), a possible reference (and, if so, a criticism) of Eisner (1985, 223).

6. Moments of openness to alterity—including to the alterity of art—enables subjective dissolution, or regression, so that the structures of selfhood may be reconstructed. In the method of *currere*, then, the regressive phase is not only temporal but it also signifies disassembling the structures of the present self, providing opportunities for reconstruction. As noted (in note 2), for Wang [2004, 16] such openness to alterity—rendered lyrical in the image of the "stranger"—creates a third space "giving rise to new realms of inter/subjectivity," as we will see in the next chapter. There can be gendered, racial, and explicitly political dimensions to such shattering (Pinar 2006b, 172).
7. As a lifelong student of autobiography (1994), I have always appreciated Greene's emphasis upon subjective significance of educational experience. That significance is never insular but socially engaged, even cosmopolitan, what now I characterize as worldliness (2009) and as allegorical (2012, xiv).
8. While a serious scholar of Dewey, Greene's knowledge of progressivism was not limited to his work. Craig Kridel (2006, 80) reports that as a graduate student in the early 1950s Greene had enrolled in Theodore Brameld's doctoral seminars at New York University (from where she graduated with the doctorate). Later Greene attributed her career to the inspiration Brameld provided.
9. For me, there is no choice to be made between academic knowledge or experience; they are reciprocally related. In positing the binary, Greene is perhaps reacting to what progressives have long demeaned as "traditional" instruction, for example, didactic pedagogy emphasizing facts over feelings. It is obvious to me that aesthetic education conveys understanding *through* facts.
10. In the late nineteenth century the conception of "objectives" (or "goals") questioned what had become the ritual of recitation as instructional method. Recall that in the so-called classical curriculum comprehension was considered secondary, as recitation (often of ancient Greek and Latin) was presumed to exercise the mind conceived as a muscle. Raising questions of meaning, personal relevance, and social utility—as Dewey did—challenged and, indeed, helped displace nineteenth-century classical conceptions of education as mental discipline.

Today to insist that the specification of objectives initiate every discussion of classroom teaching is surely a reinstantiation of the ritual the question of objectives was designed to dismantle. Objectives have become devices disguising manipulation as professional practice, demoting curriculum and instruction to means to extra-intellectual ends, however laudable (as in the case of social justice). Matching outcomes to objectives ensures that educational experience is replaced with institutional control by measurement. The key curriculum question—*what knowledge is of most worth*?—is no longer than an ongoing ethical, subjectively situated, historically attuned reconstruction of the past, but, instead, a calculation in social engineering's agenda to manufacture the future after the present. Determined to get from "here" to "there," such instrumental rationality deforms the future in terms of the present (Seigfried 1996, 174). If the "there" is arriving where one decided to be in the present then the destination is inevitably a version of that place where one began.Instrumentalism removes us from the spheres of erudition and intellectuality that one would think would constitute a profession called education. Instrumentalism relocates education to the sphere of social calculation and engineering, wherein ideas are pursued not for their own sake or because one finds them interesting, or because they enable us to understand what we experience, but because they provide returns on our investment. As one cannot help but have noticed during the Great Recession of 2008, the maximization of profit sometimes precipitates impoverishment, and not only the financial kind. Likewise, devotion to social justice can reinscribe tyranny, and not always with a different set of victims (see Pinar 2009, chapter 2).

11. While I share with Greene—as does Kieran Egan, among others, including James B. Macdonald (1995 [1971], 60; 1995 [1974], 92)—the centrality of the imagination in educational experience, I see danger where Greene sees only opportunity. Setting "our imagination free" (Greene 2001, 172)—even if such a thing were possible—risks severing it from ethics and erudition. Recall, for instance, the roles played by the imagination in racism (in lynching specifically: Pinar 2001).
12. While "noticing" would seem to privilege visuality over the other senses, Greene's conception is not only ocular, as it also engages the auditory, as indicated by the image and sound of a "blue guitar" (see Greene 2001, 31). Once again there is an association with Aoki to make, as the great Canadian theorist emphasized auditory metaphors in his teaching (Aoki 2005 [1990]).
13. It is Greene's passion that persuaded me to entitle the 1998 collection *The Passionate Mind of Maxine Greene*. Passion is, I suggest, prerequisite to public service, personified in the lives of Jane Addams, Laura Bragg, and Pier Paolo Pasolini (Pinar 2009). Recall that in *Bildung*—Schiller's version specifically—sensory experience and rationality

become synthesized (Nordenbo 2003, 33). James B. Macdonald (1995 [1971], 59) also appreciated the educational significance of "combining passion with intellect."

14. In its emphasis upon inner cultivation and, specifically, self-reconfiguration, *Bildung* construes "life [itself] as a form of art" (Gur-Ze'ev 2003, 77).

7 *Currere* and Cosmopolitanism

1. Cosmopolitan is customarily defined as (a) having worldwide rather than limited or provincial scope or bearing, (b) having wide international sophistication: *worldly*, (c) composed of persons, constituents, or elements from all or many parts of the world, (d) found in most parts of the world and under varied ecological conditions. Each of these dictionary definitions is relevant here, but they fail to denote the forms of its subjective personification. In *The Worldliness of a Cosmopolitan Education* (2009), I attempt just that, decrying the eclipse of individuation by identity politics, the replacement of academic knowledge and understanding by instrumentalism, and the significance of intellectual independence in democratic life. To contradict these tendencies in our not very cosmopolitan present, I provided personification of cosmopolitanism that illustrated each: (1) Jane Addams personified the individualist as social activist; (2) Laura Bragg showed how study can be extended (sometimes prosthetically, as in her "boxes") through pedagogy; and (3) Pier Paolo Pasolini personified intellectual independence in outrage, activism, and extraordinary aesthetic achievement, juxtaposing high and low culture as precious and codependent.
2. I refer throughout this chapter to Professor Wang's *The Call from the Stranger on a Journey Home: Curriculum in a Third Space* (2004). Wang works through three oeuvres—simultaneously significant in both Chinese and North American (and European) fields—to address issues she is living through as a teacher, student, and scholar. Her study is an exemplary instance of curriculum as *currere*, as the lived experience of academic study, subjectively situated, historically attuned. Wang's analytic—pedagogical—strategy of juxtaposing these three oeuvres might usefully be adopted by other scholars seeking to cultivate cosmopolitanism.
3. Ted Aoki, too, appreciated international—and multicultural—curriculum work as creating a "third space" (2005 [1996], 318) and, specifically, between East and West. In this volume, I have named it noncoincidence.
4. Recall that reality was an "obsessive" preoccupation of Pasolini, a lifelong thematic Viano (1993, 15) ascribes to his homosexuality.

   > Finally, it is tempting to see Pasolini's lifelong obsession with reality in light of his homosexuality. The constant experience

> of the real Pasolini (what he felt he was), as opposed to the Pasolini as perceived by others, convinced him of the existence of a gap between reality and representation, reality and the mask. Inevitably this led to the desire to pursue reality as what lies beneath the mask.

Reality is not only what is "within," and it is not a matter of the "same," as vernacular conceptions of homosexuality as same-sex desire implies. Rather, reality was for Pasolini always alterity, and alterity, reminiscent of Levinas, demands a reply. "Reality is," Viano (1993, 33) summarizes, "the must entailed by the constant presence of what is other." For Wang, reality has a gendered but not sexual referent, and I cannot help but wonder if the marginalization—the exile and estrangement—engendered by her move to the United States has not underscored for her reality's alterity while lending an urgency to the ongoing project of discerning that reality, however shifting, constructed, and multivariate.

5. Instead of "creation," I have employed the term "reconstruction" to specify that one's subjective and social reconfiguration occurs in the midst of a life history, at a particular conjunction of history, society, politics, always gendered and rarely self-transparently. In contrast to the nineteenth-century US conception of the self-made man (see Pinar 2001, 1086), subjective reconstruction implies debts to ancestors, legacies of various kinds, working alone and with others for recreating the subjectivity in which one finds oneself, through which one finds oneself acting in the world and being acted upon by the world. In contrast to "reorganization," reconstruction requires the creation of something distinctive from what one has already as well as from what one has recently encountered. In terms of curriculum development, curriculum reconstruction requires curriculum scholars' synopses of new research conducted in the university for schoolteachers' possible inclusion in their offerings to students. These synopses represent no watered-down versions of the original, but sophisticated juxtapositions of new scholarship constituting not only new information, intellectual provocations to extant understanding of specific topics as they are attuned to the historical present (and not only to the academic disciplines in which new research advances).
6. Foucault draws a sharp distinction between the ancient practices associated with men's love of boys and contemporary homosexual relationships (see Wang 2004, 29).
7. Recall that Jane Addams reconceived resistance as inclusion and cooperation: *nonresistance* (see Knight 2005, 145, 253, 325). Except on occasion—for instance, her campaign against Chicago Alderman Johnny Powers (see Knight 2005, 339; Elshtain 2002, 181)—Addams engaged (or tried to: recall George Pullman declined to meet with her over the 1894 strike: see Brown 2004, 283; Knight 2005, 314) those to whom she was opposed. For Pasolini, the "seamless domination

of capital" (Miyoshi 2002, 48) was omnipresent and irresistible; only through complex aesthetic creations that could not be consumed were educative moments imaginable (see Rohdie 1995, 170, 197; Viano 1993, 31; Greene 1990, 217).

8. As it was for Zitkala-Šа: see Pinar 2009, 23–25.
9. Other contemporary Chinese curriculum scholars also attempt to resuscitate Confucianism: see Zhang and Zhong (2003).
10. Wang 2004, 88.
11. See, for instance, Dworkin (1974) for an account of misogyny across culture and history. I understand "women" and "men" not only anatomically (there is the reality of intersexuality: see Holmes, 2000) but metaphorically as well, as designating subject positions that are in fact variable, shifting, capable not only of cross-dressing, but also blurred identificatory loyalties. "If writing," Pamela Caughie (1999, 167) suggests,

    > is the coming into being of an identity and not the expression of an already existing subject, as Barthes's concept of the "writer" and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "becoming woman" signify, . . . that becoming is figured as the performance of white male self-difference . . . The man who writes must become something else.

    Is the "something else" a woman must become the woman she is not yet, a woman defined not by patriarchy and misogyny nor their gendered repudiations?
12. As in their early manuscripts, both Kierkegaard and Marx seemed to do: see the epilogue.
13. Generational tensions were evident during the 1970s Reconceptualization of the field (see Pinar et al. 1995, chapter 4). Recently, they have surfaced in practices associated with the "peer review" of scholarly manuscripts (see Kumashiro 2005). Nor were they absent from the identity politics "event" at the 2006 Purdue Conference (see epilogue) nor from the Canon Project debacle at the 2007 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies (Pinar 2009, 165 n. 2).
14. I am referring to the state-of-the-field conference held at Purdue University February 16–19, 2006, chaired by Professor Erik Malewski (2010a, b, c); see epilogue.
15. I have employed a rhetorical "we" throughout this chapter, meaning, at times, senior curriculum studies scholars and, at other times, simply, Americans. Of course, I intend *no* implication of uniformity or homogeneity (culturally, politically, and intellectually) in any use of "we," as one graduate-student listener at the University of Alberta (where I lectured in early 2006) accused. Identities are splintered, contested, and multivariate, a fact that has become, I should think, platitudinous due to its repetition. At the University of Alberta, it had to be repeated one time more.

16. Such dialogue constitutes the project of internationalization, organized by the international association (International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies) and, for me, in the research project—funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada—focused on curriculum studies in South Africa (Pinar 2010a), Brazil (Pinar 2011a), Mexico (Pinar 2011b), and, as of this writing (May 2011), on curriculum studies in China (in progress) and India (in progress).

Epilogue: The Recurring Question of the Subject

1. The concept of *curriculum development* summarizes the first paradigmatic moment of US curriculum studies, a meaning and mission for the field reconceptualized during the 1970s to *understanding curriculum*. I have proposed *internationalization* as the third moment (see Pinar 2008), a movement toward a cosmopolitan reconstruction of an often self-absorbed and thereby provincial US field. In Canada, the disciplinary situation is rather different (see Chambers 2003; Stanley and Young 2011). Were I including Canadian concepts in this sketch of the US field, I would start from the canonical curriculum history of George Tomkins (2008 [1986]) and curriculum theory of Ted Aoki (Pinar and Irwin 2005).What is the disciplinary situation in US curriculum studies? In his thoughtful introduction to the *Handbook of Curriculum Studies*, Erik Malewski (2010a, xv n. 2) construes the character of the contemporary field as "chaotic." Strangely, this no complaint. Rather, Malewski depicts the "lack of definition" and "proliferation" of the field not as "balkanization" but as "healthy" (2010b, 5; 2010c, 537). Who could oppose "proliferation," at least as Malewski formulates it (2009b, 23)? But surely, any field disintegrates unless its contemporary complexity is threaded historically. Despite Malewski's identification of "throughlines" (2010b, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37), history (and only "understudied" history at that) remains one of seven, not as a disciplinary structure for all scholarship. What Malewski identifies as "throughlines" seems to me more like "features" of any field. The only "throughline" in his introduction is his rereading of Huebner. Malewski might have included Macdonald's (1995, 137, 139, 145, 152, 169) rejection of Huebner's "moribund field" thesis, particularly as it provides specific suggestions concerning the "improvement of the state of the field" (1995, 144). A throughline threads concepts through different eras in different scholars' work. If the field is only a "site," it is unsurprising that Malewski (2010b, 5) declines to characterize the field as being at a "particular juncture" or in a "particulate state," as these imply temporality. If it is no ongoing conversation, the field becomes a place to park, from which one can shout and suffer ("contention" and "struggle" in Malewski's terms).

2. Malewski (2010b, 5) admits that the term—"post-reconceptualization"—is "misleading," although he tries to rescue it by celebrating rather than bemoaning the field's failure to state its mission, to demonstrate its character. There seems no conceptual content to the term, as Malewski (2010c, 536) admits: "Post-reconceptualization, rather than being a break or a shift [or an idea] in the terms for curriculum studies scholarship, seems to foreground new sensibilities within the field." Those "sensibilities" are left unspecified. The claim to a "next moment" is further undermined by the fact that Malewski's enemies—those espousing an economistic conception of schooling (see 2010b, 10ff.) and those demanding that "theory" inseminate "practice" (2010b, 19–24)—are the same enemies of the generation he and his colleagues supersede. Empirically, there is a "next moment," but its meaning remains unarticulated. The problem with postmodernism (see chapter 1) pervades the present moment, rendering "uncertainty" and "doubt" not facts of life with which to grapple, but *ideals* to which to aspire. Malewski (2010c, 534, emphasis added) asks: "How to work strategically out of our canonical knowledge to make interventions while *upholding doubt and uncertainty* as ways of knowing?" This new master-narrative guarantees there will be no intellectual advancement or progress, themselves dismissed as demands of a "totalizing intentionality" (Malewski 2010c, 536). "Postmodern thought," Uljens (2003, 43) points out, "cannot criticize universal theories while simultaneously claiming cultural independence and universal truth for itself."
3. Malewski (2010b, 2) acknowledges that "historical works, such as Huebner's, give us the concepts and objects that enable dialogue while at the same time those objects and concepts give us the very horizon of intelligibility." One senses that this "horizon" is not a gift to be preserved and passed along to others entering the field, but instead a limitation to be overcome. Indeed, Malewski (2010c, 538) endorses "breakdowns in continuity." Why? Is not continuity exactly what is missing in the field in its "next moment"? "In the Jewish tradition," Mosès (2009 [1992], 146) points out, as "indeed in all civilizations, the texts themselves assume their meaning only through the teaching that reinterprets and updates them from one generation to the next." History guarantees discontinuity: the disciplinary obligation is to remember. Joining an ongoing conversation requires years of study to learn the vocabulary, to know what has been said already: what, when, why, and by whom. Entering such a conversation requires humility and courage. Interrupting it is a destructive act of arrogance. Curriculum studies in the United States will continue, but the "next moment" may turn out to be, in retrospect, a hiatus in its history, a moment of breakdown, not reconstruction.
4. Emphasizing skills—what students can "do" is the jargon of the day—represents an "ideological preference for standardization of

thinking and behavior" that produces, presumably, "the good citizen and competent worker" (Autio 2006a, 107). What "skills" produce are students who know nothing and do what they're told. After decades of such school "reform," can anyone be surprised—let alone shocked—that, as Sam Dillon (May 5, 2011, A21) reports, fewer than half of US eighth graders knew the point of the Bill of Rights when they were tested on a recent national civics examination? Even fewer "demonstrated acceptable knowledge" concerning the "checks and balances" among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of US government. Almost 75 percent of high school seniors who took the test were unable to name the effects of United States foreign policy on other nations or could identify a power granted to Congress by the Constitution. If tested, the "general public" would fare no better I suspect, but the point of this announcement is to provide new opportunities for ideologues and profiteers (intersecting categories in the United States). The former Supreme Court justice, Sandra Day O'Connor, is, presumably, not interested in profit, although rules for nonprofit salaries are not strict, and only examination of the tax returns of her nonprofit group—icivics.org—would settle that matter. Whatever her motive, O'Connor drew no connection to US school reform's contentless emphasis on "skills"—perhaps unsurprisingly, as icivics.org teaches students civics through Web-based games and other tools—when she sounded the alarm: "Today's NAE results confirm that we have a crisis on our hands when it comes to civics education" (quoted in Dillon May 5, 2011, A21). While O'Connor may be sincere (after all, it is distressing that Americans generally—not only students—are evidently ignorant of their government's structure and function), the rhetoric of "crisis" has long been used to demonize teachers and promote the agendas of politicians and their profiteering collaborators (Berliner and Biddle 1995).

5. These two figures have been important (if unequally) in the intellectual history of US curriculum studies, as the index of *Understanding Curriculum* (Pinar et al. 1995) reveals. While the lesser known figure in the field, Kierkegaard's emphasis upon inwardness has been important to me (1994, 7, 17, 41, 48, 73, 94, 219) and to Douglas McKnight (2009). On at least one occasion, James B. Macdonald (1995 , 179) quoted Kierkegaard to express the curricular significance of "the poetic practical interest in *meaning*."
6. Toews (2004, 10 n. 19) notes that Schelling's emphasis on "existential will" and "radical freedom"—emphases that distinguished his thinking from Hegel's—drew the attention of twentieth-century existentialist philosophers and theologians like Martin Heidegger, Paul Tillich, and Karl Jaspers. But such "inner freedom" had gone out of fashion by the 1960s, when structuralism, then post-structuralism, emphasized the epiphenomenal status of subjectivity and its incapacity for action in the world. While acknowledging the pervasiveness of

"governmentality" in global systems of surveillance and control, it is nonetheless time to reassert subjectivity's capacity for reconstructing the world it has created.

7. Toews (2004, 9 n. 18) discerns associations between Schelling's conceptions of the genesis of the "symbolic world of historical culture" from the "prehistoric, silent, and never fully conceptualizable realm of things in themselves" with Lacanian psychoanalytic theories concerning the origins of language, meaning, and culture.
8. While there are those who are skeptical that basic personality traits can shift sharply from one generation to the next (or from one culture to another), several researchers—relying on computer analysis of three decades of popular music—have found a "statistically significant" increase in "narcissism" and "hostility" (Tierney 2011, D1). Nathan DeWall, W. Keith Campbell, and Jean M. Twenge are among those psychologists who have found that "narcissism is increasingly prevalent among young people" (Tierney 2011, D2). Strangely, the article repeats in its title the misconception that narcissism is associated with vanity. Christopher Lasch (1984, 18) cites the common "confusion of narcissism with egoism and selfishness." Narcissism represents a "confusion of self and the not-self—not 'egoism'" (1984, 19). Lasch (1984, 19) continues: "The minimal or narcissistic self is, above all, a self uncertain of its own outlines, longing either to remake the world in its own image or to merge into its environment in blissful union." This blurring of self and society is intensifying, according to the research reported by Tierney. In a meta-analysis published last year in *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, Twenge and Joshua D. Foster examined data from nearly 50,000 students—including data provided by critics—and concluded that narcissism had "increased significantly" during the past three decades (roughly the years since the publication of Lasch's legendary study). During this period, there is evidence of increased frequency of reported "loneliness" and "depression," no surprise to these researchers (including Richard S. Pond of the University of Kentucky) who associate narcissism with "heightened anger" and troubled relationships (quoted passages in Tierney 2011, D2). Lasch understood all this over three decades ago. "Experiences of inner emptiness, loneliness, and inauthenticity," he (1978, 27) explained, linking psychology with economics, "arise from the dangers and uncertainty that surround us, and from a loss of confidence in the future. The poor have always had to live for the present, but now a desperate concern for personal survival, sometimes disguised as hedonism, engulfs the middle class as well." Accompanying these is "pervasive dissatisfaction with the quality of personal relations," leading some to advise against making "too large an investment in love and friendship, to avoid excessive dependence on others, and to live for the moment—the very conditions that created the crisis of personal relations in the first place" (1978, 27).

9. Instrumentalizing even sensible organizational schemes leads to disappointment, as it overpromises what organizations qua organizations can deliver. Consider the fate of the small-schools movement (Raywid and Schmerler 2003). "Many advocates of the original small schools movement," Maria Hantzopoulos (2009, 114) reports, " are now skeptical about the sudden exponential multiplication of small schools. They are particularly concerned about the way that newer small schools have focused solely on size while ignoring the elements of democratic participation inherent in the original movement." Add "democratic participation" and I suspect there will still be kids who won't learn what we teach them. Teach knowledge that is of most worth, not because students will necessarily recognize its value but because we are ethically obligated to offer it to them. Every day in every way engage students in their own learning but understand education cannot be forced. Authoritarianism installs stupidity.
10. Markus Gabriel insists that "nature" is itself a "historical concept" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 77).
11. The conditions of self-constitution can change through the education of the public, not only through political intervention. This same tension—between fact and freedom—existed in Kant, Tero Autio tells us, and for Kant the resolution was education. "The philosophical controversy between the determinate and free order of moral reality," Autio (2006a, 100) reports, "also shaped in some respect Kant's theory of education. Kant was firmly convinced that 'the greatest and most difficult problem to which man can devote himself is the problem of education'" (Kant, quoted in Autio 2006a, 100). In his history of *Bildung*, Biesta (2003, 62) quotes Kant's belief that humanity's "propensity and vocation to free thinking" can be realized only through education. Capable of independent judgment, the educated subject becomes an engaged participant in civil society, a citizen (see Peukert 2003, 105), but not narrowly nationalistic. Peukert (2003, 117) quotes Kant's affirmation that "the curriculum should be constructed in a cosmopolitan manner."
12. "What the project of *Bildung* essentially aims at," Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 76) asserts, "is not historically determined." Such education may not be historically determined, but it follows from Gur-Ze'ev's analysis of critical theory that it is decidedly historically attuned. While what Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 78) views as a first stage of critical theory construed the individual as dependent on social conditions, and his or her emancipation likewise dependent on shifts in the social totality, in the second stage "estrangement" and "alienation" enabled a negative freedom (2003, 84). As a consequence—and in contrast to Bruford's pessimism (see 2009 [1975], 264)—Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 92) concludes that the "realization of the inner imperative of the *Bildung* project is still possible." Negative freedom is noncoincidence.

13. Material conditions include psychic content, including "habits and learned behaviors" (Aboulafia 2010, 135). Material conditions can convey immanence, not only sedimentation, as in Dewey's notion of habit, "understood as an active and creative relation to the world" (Aboulafia 2010, 166 n. 3). "What makes habit so central," Zizek asserts, "is the temporality it involves: having a habit involves a relationship to future, since habit is a way which prescribes how I will react to some events in the future." Habit, he summarizes, is "the *actuality of a possibility*...a property (to react in a certain way) that I full possess here and now, and simultaneously a possibility pointing towards the future" (Gabriel and Zizek 2009, 103).
14. In our time, the 1960s was such a revolutionary period. While not to be idealized, the social upheaval of the 1960s did force many to fashion subjectively coherent lives in the service of social causes, prominent among them civil rights, women's rights, gay rights, and the American Indian Movement. I have suggested that the Great Repression—starting in 1968 with the election of Richard Nixon—is animated by a repudiation of this revolutionary period. While the moments are very different, their results are eerily similar to Kierkegaard's period: narcissism, presentism, subjective incoherence and a fascistic sociality congenially recast as "collaboration." Perhaps the term "collaborators" in the World War II sense conveys more carefully the complicity with the status quo collaboration too often compels. "The prevalent mode of social interaction today is antagonistic cooperation," Lasch (1978, 118) appreciated, "in which a cult of teamwork conceals the struggle for survival within bureaucratic organizations."
15. Capitalism flatlines time, as social processes condense into calculations of acquisition, accumulation, and assessment.
16. At this juncture, Toews (2004, 433) notes, Kierkegaard's and Marx's analysis diverged. After 1844, Toews notes, Marx emphasized historical conditions, losing faith that the transformation of human life could never occur through "actions" grounded in "individual ethical commitments." In contrast, Toews (2004, 433) continues, Kierkegaard became preoccupied with the "moment of actualization itself," wherein "individual ethical choice" and "commitment" were primary. For me, both domains are imperative, as I make explicit in my constant conjoining of subjective and social reconstruction.
17. Yet another resonance between European and US traditions is obvious in Wilhelm von Humboldt's understanding of how language is reconstructed through conversation, contingent, as conversation is, upon some measure of shared meanings, memory, and mutuality. Humboldt also appreciated, Charles Taylor (1989, 525 n. 12) has pointed out,

    > how the very nature of a conversation requires a recognition of individual speakers and their different perspectives. The

> speech situation cannot be thought of as built out of casually related monologues; but neither can it be thought of as the deployment of a super-subject or the unfolding of a structure. Common space is constituted by speakers who join their perspectives, and to this end speakers must remain ever at least tacitly aware of them.

This is a succinct summary of the "orality" complicated conversation requires.

18. As Humboldt wrote to Schiller: "Everyone must seek out his own individuality and purify it, ridding it of the fortuitous features. It will still be individuality, for a portion of the fortuitous is inseparable from the make-up of every individual, and cannot and should not be removed. It is really only in that way that character is possible, and through character greatness" (quoted in Bruford 2009 [1975], 13–14). Freedom requires such distillation, as it concentrates inner strength and resolve, integrating self-difference for the sake of self-mobilization.
19. Biesta (2003, 73) asks: "Is there a place for *Bildung* in a world where . . . there is no 'outside,' no safe haven from which we can oversee and judge reality, a world without generality?" Noncoincidence enables one to pose and answer the curriculum question—*what knowledge is of most worth*?—without positing an "outside" from which overseeing is possible. Being-in-the-world hardly obviates critique; it situates it. That to which *Bildung* aspires, Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 76) asserts, is "not historically determined." That acknowledgment does not position *Bildung* outside history. Indeed, Gur-Ze'ev (2003, 76) juxtaposes *Bildung* with critical theory, stressing their similarity: "Both traditions" reference the "openness" that is "immanent to life, to existence, or to Being, in its historical actualization." Exceeding material conditions and their determination of subjectivity and society is "central" (Gur-Ze'ev 2003, 77). The 1840s preoccupations of Kierkegaard and Marx remain with us today.
20. Today, Reichenbach (2003, 95) suggests, "processes of *Bildung* are perceived as processes of transformation with unknown outcomes, not as processes of perfection." In Todd's (2009) acknowledgment of imperfection and my (2009) affirmation of worldliness, an appreciation for "unknown outcomes" accompanies a cosmopolitan education.
21. The ongoing exploitation of the planet requires the ignorance—not the education—of the public. School reform supports commercialization through the curriculum, although individuals and groups fight to preserve what's left of the world we inhabit. Consider the case of coal. Three groups—Rethinking Schools, the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, and Friends of the Earth—have asked Scholastic Inc. to stop the distribution of fourth-grade curriculum materials that the American Coal Foundation paid Scholastic

to develop. The groups point out that Scholastic's "United States of Energy" package fails to inform children about coal's negative effects on the environment and human health (Lewin 2011, A17). Such academic-business partnerships—widely touted in university-based research—are unethical when they function to smuggle commercial self-interest into the civic sphere that is the school.

22. Communication is central. In Pantnagar, India, students of the Nagla elementary school are participating in an educational experiment encouraging them to compose their own stories and pursue independent projects. Fifth graders recently interviewed organizers of religious festivals, reporting what they learned to their classmates. In contrast to the educationally undermining efforts of Bill Gates in the United States (Dillon November, 2009), the project in Nagla and 1,500 other schools in this Indian state, Uttarakhand, are part of a five-year-old project to improve Indian primary education funded by one of the India's wealthiest men, Azim H. Premji, chairman of the information technology giant Wipro. Evidently the centrality of orality in study is not lost on those who work at Premji's Azim Premji Foundation, dedicated to changing how students are taught and tested at government schools (Bajaj 2011, B1).
23. Not only ancient Greek forms of orality are relevant to this point; indigenous oral traditions are as well (see Archibald 2008, 15, 20, 30, 31). Not only speaking but also listening is key (2008, 76). Storytelling remains, Jo-ann Archibald explains, an important "source of education and as a means to achieve emotional wellness" (2008, 84). "I have felt the story's energy and strength," Archibald (2008, 85) testifies, and "this energy is a source of power that feeds and revitalizes mind, heart, body, and spirit in a holistic manner." She summarizes: "Indigenous stories are at the core of our cultures. They have the power to make us think, feel, and be good human beings. They have the power to bring storied life back to us" (2008, 139).
24. One consequence of school deform is a decline in participation in science fairs. Science fairs are important educational occasions. Students not only show their parents, classmates, and the general public displays of their scientific inquiries but they engage in exchanges regarding those inquiries with nonspecialists and specialists as well. Amanda Alonzo, a science teacher at Lynbrook High School in San José, California, who advises science-fair students during her lunchtime and late evenings, reports: "I have so many standards I have to teach concept-wise. It takes time away from what I find most valuable, which is to have them inquire about the world" (Harmon 2011, A11). US education policy "holds schools accountable for math and reading scores at the expense of the kind of creative, independent exploration that science fair projects require" (Harmon 2011, A1). "To say that we need engineers and 'this is our Sputnik moment' is meaningless if we have no time to teach students how to do science,"

said Dean Gilbert, the president of the Los Angeles County Science Fair, referencing President Obama's 2011 State of the Union Address (quoted in Harmon 2011, A1). The Los Angeles Science Fair now has 185 schools participating, down from 244 a decade ago (Harmon 2011, A1).

25. Probably the central category of Franz Rosenzweig's thought, "redemption" did not denote the relationship between God and humanity, or between God and the world, but, as Mosès (2009 [1992], 49) explains, "the relationship of man to the world, the movement of human initiative that turns to reality to act on it." I am of course reminded of reconstruction, of reactivating the past in the present, so that, as Eric Santner (2006, 130) suggests, one might discern "in the present a new legibility of the past that in some sense redeems it. Such a sense of redemption is "sociopolitical," as LaCapra (2009, 5) reminds. "I see processes of working through problems," LaCapra (2009, 40 n. 8) explains, "as intimately related to the historical attempt to understand and overcome—or situationally (not totally or annihilating) 'transcend'—aspects of the past." Reactivating the past in the present in order to find the future contradicts the memorialization of victimhood in some forms of identity politics.

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